70 Ga. 533 | Ga. | 1883
The defendants in error brought their separate actions in the superior court of Bibb county against the plaintiff in error, in which each alleged that he made a contract with the defendant (the plaintiff in error), that for and in consideration of the sum of thirty-five 55-100 dollars, it would transport the |)laintiff from the city of Macon, Georgia, to the city of Galveston, Texas; that he paid said amount to defendant, and that defendant issued and delivered to plaintiff a ticket, with certain coupons attached ; that plaintiff travelled and was transported on said ticket as far as the city of New Orleans; that part of the ticket so purchased was over the Morgan line from New Orleans to Galveston; that he left the city of Macon on the 20th of August, 1879, and followed the directions given him by defendant, reaching New Orleans on the 21st of August, 1879, and there the defendant failed and refused to carry him farther on his journey, and the Morgan line failed and refused to carry plaintiff from New Orleans to Galveston. And it was further averred that there was no steamer running on the Morgan line from New Orleans, and had not been for a long time before the issuing of said ticket and the making of the contract, and that fact defendant knew before it sold the ticket. These are all the allegations in the declaration material to be considered by this court.
The defendant in the court below and plaintiff in error in this court filed a plea of the general issue.
The plaintiff, Combs, was sworn as a witness in behalf of plaintiffs, and he testified that he wanted to go to Texas for the purpose of buying ponies or horses, in the summer
The plaintiffs introduced in evidence two coupons of tickets from New Orleans to Galveston, copy of which is as follows :
“Central Railroad of Georgia. First Class. Galveston, Texas, via C. of G., C. & W., W. of A., L. & N., T. M. L. T. Co. Issued bythe Central Railroad of Georgia. Good for one first-class passage to Galveston, Texas, when officially stamped, and subject to the following contract: 1 st. In selling this ticket, this company acts as agent, and is not responsible beyond its own line,” etc.
Stamped on the back of each ticket and coupon :
“Central Railroad of Georgia. S. C. Hoge, agent. August 20, 1879.”
The defendant introduced S. C. Hoge, who was sworn, and he testified that he was the agent of the Central Railroad at Macon; sold two tickets in August, 1879, to two men, who said they wanted to go to San Antonio, Texas, by way of Galveston; did not know whether plaintiff' was one of the mien, but these are the tickets which he sold; recognizes the stamps and remembers the date on them; it was in August, 1879. They asked witness if he could sell them tickets by Memphis to Galveston; he informed them he could not, as there was yellow fever there; the place was quarantined, and we had been notified to take the tickets off sale. ,He then asked witness if there was any other route they could get tickets, so as to go through on same tickets. Witness replied that he could sell them tickets through New Orleans, blit he did not know whether they could get through or not, on account of the yellow fever being there. Witness knew that the yellow fever was there as well as at Memphis. Witness told them that he had not been notified to take the tickets off sale by that route, and, therefore, he had to sell them the tickets; but he did not tell them they could go through on the tickets; simply told them he was doubtful about it. Some
Major N. T. Shellman was introduced and sworn as a witness for defendant, and he testified that he was the general agent of the Central Railroad at Macon, in 1879; he remembered the plaintiff coming to him to take up the coupons of the two tickets, and to reimburse them for their expenses in going and returning from New Orleans, as they had not been enabled to go further on account of the Morgan line of steamers being quarantined or stopped by the prevalence of yellow fever at New Orleans. Witness refused to pay them, and referred the matter to Mr. Smith, who had charge of the passenger business of the road.
A letter was received from Mr. Smith, and it was read to Combs, who seemed to be acting for himself and Richards. Witness proposed to pay twenty-five 50-100 dollars for the unused portion of the tickets, not because the road was bound, but in order to settle the matter. Combs refused to settle, and the suit was brought.
This is all the testimony submitted by the parties in this case, and as the cases of Combs and Richards were the same in all respects, by consent of the parties, the two cases were tried together, and a verdict was rendered in each case for the sum of one hundred and thirty-nine 55-100 dollars.
The defendant moved for a new trial on several grounds.
• (1.) Because the court erred in charging the jury, “If you believe that, at the time the contract was made, these men were notified that they could not get through New Orleans to Galveston, and they agreed to take the risk to see whether they could go throrigh or not, then they are not entitled to recover. It is for you to say whether that was the contract or not. If the agent of the railroad simply expressed a doubt as to their getting through, and they did not agree to take the risk, then the railroad is still liable for the actual damages, whatever they may be.
(3.) Because the jury found contrary to the following charge: “ If you believe these men made this contract with the railroad company, or its agents in Macon, for the sale of tickets, and they agreed to transport them from Macon to Galveston, then the railroad is bound to do so, unless from providential cause or something of that sort, and if they did not do it, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the actual damage which they have sustained by reason of the railroad company not having complied writh its part of the contract.”
(4.) Because the jury found contrary to the evidence and against the weight of evidence.
(5.) Because the jury found contrary to law and the equity and justice of the case.
The court overruled the rnotidn for a new trial, and error to this court is assigned upon exceptions to this ruling.
It may be very safely assumed from these decisions that the law of this state is that, when a railroad company issues and sells a ticket over its own lines of road, and over the lines of other roads to ' a point designated, such company is liable to the passenger thus purchasing such ticket, who checks his baggage through on the line indicated in the ticket, for the safe and secure carriage and transportation of such baggage. And if the railroad company would be liable for the safe and secure transportation of the baggage of a passenger, which is but a convenience and incident of the passenger, it cannot be very readily perceived, why such company should not be liable for the safe and secure carriage and transportation of the passenger himself. Why is the company thus contracting, liable for the transportation of the passenger’s baggage ? Is it not because such is the undertaking of such company?
In the case of Illinois C. R. R. vs. Copeland, 24 Ill., 338, the Supreme Court of that state say this: “We hold the ticket and the check given by this company, and. produced in evidence, imply a special undertaking to carry the passenger to St. Louis, via the Terre Haute and Alton Railroad, and his baggage also. The ticket is what is known as a through ticket, and the check denotes that the baggage is checked from Chicago to St. Louis, and both inform the passenger that the.Illinois Central has running
Judgment reversed.