500 N.E.2d 881 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1985
In July 1982, plaintiff-appellant, the Attorney General of Ohio ("the state"), filed separate complaints against three Summit County car dealers, alleging unfair or deceptive acts or practices in certain advertisements which appeared in the Akron Beacon Journal. Specifically, the complaints alleged violations of R.C.
The actions were tried to the court and judgment orders were issued dismissing *302 the state's complaints on the ground that Ohio's Advertisement and Sale of Motor Vehicles rule was improperly adopted. The trial court denied the state's motion for summary judgment and refused to declare acts or practices violative of the federal statute and rules to be unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. It is from these orders and the denial of the state's motion for summary judgment that the state now appeals, assigning as error:
"1. The trial court erred in finding that Ohio Administrative Code §
"2. The trial court erred in finding Ohio Administrative Code §
"3. The trial court erred in dismissing appellant's complaints against appellees.
"4. The trial court erred in failing to find that an act or practice in violation of
This court reverses in part and affirms in part.
There are two issues involved here: (1) whether Ohio Adm. Code
The car dealer advertisements as stipulated between the parties were published between March 18 and April 2, 1982, offering various cars and trucks for sale and lease. Some offered rebates upon the purchase of the vehicles. The complaints alleged that: (1) the advertisements did not contain beginning and ending dates of the sales as required by Ohio Adm. Code
The assignments of error dealing with Ohio Adm. Code
To accept that argument, however, is to place form over substance. The evidence shows that the Ohio code governing procedure for codifying rules of administrative agencies was changed November 15, 1981. By virtue of the new Act, LSC assumed the responsibility previously assigned to LRB to accept filings of administrative rules. The same individual who took filings for LRB was charged with taking filings for LSC. The logbook of filings maintained by LRB was continued by LSC. The LSC director, in a certified statement admitted into evidence, said the November 20, 1981 filing in question was time-stamped with *303 an LRB stamp because no stamp had yet been acquired with the LSC inscription on it. LRB was no longer in existence. LSC was the only place the proposed amendment could have been filed. Clearly, the filing was with the proper agency, despite the LRB time-stamp.
The trial court cited only the above reason for its finding that the rule was not properly adopted, but appellees have reiterated other arguments raised below which, while not so designated, constitute in effect cross-assignments of error pursuant to R.C.
Appellees argue that the rule should be invalidated because R.C.
Appellees also argue that the rule should be invalidated because the state did not comply with the R.C.
Since this court has concluded that Ohio Adm. Code
In the fourth assignment of error, the state argues that certain acts or practices concerning the advertising of a consumer lease declared to be unfair or deceptive by federal statute (TILA) and its rules should also be unfair or deceptive acts under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. The state sought to incorporate into the state Act, by declaratory judgment, the language of the federal Act relating to full disclosure of lease terms. The trial court refused to do this, noting that both the Ohio Legislature and the Attorney General with his rule-making powers under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, could have specifically incorporated these provisions if they had so desired. The state argues that such incorporation is mandated under R.C.
"In construing division (A) of this section, the court shall give due consideration and great weight to federal trade commission orders, trade regulation rules and guides, and the federal courts' interpretations of subsection 45(a)(1) of the `Federal Trade Commission Act.'
The state, however, has failed to demonstrate how the particular section of TILA which it wishes to incorporate *304 into the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act qualifies as either a federal trade commission order or a trade regulation rule or guide. The state further fails to cite any federal court interpretation of the TILA provision on consumer lease disclosures as prohibited under subsection 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
At issue here is the TILA requirement of disclosure of certain information when advertising consumer leases. However, the commission orders cited by the state deal with TILA requirements for disclosure of consumer credit terms and conditions and not consumer lease disclosures. Furthermore, the Section 1607(c), Title 15, U.S. Code provision that violations of the federal Act containing TILA requirements shall be deemed violations of the FTC Act "[f]or the purpose of the exercise of * * * [the commission's] functions and powers" under the Act, without more, does not make a TILA rule or regulation automatically a "trade regulation rule." While it is possible that this particular TILA provision may sometime come within the Ohio statutory limitations, the trial court did not err in refusing at this time to include the federal standards on consumer leasing disclosures in the state Act. This assignment of error is overruled.
Therefore, the judgments of the trial court dismissing the complaints are reversed insofar as they are based on Ohio Adm. Code
Judgments reversed in part and affirmed in part.
QUILLIN and BAIRD, JJ., concur.