CED PROPERTIES LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. CITY OF OSHKOSH, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 2012AP5
Supreme Court
Oral argument December 18, 2013. —Decided March 6, 2014.
2014 WI 10 | 352 Wis. 2d 613 | 843 N.W.2d 382
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Richard J. Carlson and Silton Seifert Carlson S.C., Appleton, and oral argument by Richard J. Carlson.
¶ 1. N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court.1 This case involves special assessments levied by the City of Oshkosh (“the City“) against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED“), which is located at the intersection of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. Specifically, we review whether CED‘s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended
to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments.
¶ 2. The City maintains that its typical practice is to issue a separate special assessment for each street that abuts a property. The City, therefore, asserts that it issued two separate special assessments against CED: one assessment against Murdock Avenue and another separate assessment against Jackson Street. In contrast, CED argues that the City issued a single special assessment against its property when it adopted Final Resolution 10-227, which stated that “the assessments for all projects included in said report are hereby combined as a single assessment, but any interested property owners shall be entitled to object to each assessment separately or both assessments, jointly for any purpose or purposes.”
¶ 3. Both the circuit court and the court of appeals held that the City did, in fact, levy two separate special assessments
¶ 4. On November 30, 2011, the Winnebago County Circuit Court, the Honorable Thomas J. Gritton presiding, held that
¶ 5. CED sought review and argues that under Wisconsin‘s rules of notice pleading, its original complaint was sufficient to challenge both the Jackson Street and the Murdock Avenue special assessments. Alternatively, CED argues that
¶ 6. We agree with CED‘s first argument and hold that its original complaint was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment, but the Jackson Street special assessment as well. Wisconsin
has long abandoned rigid pleading requirements in favor of liberal civil procedural rules. Notice pleading rules not only simplify pleading in Wisconsin, but also favor the resolution of claims on the merits. CED filed its original complaint within the 90-day time period required by
¶ 7. The alleged problem with the complaint was that it included only the monetary value, $19,241.73, which corresponds with the Murdock Avenue special assessment. That the complaint failed to identify an additional $19,404.93 for the Jackson Street special assessment is not detrimental
I. Background
¶ 8. CED owns property situated on the northeast corner of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. On July 27, 2010, the City passed a resolution that levied special assessments against several properties, including CED‘s property, to assist in
funding an intersection improvement project. The project consisted of the creation of a multi-lane roundabout and various landscape improvements at the intersection of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue. The City levied a total of $38,646.66 in special assessments for the “Jackson Street - Murdock Avenue intersection improvement project,” against parcel number 15-1898-1000, CED‘s property. The City levied $19,404.93 against the portion of CED‘s property bordering Jackson Street and assigned an additional $19,241.73 against the same corner lot property, which also runs alongside Murdock Avenue.
¶ 9. While the City issued one final resolution, the final resolution included maps indicating, as reference points, both Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue. Most important, two schedules accompanied the final resolution. Each schedule identified the same parcel I.D., 15-1898-1000, and the same description, 1800 Jackson Street, in reference to the owner, CED. However, the schedule immediately following the Jackson Street map indicates a concrete paving assessment of $19,404.93, while the schedule associated with the Murdock Avenue map lists a concrete paving assessment of $19,241.73.
¶ 10. On September 23, 2010, CED appealed the special assessments by simultaneously filing a notice of appeal and a complaint with the circuit court. Paragraph three of the complaint states, “Plaintiff owns property located at 1800 Jackson Street Oshkosh, WI 54901, City of Oshkosh parcel number 15-1898-1000.” Paragraph four of the complaint states, “On July 27, 2010 Oshkosh, by its Common Council, authorized the issuance of a $19,241.73 special assessment on parcel number 15-1898-1000 to help pay for the street repair portion of the Jackson Street Murdock Avenue intersection improvement project.”
¶ 11. It is undisputed that CED filed its notice of appeal and complaint within the 90-day time limit set forth in
¶ 12. The City moved for partial summary judgment arguing that CED‘s claim regarding the $19,404.93 Jackson Street special assessment was not filed within the 90-day time limit set forth in
¶ 13. CED moved for summary judgment arguing that its original complaint sufficiently challenged the entirety of the special assessments. Alternatively, CED argued that its amended complaint related back to the original complaint and thus saved its claim as to the Jackson Street special assessment. Furthermore, CED argued that the City‘s special assessments were invalid for a number of reasons, including that the City failed to comply with procedural requirements.4
the amount of the special assessments exceeded any benefit to CED‘s property, that the special assessments were a violation of equal protection, and that CED received untimely notice of the hearing in which the City adopted the special assessments.
¶ 14. As to the Murdock Avenue special assessment, the circuit court agreed with CED and granted it partial summary judgment. In granting CED partial summary judgment, the circuit court relied on the City‘s concession that it failed to follow proper procedure when levying the special assessments at issue. Specifically, the City failed to include the total cost of the intersection improvement project in the engineer‘s report as required by
¶ 15. A majority of the court of appeals agreed; however, its reasoning differed from the circuit court‘s. First, as a preliminary matter, the court of appeals determined that the City, did, in fact, issue two separate special assessments against CED‘s property. Second, the court of appeals, contrary to the circuit court, held that the rules of notice pleading and the relation back statute,
Murdock Avenue special assessment. Furthermore, the court of appeals reasoned that the original complaint related only to the Murdock Avenue special assessment; therefore, appeal of the Jackson Street special assessment remained untimely.
¶ 16. Judge Paul F. Reilly, who dissented, would have first held that the City issued a single special assessment against CED. In addition, Judge Reilly argued in his dissent that CED‘s original complaint gave fair notice to the City that CED intended to appeal the entire special assessment levied against its property.
