¶ 1 Centennial Development Group, LLC sued Lawyer’s Title Insurance Corporation after the latter’s title commitment failed to disclose an easement. We affirm the superi- or court’s holding on summary judgment that Arizona Revised Statutes (“AR.S.”) section 20-1562 (West 2013) bars Centennial’s claim for negligence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Centennial contracted to buy 75 acres in Snowflake. It made a down payment of $50,000 toward the purchase price of $1,500,000 and gave the seller two notes and deeds of trust to secure its obligation to pay the balance. In connection with its purchase, Centennial obtained a title commitment and a title insurance policy from Transnation Title Insurance Company, now Lawyer’s Title. Roughly a year after closing, Centennial discovered a roadway and utility easement across its property that the commitment had not disclosed. Believing the easement substantially diminished the value of its property, Centennial unsuccessfully tried to sell the property, then defaulted on its carry-back loan from the seller. In lieu of foreclosure, Centennial reconveyed all but one acre to the prior owner through a warranty deed subject to all easements of record. The easement at issue does not burden the single acre Centennial retained.
¶3 Centennial sued Lawyer’s Title, alleging negligence and breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Lawyer’s Title on both claims. We have jurisdiction of Centennial’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (West 2013) and -2101(A) (West 2013).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review.
¶4 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) allows a court to enter summary judgment
B. The Negligence Claim.
¶ 5 Centennial’s negligence claim alleged Lawyer’s Title misrepresented the condition of title by omitting the easement from the report of exceptions attached to the policy. Centennial alleged the omission of the easement constituted a negligent misrepresentation on which it reasonably relied in deciding to buy the property. The superior court granted summary judgment against Centennial based on AR.S. § 20-1562, reasoning the statute bars an insured from relying on information contained in a report of exceptions attached to a title insurance policy. See AR.S. § 20-1562(5).
¶ 6 Before a title insurer issues a policy, it reviews public records for defects, then issues a title commitment that lists exceptions to coverage. Action Acquisitions,
¶ 7 Before AR.S. § 20-1562 was amended in 1992, an insurer could be liable in Arizona for issuing a title commitment that negligently failed to disclose an encumbrance of record. See Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn.,
¶ 8 But a 1992 amendment to A.R.S. § 20-1562 changed that rule by effectively barring a common-law claim against an insurer whose title commitment fails to identify a cloud on title. See generally State v. Rios,
1. “Abstract of title” means a written representation ... that is intended to be relied on by the person who has contracted for the receipt of the representation. The abstract of title shall include all recorded conveyances, instruments or documents that impart constructive notice with respect to the chain of title to the real property described in the abstract. An abstract of title is not a title insurance policy. * * *
5. “Preliminary report”, “commitment” or “binder” means a report that is furnished in connection with an application for title insurance and that offers to issue a titleinsurance policy subject to the stated exceptions set forth in the report____ The reports are not abstracts of title and the rights, duties and responsibilities relating to the preparation and issuance of an abstract of title do not apply to the issuance of a report. The report is not a representation as to the condition of title to real property but does constitute a statement of the terms and conditions on which the issuer is willing to issue its title insurance policy if the offer is accepted.
A.R.S. § 20-1562(1), (5) (emphasis added).
¶ 9 Under the plain language of the amended statute, the title commitment that Lawyer’s Title issued in connection with its policy was not a representation of the condition of the title to the property. Nor did the insurer’s issuance of the commitment subject it to “the rights, duties and responsibilities relating to the preparation and issuance of an abstract of title.” A.R.S. § 20-1562(5). Because the commitment was “not a representation as to the condition of title” to the property, it cannot form the basis of a claim by Centennial for negligent misrepresentation.
¶ 10 Centennial argues § 20-1562 does not protect a title insurer from liability pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) for failing to exercise reasonable care in supplying information in the course of its business. But we do not follow the Restatement when it conflicts with an Arizona statute. See Ocotillo W. Joint Venture v. Schwartz,
C. The Contract Claim.
¶ 11 The policy insures Centennial “against loss or damage ... sustained or incurred ... by reason of ... [a]ny defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title.” That grant of coverage, however, is subject to the following condition:
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER CONVEYANCE OF TITLE.
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of an insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or interest in the land, ... or only so long as the insured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by the insured in any transfer or conveyance of the estate or interest.
In entering summary judgment against Centennial on its contract claim, the superior court concluded that under this provision, Lawyer’s Title owed no obligation to Centennial with respect to the 74 acres Centennial had reconveyed to the prior owner. And because the single acre Centennial retained was not affected by the undisclosed easement, the court held Lawyer’s Title owed no duty to cover the loss Centennial alleged it incurred when it discovered the easement.
