*1 Tankersley’s sen- enhanced court of district obstruction constitutes conduct or investigation not obstruct tence did “the offense whether justice to determine offense, rather of the instant prosecution with interference substantial result[s] in justice of and, so, the administration obstructed justice” the administration proceedings. the FTC civil respect to the sen- with direct Sentencing Guidelines at Therefore, government as conceded by sentence to enhance tencing court 2J1.2(b)(2). court’s basis for the district argument, oral § U.S.S.G. three levels. was erro- Tankersley’s sentence enhancing contends that further Tankersley this enhancement neous. We vacate himto be cannot apply this enhancement court to determine to the district remand in double engaged cause the district exist for enhanc- proper grounds whether same conduct considering the counting by pursuant to this Tankersley’s sentence ing as it considered to enhance his sentence Sentencing Guideline. contempt. Con criminal for punish him Tankersley’s argument, trary to III. Conclusion sentencing when counting occurs double reasons, Affirm in foregoing For the adjust upward more two or applies part in part, RemaND VACATE conduct. See the same ments based on opinion. consistent with proceedings 922, Parolin, 239 F.3d v. United States (7th Cir.2001); States v. United 928-29 Cir.1998).

Salyers, 160 F.3d case, convicted the district court

In this contempt because criminal

Tankersley of attempted yacht and he

he sold his this sale proceeds of

transfer the Then, the district sentencing

Bahamas. STATES, AND SOUTHEAST CENTRAL Tankersley’s sentence be court enhanced AREAS PENSION SOUTHWEST in resulted Tankersley’s conduct cause McDougall, FUND, Howard the adminis interference with substantial Trustee, Plaintiffs-Appellees, justice. tration of v. Obstructing the Administration C. LINES, INC., TRUCK HUNT Justice Defendant-Appellant. Tankersley contends Finally, No. 01-2558. enhancing his sen- district court’s basis obstructing the tence for administration of Appeals, United States Court § was errone- justice 3C1.1 under U.S.S.G. Circuit. Seventh court en- the district sentencing, ous. At because Tankersley’s sentence hanced 2002. Argued Jan. in- that he continued to violate found Decided storage

junction concealing assets certain infor- fading provide units and However, U.S.S.G. receiver.

mation to the the defen-

§ “unless 3C1.1 does or trial of investigation

dant obstructed 2J1.2, count.” U.S.S.G.

the obstruction which the n. 2. conduct upon

cmt. *2 Franczyk, (argued),

John J. Jr. Rose- mount, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee. original notice sent the Palles, Chica- Stromsta, Ravitz & Jon K. but that Hunt on McDougall. IL, for Howard go, motion for in its conceded McBride, & Baker Spognardi, Mark A. not withdraw that Wintz Aitken, II, H. Jr. Hervey Coles, Chicago, *3 20[, July or about until “on plan the from Aitken, Al- & Thiemann Taylor, (argued), in- have Hunt could not Because 1996].” Lines, Inc. Truck exandria, VA, Hunt ac- until Wintz withdrawal curred it was clear plan, the tually withdrew from KANNE, MANION, and Before original had sent States that Judges. Central WILLIAMS, Circuit months and one-half at least one demand KANNE, Judge. Circuit Judge liability. any incurred Hunt before although that Lines, Nordberg then held Inc. with- 1994, Hunt Truck In pay- interim regarding provision MPPAA from Central drew broad, did not allow Fund was it Pension ments Areas and Southwest after Hunt States”). until payments (“Central Usually, to seek States Therefore, liability. liability on Hunt’s withdrawal incurred withdrawal give rise to summary judg- Nordberg granted Pension Multiemployer Judge part under 1980, Hunt, finding Act of U.S.C. that ment in favor Plan Amendments “MPPAA”). However, (the statutory comply with the failed to §§ 1381-1461 States another to MPPAA. its assets of the prerequisites sold because Hunt Inc., Drivers, Hunt Parcel Wintz company, liability provided withdrawal not face did Proceedings B. Arbitration to payments to make

