724 N.E.2d 458 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1998
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On March 26, 1997, the Central Ohio Transit Authority ("COTA") filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against John W. Timson. COTA averred that Timson had engaged in habitual and persistent vexatious conduct against COTA in the previous four years and that Timson was a vexatious litigator as defined in R.C.
Timson filed an answer, a counterclaim, and a motion to dismiss. Timson's counterclaim alleged negligence and intentional infliction of "mental anguish." On June 6, 1997, the trial court denied Timson's motion to dismiss.
On December 23, 1997, COTA filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was undisputed that Timson was a vexatious litigator under R.C.
On March 5, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, concluding Timson was a vexatious litigator and granting COTA's motion for summary judgment. A judgment entry was journalized on April 3, 1998.
Timson has appealed to this court, assigning the following errors for our consideration: *46
"Assignment of Error No. I
"The court of Judge Johnson erred in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under OH Civ Rule 12(B) by reason section
"Assignment of Error No. II
"The court of Judge Johnson erred in granting a summary judgment to COTA and denying appealants [sic] memo contra summary judgment in violation of the due process provisions of the Fourtteenth [sic] Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
As a threshold matter, we address the issue of whether there exists a final, appealable order.1 As noted above, appellant asserted a counterclaim against COTA alleging, essentially, negligence. COTA filed an answer to the counterclaim asserting as one defense that appellant was a vexatious litigator. In its motion for summary judgment, however, COTA addressed only its claim that appellant was a vexatious litigator. Likewise, the trial court's decision and judgment entry only addressed COTA's claim under the vexatious litigator statute.
Civ.R. 54(B) states that in the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, an order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims does not terminate the action as to any of the claims. R.C.
In Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989),
We now turn to the merits of the appeal. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Appellant asserts that his motion to dismiss should have been granted because (1) the complaint was not signed by appellee's chief legal officer, (2) appellee was not a party authorized to bring a suit under R.C.
Appellee is correct that appellant did not raise the issues regarding the signing of the complaint and proper party below. However, R.C.
"(B) A person, the office of the attorney general, or a prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chieflegal officer of a municipal corporation who has defended against habitual and persistent vexatious conduct in the court of claims or in a court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court may commence a civil action in a court of common pleas with jurisdiction over the person who allegedly engaged in the habitual and persistent vexatious conduct to have that person declared a vexatious litigator. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
We note first that the record before us indicates that the complaint was signed by appellee's chief legal officer, Robert E. Tanner, Jr. More important, however, appellee is a party authorized to bring a suit under R.C.
We now turn to appellant's contention regarding the constitutionality of R.C.
Substitute House Bill No. 570 ("Sub. H.B. No. 570"), passed into law on November 14, 1996, and codified at R.C.
Pertinent portions of R.C.
"(A) As used in this section:
"(1) `Conduct' has the same meaning as in section
"(2) `Vexatious conduct' means conduct of a party in a civil action that satisfies any of the following:
"(a) The conduct obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action.
"(b) The conduct is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
"(c) The conduct is imposed solely for delay.
"(3) `Vexatious litigator' means any person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions, whether in the court of claims or in a court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court, whether the person or another person instituted the civil action or actions, and whether the vexatious conduct was against the same party or against different parties in the civil action or actions. `Vexatious litigator' does not include a person who is authorized to practice law in the courts of this state under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio unless that person is representing or has represented self pro se in the civil action or actions. *49
"* * *
"(E) An order that is entered under division (D)(1) of this section shall remain in force indefinitely unless the order provides for its expiration after a specified period of time."
Pursuant to R.C.
Appellant contends that R.C.
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
Section
In determining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, this court adheres to the principle that all such enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutional validity. Id. at 274,
The purpose of the vexatious litigator statute is clear. It seeks to prevent abuse of the system by those persons who persistently and habitually file lawsuits without reasonable grounds and/or otherwise engage in frivolous conduct in the trial courts of this state. Such conduct clogs the court dockets, results in increased costs, and oftentimes is a waste of judicial resources — resources that are supported by the taxpayers of this state. The unreasonable burden placed upon courts by such baseless litigation prevents the speedy consideration of proper litigation.
