80 Va. 110 | Va. | 1885
delivered the. opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court of the city of Richmond. The facts of this case are few, and the. principles of law applicable" thereto well settled. Pursuant to an act of the legislature, approved March 6th, 1882, and amended and reenacted the same day (Acts 1881-T2, p. 246, ct acq.), the plaintiffs in error, on the 22d day of August, 1882, directed the president of the hoard to make, proper advertisement for bids for the erection of a new asylum building. Advertisement was duly made, and at a subsequent meeting of the
The articles of agreement and specifications contained in full the terms of the contract between the parties, and it appears
'But- it would seem that the board was not yet satisfied; and, accordingly, at a meeting held on the 19th January, it was resolved that Madison Flanagan be dismissed from the work, and that advertisement be made for new bids. It is true there was oral testimony that the resolution was erroneously entered by the secretary. For the board it was contended that this action was in consequence of the failure of Flanagan to furnish bond and security according to the requirements of the board. But, in the view we take of the case, the result is the same.
In consequence of this termination of the relations between the parties the present suit was brought, in which the plaintiff claims damages to the amount of $25,000. The case was fully heard, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for §6,159.50. .
At the trial the defendants asked for thirteen instructions, all of which were refused, and in the petition to this court there are no less than sixteen errors assigned, with an intimation of “ other errors to be assigned at bar.”
It is wholly unnecessary to consider these various assignments in detail. The general principles applicable to them all will he stated, and by which the judgment must he controlled.
It is insisted, first, that the circuit court erred in refusing to require the plaintiff, on the defendant’s motion, to file a bill of particulars. It appears that the motion was denied at the term at which it was made, but at the next term, and before trial, the plaintiff* appeared and filed a bill, in which the items of his claim were fully and clearly set out. Thereupon, if the defendants desired time for the preparation of their defence, an application to the circuit- court for a postponement of the trial ought to have been made. And as no such application was there made, the objection now raised here cannot avail.
There can be no reasonable doubt that, upon the acceptance of the plaintiff’s bonds, and the spreading upon the minutes of
In the present case the first bond was signed by the contractor, and was in a penalty of §20,000, as required by the statute, and the second and third were intended simply to strengthen the security of that bond. And that they were valid
The recprirements of the statute in respect to taking bond were, therefore, fully complied with, and the court properly instructed the jury as follows : “ If the jury believe that, after the action of the board of the asylum of October 30th and October 31st, 1882, in accepting the bonds of the plaintiff and in prescribing the form of contract, the plaintiff’ was furnished with a. written contract in such form, and that he executed it by his own signature and delivery to the president of the board, then it became the duty of the president to execute it on behalf of the board, and his failure to do so could not deprive the plaintiff of any rights under the contract, and if thereafter, without any fairlt on the part of the plaintiff', the defendants prohibited or prevented him from fulfilling the contract, they should find for the plaintiff.”
Nor did the court err in instructing the jury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, they should allow' a reasonable sum for work and labor-done, money expended in the performance of the contract, and materials furnished, and, in addition, an equivalent sum for the profits which he would have realized from the performance of the contract if he had been permitted to execute it. This was entirely right. The subject has been recently considered by this court, in the case of The Commissioners of the Sinking Fund v. The Kendall Bank-Note Company, 79 Va., 563, in which, after a review of the authorities by Judge Lacy, who delivered the opinion, the law was declared to be as stated to the jury by the circuit court.
By these instructions the law of the case was fully and correctly propounded to the jury, and, upon the evidence, we are of opinion that the verdict is right and ought not to be disturbed. It is -well settled that when instructions are given ■which cover the entire case, and which properly submit the-
What has been said sufficiently disposes of the several assignments of error in the petition, and requires an affirmance •of the judgment of the circuit court.
Judgment affirmed.