86 Pa. 427 | Pa. | 1878
delivered the opinion of the court,
The plaintiff below brought an action of debt to recover the penalty of $500 under the first section of the Act of 22d March 1867, Pamph. L. 38, for excluding him from a particular car of the defendant corporation. It was alleged by the plaintiff, that himself and wife were prevented from entering one of the passenger cars of the defendant, at Wilkesbarre, on the 26th of December 1873, by one of the employees of .the company, and compelled to take another passenger car of the same train in order to proceed to their home,
If this were an action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries, occasioned by the act of the company’s servant, the reasoning of the learned judge would not be inaccurate. In such case a verdict in favor of the wife for injuries sustained by her, would be no answer to a suit by the husband for injuries sustained by him. It was not an action for damages at all. It is not even contended that any damages were sustained. The action is for the penalty imposed by the legislature upon railroad companies, who should compel colored persons to ride in a particular car. The object of the act was to punish such corporations for making such distinction. The exclusion of the plaintiff and his wife, was a single act, done at the same time and by the same person. To punish the company twice for the same act, would be unreasonable, and against the spirit and meaning of the Act of Assembly. This is plain from an examination of the second section, which provides : “That any agent, conductor or employee, of any railroad or railway corporation within this Commonwealth, who shall exclude, allow to be excluded, or assist in the exclusion from any of their cars set apart for the accommodation of passengers, any person or persons, on account of color or race, or who shall refuse to carry such person or persons on account of color or race, or who shall throw any car or cars from the track,* thereby preventing persons from riding, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,” &c. Thus we have two sections relating to this subject, the first imposing a penalty of $500 upon any company which shall exclude any person or persons by reason of color or race from any particular car, or which shall allow it to be done by any agent, conductor or employee, and the second punishing by fine and imprisonment, any agent, conductor or employee who shall be guilty of such act. It certainly could not be seriously contended that the employee by whom the plaintiff and his wife were excluded, could be twice prosecuted and convicted under the second section. It was a single act, and when once punished according to law, he could not be punished again.
Judgment reversed.