The vexatious litigator statute bears a real and substantial relation to the general public welfare because its provisions allow for the preclusion of groundless suits filed by those who have a history of vexatious conduct. In addition, the statute is not unreasonable or arbitrary: It applies only to persons who have habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds engaged in conduct that serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party, is not warranted under existing law, and cannot be supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and/or is imposed solely for delay.
As for the specific constitutional provision at issue herein, Section 16, Article I, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that when the Ohio Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner. Burgess v. Eli Lilly Co. (1993),
A similar statute has been upheld in California upon similar grounds. In 1963, California adopted a vexatious litigant statute (Stats. 1963, Ch. 1471, Sec. 1). Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1965),
In Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank (1997),
The court went on to note that the right to petition has never been absolute and it does not confer the right to clog the court system and impair everyone else's right to seek justice. Id. at 703,
The analysis above applies, in essence, to the case at bar and in the context of Section
Given the above, we find that the bulk of the vexatious litigator statute is constitutional under Section
"During the period of time that the order entered under division (D)(1) of this section is in force, no appeal by the person who is the subject of that order shall lie from a decision of the court of common pleas under division (F) of this section that denies that person leave for the institution or continuance of, or the making of an application in, legal proceedings in the court of claims or in a court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court."
In Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. (1988),
In Moldovan the Supreme Court cited Section
In Moldovan, the failure to give reasonable notice of a final, appealable order was found to be a denial of the right to legal redress of injuries created by Section
As discussed above, the requirement in R.C.
Here, R.C.
In summary, we find that R.C.
In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. As indicated above, appellee's motion for summary judgment was based solely on whether appellant met the definition of a vexatious litigator found in R.C.
In order to grant summary judgment, the court must be satisfied, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the party opposing the motion. Tokles Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (1992),
In order for summary judgment to be granted in this case, there must be no genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellant habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions in a court of common pleas, a municipal court, the Court of Claims and/or a county court. See R.C.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, appellee submitted that the affidavit of its counsel, Laurence E. Sturtz; appellee's first request for admissions to appellant; a list of cases filed by appellant; and excerpts from various court decisions, orders, and entries that include, among other things, statements that appellant's actions were frivolous. In his affidavit, Sturtz stated that the list of cases represented a true and accurate summary of cases filed by appellant in Franklin County. Sturtz also indicated that appellant had filed over sixty state and federal lawsuits in this county and district since the early 1970s. Indeed, the list of cases attached to appellee's motion for summary judgment show that appellant has filed sixty-two lawsuits in Franklin County and federal court since 1973. However, as appellant has pointed out in his brief, the vexatious litigator statute applies only to conduct occurring on or after the effective date of the Act. Section 3 of Sub. H.B. No. 570, uncodified, states:
"* * * [S]ection
In addition, R.C.
Of the sixty-two cases listed in the attachment to, the motion for summary judgment, only four can arguably involve conduct occurring on or after March 18, 1997 in an applicable court. These cases have 1997 case numbers. In addition, appellee's complaint lists a case appellant filed against appellee on March 18, 1997. It is unclear to this court whether that case is the same case listed in appellee's table of cases. Even if we assume that these cases encompass conduct occurring on or after March 18, 1997, that would not make appellant a vexatious litigator under the definition in the statute. The conduct must be habitual and persistent. The four or five cases listed and the alleged conduct do not amount to habitual and persistent conduct.
In addition, appellee's descriptions and the status of those cases do not sufficiently show that appellant's conduct was of the type listed in *55
R.C.
We note further that the excerpts from various court decisions and orders attached to the motion for summary judgment involve either federal cases or conduct occurring in cases that date prior to the effective date of the Act. Hence, they cannot be used as evidence to support a finding that appellant is a vexatious litigator.