¶ 17. Before this court, CED asserts that under Wisconsin‘s notice pleading rules, its original complaint was sufficient to challenge the entirety of the special assessments levied against its property. As we noted previously, in the alternative, CED argues that Wisconsin‘s relation back statute,
¶ 18. Because we conclude that CED‘s original complaint provided reasonable and sufficient notice to challenge the entirety of the special assessments levied against its property, we do not address its alternative argument.
II. Analysis
A. Principles of Notice Pleading
¶ 19.
transactions or occurrences out of which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
¶ 20. The Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, effective January 1, 1976, are patterned after the federal rules of civil procedure. Korkow v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 193, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984). In Korkow, this court addressed the question of whether an amended complaint that added a separate claim by an added plaintiff could relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. Id. at 192. In interpreting Wisconsin‘s relation back statute, we analyzed “Wisconsin‘s liberal civil procedure rules.” Id. We noted that Wisconsin does not employ rigid civil procedure rules. See id. Instead, Wisconsin‘s notice pleading rules “are intended to facilitate the orderly adjudication of disputes.” Id. at 193.
¶ 21. We have explained that “[t]his functional approach to pleading reflects a determination that the resolution of legal disputes should be made on the merits of the case rather than on the technical niceties of pleading.” Id. at 193. “A complaint which might well have failed under the old procedure for failure to state sufficient facts now will be sustained if reasonable notice is given to the defendant in respect to the nature
of the claim.” Anderson v. Cont‘l Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 684, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
¶ 22. In Canadian Pac. Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice Hydraulics, Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 272 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1978), the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether an “omission in the summons of a statement that the answer must be served within twenty days after the date of service of the summons and complaint deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.” In holding that the omission in question did not defeat the circuit court‘s jurisdiction, the court of appeals noted,
[O]ur Rules of Civil Procedure, like the federal rules relating to pleadings, “reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”
Canadian Pac. Ltd., 86 Wis. 2d at 373 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
B.
¶ 23. Whether a circuit court properly granted a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Everson v. Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶ 9, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298. In reviewing a previous court‘s summary judgment decision, this court will apply “the same methodology as the circuit court[,] and benefit[s] from its analysis.” Id. Summary judgment “shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
C. The Sufficiency of CED‘s Original Complaint
¶ 24. CED argues that the City issued a single special assessment and that under Wisconsin‘s rules of notice pleading, its original complaint placed the City on notice that it intended to challenge the entire amount of that assessment. In addition, CED argues that the City‘s answer to its original complaint supports CED‘s argument because the City‘s answer makes reference to a single special assessment.
¶ 25. The City argues that municipalities customarily issue two separate special assessments for corner lots and that the City “clearly and unambiguously” levied two special assessments as indicated by the assessment schedules. The City further contends that CED appealed only the Murdock Avenue special assessment because the original complaint references $19,241.73, which corresponds to the Murdock Avenue special assessment. The City concedes that the special assessments were procedurally invalid because they failed to include “[a]n estimate of the entire cost of the proposed work or improvement” as required by
¶ 26. Despite these procedural inadequacies, the City maintains that CED appealed only the Murdock Avenue special assessment within the 90-day time limit required by
ling statute, it asks this court to conclude that the Jackson Street special assessment appeal was untimely.
¶ 27. While we agree with the circuit court and the court of appeals that the City issued two special assessments as indicated by the assessment schedules, we ultimately conclude that CED‘s original complaint gave the City reasonable and sufficient notice that it intended to appeal the entire amount of special assessments levied against its property. First,
¶ 28. Special assessment appeals under
¶ 29. Since the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure apply to special proceedings such as special assessment appeals under
¶ 30. Under principles of notice pleading, we are satisfied that CED‘s original complaint was sufficient to challenge the entire amount of the special assessments levied against its property. This is because the original complaint placed the City on reasonable and sufficient notice that it intended to appeal the entirety of the special assessments.
¶ 31. First, the original complaint identified the parcel number, 15-1898-1000, against which the City levied the special assessments. The property in question is identified by one and only one parcel number. Second, the original complaint identified the improvement project for which the special assessments were issued as the “Jackson Street - Murdock Avenue intersection improvement project.” Not only does the original complaint identify the name of the improvement project, but the project name itself references both street names in question.
¶ 32. The fact that CED included only the amount of the Murdock Avenue special assessment in its original complaint does not defeat CED‘s intention to appeal the entire amount of the special assessments. By listing the parcel number and the name of the improvement project along with a reference to both street names, CED‘s original complaint placed the City on reasonable and sufficient notice that it intended to appeal the entire amount of special assessments levied against its property. To conclude otherwise would hold CED to the
type of technical pleading requirements that we have held no longer apply under our rules of civil procedure.
¶ 33. Having concluded that CED‘s original complaint properly appealed both the Murdock Avenue and Jackson Street special assessments, we also conclude that CED‘s appeal was timely and that summary judgment in favor of CED is appropriate. In its original complaint, CED asserted that the City failed to comply with
¶ 34. Because we hold that CED‘s original complaint contained sufficient information to place the City on reasonable notice of CED‘s intent to appeal the total amount of special assessments, we do not reach CED‘s alternative argument regarding the application of Wisconsin‘s relation back statute to special assessment appeals.
III. Conclusion
¶ 35. We agree with CED‘s first argument and hold that its original complaint
rules not only simplify pleading in Wisconsin, but also favor the resolution of claims on the merits. CED filed its original complaint within the 90-day time period required by
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and cause remanded to the circuit court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of CED Properties, LLC in regard to the Jackson Street special assessment.