¶ 12 The policy condition recited above plainly provides that coverage continues only so long as the insured owns the affected property. Put differently, once the insured’s interest in the land terminates, coverage under the policy terminates as to that interest. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship,
¶ 13 Centennial’s damage theory, however, is that it paid too much for the property because it was unaware of the easement, and ultimately had to give back the property because it is not worth the purchase price. Thus, Centennial alleges it incurred damages while it owned the property, within the “continuation of coverage” condition of the policy. See Swanson,
¶ 14 We are not persuaded by Lawyer’s Title’s argument that, as a matter of law, Centennial’s reconveyance of the affected property bars its claim for damages. Lawyer’s Title cites no policy language that requires the insured own the affected property at the time it makes a claim. While the policy makes plain that coverage continues only so long as the insured owns the property, it contains no similar restriction on when an insured may file a claim. See Burke, Law of Title Insurance § 5.02 (3d. ed. Supp.2012) (a “post-coverage claim” may be made on a title insurance policy “so long as the damages were sustained during coverage.”).
¶ 15 Each side argues Chicago Title resolves the issue in its favor. The insured in that case owned 300 acres, including a one-acre parcel called the Miller tract. Chicago Title,
¶ 16 Applying Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a “continuation of insurance” provision similar to the one at issue here. The court explained:
A natural reading of this policy language evinces the intent of the parties to limit the scope of title protection to the period running from the effective date of the policy until the insured conveys away its interest in the land, unless, in the conveyance, the insured gives warranties to the grantee. If the insured does give a warranty to the grantee, coverage extends to protect the insured’s obligation under that warranty. But if it does not, then title insurance for that land ends, and any risk of loss for defective title becomes the problem of the new owner.
The allocation of risk by this agreement gives title insurance coverage to the insured during the period when the insured purportedly owns the property, when most of the adverse consequences due to a defective title would occur. If a preexisting defect in title were to remain after the insured conveyed the land, the risk inherent in that defect would pass to the purchaser and the insured would no longer have risk, nor coverage. Of course, if the insured were to warrant the property against title defects, then the insured would be retaining the risk of a defective title, and coverage would continue for that risk. Thus, if the conveyance were accomplished by a deed containing a special warranty, the insured would be conveying no more than what it received from its grant- or, and coverage would end with the conveyance.
Id. at 763-64.
¶ 17 Applying those principles, the court held there was no coverage for the cost the insured incurred in trying to clear title to the Miller tract because under the special warranty deed by which the insured had conveyed the tract, upon the sale, the title defect became the new owner’s problem. Id. at 74. But the court came to a different conclusion about the insured’s demand that the insurer
¶ 18 The same is true here. As relevant, the policy generally only covers loss or damage incurred during the period of ownership, but it does not require the insured to make such a claim before it sells the affected property. Id. at 766 (“The policy, rather than providing insurance for any ‘claim’ asserted during the policy period, provides that it covers any ‘loss or damage during the policy period.’ ”). Moreover, contrary to Lawyer’s Title’s argument, it is irrelevant that Centennial’s demand for coverage was not triggered by a third-party trespass or other title claim. The policy insures “against loss or damage” caused by an “encumbrance on the title.” It does not require that Centennial be sued or subjected to a threat of suit.
¶ 19 Cases interpreting similar “continuation of insurance” provisions make clear the distinction between the two holdings by the Chicago Title court. Unless the insured remains subject to liability under a warranty deed, coverage does not continue in force for damages incurred from defects discovered after the insured conveys the property. See Chicago Title,
¶ 20 Here, however, the loss Centennial alleges was sustained when it discovered the defect in title, at a time when it owned all 75 acres. Because Centennial owned the property at the time it allegedly incurred the loss, its damage claim is not barred by the “continuation in force” provision of the policy. See generally Sandler v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co.,
¶ 21 The cases Lawyer’s Title cites are inapposite. In Gebhardt, the insureds sold the property, then sued the insurer for failing to resolve a cloud on title discovered prior to the sale.
¶ 22 We hold that under the “continuation of insurance” provision of the policy, Centennial’s sale of the affected property does not bar its claim for damages it alleges it incurred prior to the sale. The parties’ summary judgment briefing did not address Centennial’s ability to prove the damages it
CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm summary judgment in Lawyer’s Title’s favor as to the negligence claim, but reverse and remand for further proceedings the judgment in favor of Lawyer’s Title on Centennial’s claim for breach of contract. We also reverse the superior court’s order awarding Lawyer’s Title attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (West 2013). We decline to grant attorney’s fees or costs to either party on appeal. See Chapman v. The Westerner,
Notes
. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version.
. California courts similarly hold that the California legislature’s enactment in 1981 of nearly identical provisions precludes a tort action against an insurer based on information in a title commitment. See Cal. Insurance Code §§ 12340.10, 12340.11 (West 2013); Siegel v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.,
. Lawyer’s Title also cites Resolution Trust Corp. v. American Title Insurance Company,