Appellee contends that appellant admitted he was a vexatious litigator by virtue of the fact that appellant failed to timely respond to appellee's request for admissions. On November 12, 1997, appellee filed a notice of service of a first request for admissions, stating that appellant was served such request by mail on November 11, 1997. In the request, appellee stated that the answers were due twenty-eight days after service of the request. Appellant filed his answers to that request on December 17, 1997.5
Civ.R. 36(A) states:
"(A) Request for Admission. A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(B) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact * *
"* * * The matter is admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight days after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney. * * * "
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the failure of appellant to timely return the request for admissions did not result in appellant admitting he is a vexatious litigator under the statute. *56
The request included an admission that appellant was a vexatious litigator "* * * in that [appellant has] habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct by bringing over sixty frivolous civil actions against various parties in the State of Ohio, Franklin County." Even if this were deemed admitted, it does not follow that appellant admitted he was a vexatious litigator under thestatute. As previously discussed, the statute applies only to conduct occurring on or after March 18, 1997. The request does not give dates of the alleged sixty frivolous actions, but given appellee's table of cases submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment, we can assume that the majority of such cases included conduct occurring prior to the date the statute became effective.
The same analysis applies to related and similar requests for admission. In addition, admissions that do not necessarily attach a figure or date to them (such as Request for Admission No. 6 that states that appellant has continuously abused the court system and judicial process, or Requests for Admission Nos. 8 and 9 that state that appellant has engaged in vexatious conduct, appellant is a vexatious litigator, and appellant should be prohibited from continuing any legal proceeding without obtaining leave of court) do not, even if deemed admitted, amount to conduct that leads this court to conclude that there is no genuine issue as to whether appellant is a vexatious litigator. It should be noted that the appellant submitted his answers on December 17, 1997. Therefore, any conduct appellant could have admitted to that falls under the statute would have been conduct occurring between March 18, 1997 and December 17, 1997 — merely nine months of conduct. This does not, as a matter of law, equal habitual and persistent conduct.
In addition, Civ.R. 36(A) states that a party may serve requests for the admission of the truth of any matter within the scope of Civ.R. 26(B) that relates to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact. Requests for Admission Nos. 8 and 9 are purely legal conclusions that are arguably beyond the scope of Civ.R. 36(A). Even if we assume that the requests related to the application of law to fact, the facts appellee refers to (clearly "facts" that include conduct occurring prior to March 18, 1997) are, as discussed above, insufficient to make summary judgment appropriate.
Given the above, appellee failed to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellant was a vexatious litigator under R.C.
In summary, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled in part and as discussed above, and appellant's first assignment of error is sustained in part and discussed above. Appellant's second assignment of error is sustained. The judgement of the Franklin County Court of Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, adn this cause is remanded for further proceedings comsistent with law and this opinion.
PEGGY BRYANT and McCORMAC, JJ., concur.
JOHN W. McCORMAC, J. retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, was assigned to active duty under authority of Sections
"(a) The filing of a civil action, the assertion of a claim, defense, or other position in connection with a civil action, filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in a civil action, including, but not limited to, a motion or paper filed for discovery purposes, or the taking of any other action in connection with a civil action;
"(b) The filing by an inmate of a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee, the assertion of a claim, defense or other position in connection with a civil action of that nature or the assertion of issues of law in an appeal of that nature, or the taking of any other action in connection with a civil action or appeal of that nature."
"If a person who has been found to be a vexatious litigator under this section requests the court of common pleas that entered an order under division (D)(1) of this section to grant the person leave to proceed as described in this division, the period of time commencing with the filing with that court of an application for the issuance of an order granting leave to proceed and ending with the issuance of an order of that nature shall not be computed as a part of an applicable period of limitations within which the legal proceedings or application involved generally must be instituted or made."
