81 S.E. 616 | N.C. | 1914
Civil action heard on motion for change of venue.
From a perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the action was instituted in Superior Court of Davidson County, against the city of High Point in Guilford County, to recover damages caused by reason of its sewerage plant and system, operated in the corporate limits of the city.
The complaint alleged, with great fullness of detail, that defendant corporation, in the operation of the sewerage system, dumps its sewage into a branch in the northwestern limits of the city, the same being entirely inadequate, going dry in certain seasons, and in time of sufficient rainfall the deposit is carried down on and upon the lands of plaintiff, situate in the county of Davidson, wrongfully creating a nuisance thereon, to plaintiff's great damage.
In apt time, the defendant, by motion duly entered, requested (432) that the cause be removed for trial to the county of Guilford. Motion allowed, and plaintiff excepted and appealed.
After stating the case: Section 419 of our Revisal, among other things, provides generally that actions to recover real property or any interest therein or for injuries thereto shall be brought in the county where the subject of the action or some part thereof is situated; section 420, that actions against a public officer or person specially appointed to execute his duties for an act done by him by virtue of his office must be instituted in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose, etc., etc. In numerous cases in this State, interpreting this latter section, 420, the Court has held that where the action involved, in whole or in part, the official conduct of a municipal officer in the county of its situs, the cause of action should be said to have arisen in that county, within the meaning of the section, and the same should be instituted and tried there, subject to the right of the court, by subsequent order, to charge the place of trial in "cases provided by law." Brevard Light andPower Co. v. Board of Light and Water Commissioners of Concord,
In Jones v. County Commissioners, 69 N.C. supra, plaintiff sued in his own county on a bond of defendant. On motion, the action was dismissed under the practice as it then prevailed, the Court holding that the suit should have been brought in defendant's county. Rodman, J., dissented on the ground that, it being the duty of the debtor to find his creditor and pay him, the default occurred in the county of plaintiff's residence; but this view, as we have seen, was rejected, the (433) Court holding, as stated, that `suits against county commissioners, as such, must be brought in the county of which they are commissioners."
In the subsequent case of Steele v. County Commissioners, Reade, J., referring to the case and to the position taken by the dissenting judge, said: "The dissenting opinion of our learned brother, Rodman, was based upon the first clause above, and upon his conclusion that the proximate cause of the action was the failure of the commissioners of Bladen to seek their creditor, who lived in Cumberland County, to which the suit was brought, and pay him his debt. We did not think that the failure to pay the debt was the cause of action spoken of in the statute; but that the debt itself was the cause of action. And that the expression, `where the cause of action arose,' meant where the debt was contracted or originated. And that view is strengthened by the second clause above, `against a public officer . . . for an act done by him by virtue of his office.' Now, as an officer's official acts are confined to his county, *387
and as the cause of action is his official act, it follows that the cause of action spoken of `arose' in the county in which the commissioners acted, and not out of their county where they did nothing `by virtue of his office.' It seemed to us to be the policy to require that all public officers, when sued about their official acts, should be sued in the county where they transact their official business. And the same policy is extended to executors, administrators, and guardians, where they are sued.Stanley v. Mason,
The language of section 420 more especially pertinent to the inquiry is that an action against a public officer for an act done by virtue of his office shall be tried in the county where the cause of action or some partthereof arose, and our cases just referred to, construing the statute, are in accord with authoritative decisions in other States, in which it is held that where the cause of an alleged grievance is situate or exists in one State or county and the injurious results take effect in another, the courts of the former have jurisdiction. In the absence of a statute, doubtless the courts of either would entertain the suit (434) (Nanville County v. Worcester,
We are of opinion that his Honor made correct decision in directing a change of venue, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
Cited: Board of Education v. Comrs.,