144 Ga. 130 | Ga. | 1915
(After stating the foregoing facts.) This case was before the Supreme Court on exceptions to the ruling of the trial court upon a demurrer. 141 Ga. 186 (80 S. E. 642). Several of the grounds of the motion for a new trial were expressly abandoned in the brief. Some of the others were palpably without merit, and require no discussion.
In 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 710, it is said: “When part of a tract is taken, the damages are not limited to such as result from the, mere severance of title caused by the taking, but include damages caused by the use of the property for the .purpose for which the condemnation is made. Such use embraces the construction of the work or improvement, and the maintenance, use, and operation of the same. Thus in a railroad case it was held proper to consider ‘all incidental loss, inconvenience, and damages, present and prospective, which may be known or may reasonably be expected to result from the construction and operation of the road in a legal and proper manner.’ ” In section 714
No ruling was here made in regard to the provision of our constitution to the effect that private property shall not be taken or damaged without just and adequate compensation being first paid ;■ and no discussion thereof is required.
Where, instead of condemning the land belonging to the plaintiff and others, the defendant obtained from them a conveyance con
, It is true that general words are employed in the release, but they must be considered in connection with the other parts of the conveyance, which is to be looked to as a whole. There is nothing .to show an intention to include a release from damages arising from negligence; and the construction above stated is the proper one to be placed upon the instrument.
A release is to be construed according to the intent of the parties. Surrounding circumstances are admissible to explain an ambiguity. General words of release accompanying particular recitals are to be construed in connection with such recitals, so as to give effect to the intent exhibited by the instrument as a whole. See, in this connection, 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 290-294, and citations. Sometimes the expression has been used that certain damages were or were not in contemplation of the parties; and the trial court in this case submitted to the jury to determine whether the damages claimed in the present suit were or were not in the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed. We do not think that this form of instruction was well adapted to the case, or an apt method of expression. Parties may execute an instrument which will-release all claims of every character, although they may hot have in special contemplation a particular claim or item of damages. But under the construction which has been given above to the words of release included in the conveyance here involved, it is not necessary to discuss further what might be the best mode of submitting to the jury the question of intent in a proper case.
From what has been said a reversal of the judgment must be
Judgment reversed.