that continued Wintz 1996, 20, initiated Hunt On December 1996, subsid- one of Wintz’s the fund. liability as- of the arbitration withdrawal with- triggering bankrupt, iaries went 1401, to 29 pursuant U.S.C. sessment Initially, part. liability on Wintz’s drawal to arbi- assigned was arbitration and the de- to Wintz a notice sent Central States June trator Ira F. Jaffe. On making installment begin manding that had also concluded Hunt arbitrator liability, but on the withdrawal payments in- an issued prematurely been billed permitted default That defaulted. Wintz af- containing the terim arbitration award secondary pursue to Central States to directing Central States order firmative payments. liability for the withdrawal demand, noting a re- a revised issue “starting to preferred Nordberg vised demand Proceedings A. before anew.” process sent 31, 1996, May On begin demanding a Hunt notice 1, 1998, arbitra- pursuant On its on withdraw- making interim award, issued tor’s interim and Cen- pay, liability. Hunt refused al for With- Notice Demand a revised seeking interim brought suit tral States seeking pay- Hunt Liability against case was and the payments, withdrawal November from from ments Nordberg. A. John assigned 1, 1999. On October until final to a converted cases, the interim award was a district Although in most parties. by stipulation of allowing pen- award an routinely order grants award, final arbitration payments, interim to obtain plan sion actually make Hunt to require specifically exception be an proved I Rather, it sole- payments. any I, Nordberg noted withdrawal rule. In Hunt ly ordered Central States to issue the early re- as May 3” and held that Central vised demand. bound by its admission before the district court and thus the date of Proceedings

C. Judge Shadur before was not legitimately in dispute. 15,1998, On October Central States filed See id. We further concluded that suit seeking to enforce the arbitration MPPAA, pension fund was not award, assigned case was permitted to issue a notice and'demand for Milton Shadur. Central complaint until after employ- sought to affirm and enforce the arbitra- er incurred such liability. See id. Be- tor’s final award to enter cause Wintz had not withdrawn at the time against Hunt in accordance therewith. On Central States issued the original demand *4 8, 1999, April Judge Shadur judg- entered Hunt, we held that Central States’ fail- ment enforcing the final award. April On comply ure to procedural with this require- 26, 1999, 59(e) States filed a Central Rule ment meant that Central States could not motion to judgment, amend seeking to payments collect interim May on the based amend judgment provide for mone- 31,1996 notice. See id. because, tary above, relief as noted arbitration’s provide award did not for In affirming Judge rulings, Shadur’s we payments. Judge Shadur de- noted that Arbitrator “Jaffe’s sole affirma- motion, nied the noting power that his was tive order was that Central States issue determining limited to whether the arbi- demand,” and that Judge Shadur was time, trator’s was decision correct. At no 59(e) deny correct to Central States’ Rule Judge Shadur on rule court, motion. Writing for the Judge Ev- ultimate issue of whether Hunt liable ans by concluded stating that for the withdrawal under the MPPAA or absolutely that, [W]e wish make clear on happen what would Hunt refused to while Central States cannot recover on make under the revised demand.

this our appeal, pre- decision does not D. Prior fact, Our Decision clude recovery. future ap- pears certain that Central States will 6, 1999, On appealed Hunt Judge (and should) receive the full withdrawal Shadur’s judgment enforcing the final fee to which it is entitled. perAs arbi- award. On June award, trator Jaffe’s the fund has issued moved to appeal Judge consolidate its of a renewed demand. Central Nordberg’s decision with its of appeal appears States to be impres- under the Shadur’s of denial Central sion States’ motion that either judgment, Nordberg’s to amend or and we issued an ordered consolidating Shadur’s opinions preclude it appeals. collecting from on this demand. second This judges’ is the case. Since both appeal, On this court affirmed low both rulings solely focused on pri- the fund’s States, er courts. See Cent. Southeast and or, (Indeed, premature demand. Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Hunt already complying.) should be If Hunt Lines, Inc., (7th Truck Cir.2000) demand, fails (“Hunt ”). pay on this Central I regard With appeal merely States need file decision, of under the Nordberg’s suit rejected Central States’ effort MPPAA’s enforcement argue scheme to ensure that “on or about 20” could mean “as that it receives interim payments. Analysis I. Id. at 743.* grant review We Present Suit E. The novo, the facts viewing all of judgment de dictate, States Following our inferences drawing all reasonable Hunt for collection against filed suit nonmoving party. of the in favor therefrom with- complete for and Southwest See Cent. assigned Hunt, case was and the White, 258 F.3d v. Pension Fund Areas our Ignoring A. Judge Ronald Guzman. Cir.2001). (7th prior Because the judgments prior statement on a in federal court brought litigation was collect- from preclude” “not judi- claim, rule of res the federal federal demand, ar- the renewed ing under ap judicata res whether cata determines judicata res gued action. See In present plies to the responded action. Central Inc., 814 F.2d Energy Co-op., Matter determine first to was the suit Cir.1987). three re revised ultimate under res federal summary judg- quirements Hunt moved demand. (1) parties of the or identity case an present law are: ment, contending that alternative, (2) or, of the causes identity an privies; their *5 (3) recovery. actions; judgment on the a bar final laches should and argu- summary judgment dispute no that There is moved merits. id. See alia, Rather, did not judicata res ing, inter the first element satisfied. in stated explicitly had remaining apply because whether the dispute parties the action would subsequent that a Hunt I have been satisfied. two elements failure to Hunt’s and because be revised demand that both the

make record The shows wrong. a new and ac Nordberg constituted the before action Shadur, our as well as tion before argu- rejected Hunt’s court The district I, proce the in Hunt concerned decision in judgment granted ment and original propriety dural States, denying while favor of Central to directive Arbitrator Jaffe’s demand The district cross-motion. Hunt’s demand notice. revise the date the judgments prior the noted that initialiy has ad Thus, action ever no previous issues procedural the various involved ultimate under Hunt’s dressed demand the revised “not collection under Further, party neither revised demand. disregard payments Hunt choose should subject of the arbitration disputes that demand.” to the revised pursuant only 31,1996 original demand was the failure held court then district a where concern scenario and did not constituted demand revised pay under pursuant disregard payment chose to judica- res was not wrong and thus a new Therefore, we con demand. the revised on its resting solely appeals, ta. Hunt pay- to make Hunt’s failure clude that judicata. claim is res argument this * fees, Fund v. Hunt Truck Pension attorney's Southwest Areas sought Subsequently, Hunt Cir.2001) Lines, Inc., 1006 court. by the district were awarded which II"). (‘ holding, Di However, so the district appeal, we held that on ‘Hunt court, Wood, again writing in awarding ane discretion in had abused its liabil pay for dispute structed Hunt no attorney's there was fees because so. failure to do ity questioned Hunt's ultimately face that Hunt See id. liability. See Cent. operate ments under the revised demand is a new to bar the subsequent suit.” See Energy wrong Co-op., and thus the causes of action are 814 F.2d at 1233. not identical. I, In Hunt we specifically held that “[w]hile States cannot recover on Moreover, judgment a final on the appeal our preclude decision does not merits of ultimate liability under future recovery,” and that if Hunt failed to the revised demand is also absent. As demand, pay on the revised noted, succinctly Guzman “[t]he merely needed to file suit under prior thrust of the decisions the district MPPAA’s enforcement scheme to ensure court and the Seventh Circuit was that that it received the appropriate payments. original Central States’ demand for with added). 204 F.3d at (emphasis There- premature and wheth fore, even we were to assume that the appropriate er the method to cure this claims were identical and that judg- a final defect could in fact be revised demand entered, ment on the merits had been rather than procedural rescission. The judicata would not due to our ex- premature ramifications of Central States’ press language in I. D See & K separate notice is and distinct from the 260; Prop., F.3d at Energy Co-op., 814 substantive merits of the final withdrawal F.2d at 1233. liability assessment.” II. Conclusion Furthermore, Hunt’s contention reasons, For the foregoing we Affirm present suit is res also of the district court. fails generally accepted because “[u]nder doctrine, exception the res a MANION, Judge, Circuit *6 concurring. litigant’s precluded claims are not if the only reason res does not in an earlier expressly action re (albeit apply here is because of this court’s litigant’s right bring serves the those panel) different express language in claims in D Prop. a later action.” & K declaring Hunt I that the decision would Crystal Lake v. Mutual Ins. Co. Life of not future preclude recovery. When arbi- York, (7th Cir.1997) New 112 F.3d eventually trator Jaffe issued his final Intern, (quoting Apparel Art Inc. v. Amer requirement award did not include a Ltd., (1st Enter. tex Cir. payments, make the withdrawal 1995)). The Second Restatement spe also Central States could and should have cifically addresses the issue at hand and brought modify a suit to the award rather provides § general that “the rule of 1401(b) than simply enforce it. Section claim, does not extinguish permits options. ERISA both Under part or all of the claim possi subsists as a circumstances, other fail- plain ble basis for a second action modify preclude ure to sue to its against tiff the defendant [when] [t]he current suit to collect the withdrawal lia- court in the expressly first action has re bility judicata. under the doctrine of res served the plaintiffs right to maintain the declaration I’s that Central States is ” (Second) second .... action Restatement created law for this case 26(b)(1) (1982). Indeed, Judgments applicable that would not be otherwise. previously

we have held that “[i]f reserves for later resolution an issue that

might adjudicated otherwise have been proceeding,

the initial will not