after stating the case: Section 4.19. of our Eevisal, among other things, provides generally that actions to recover real property or any interest therein or for injuries thereto shall be brought in the county where the subject of the action or some part- thereof is situated; section 420, that actions against a public officer or person specially appointed to execute his duties for an act done by him by virtue of his office must be instituted in the county where the causе or some part thereof arose, etc., etc. In numerous cases in this State, interpreting this latter section, 420, the Court hаs held that where the action involved, in whole or in part, the official conduct of a municipal officer in the county of its situs, the cause of action should be said to have arisen in that county, within the meaning of the section, and the same shоuld be instituted and tried there, subject to the right of the court, by subsequent order, to change the place of trial in “cases рrovided by law.”
Brevard Light and Power Co. v. Board of Light and Water Commissioners of Concord,
In Jones v. County Commissioners, 69 N. C., supra,, plaintiff sued in his own county on a bond of defendant. On motion, the action was dismissed under the practice as it then prevailed, the Court holding that the suit should have beеn brought in defendant’s county. Rodman, J., dissented on the ground that, it being the duty of the debtor to find his creditor and pay him, the default occurred in thе county of plaintiff’s residence; but this view, as we have seen, was rejected, the *433 Court bolding, as stated, tbat “suits against county сommissioners, as sucb, must be brought in the county of wbicb they are commissioners.” -
In the subsequent ease of
Steele v. County Commissioners, Reade, J.,
referring to the case and to the position tаken by the dissenting judge, said: “The dissenting opinion of our learned brother,
Rodman,
was based upon the first clause above, and upon his conclusion that the proximate cause of action was the failure of the commissioners of Bladen to seek their creditor, who lived in Cumberland County, to which the suit was brought, and pay him his debt.
"We
did not think that the failure to pay the debt was the cause оf action spoken' of in the statute; but that the debt itself was the’ cause of action. And that the expression, ‘where the cause of action arose meant where the debt was contracted or originated. And that view is strengthened by the second clause above, ‘against a public officer . . . for an act done by him by virtue of his office.’ Now, as an officer’s оfficial acts are confined to his county, and as the cause of action is his official act, it follows that the cаuse -of action spoken of ‘arose’ in the county in which the commissioners acted; and npt out of their county where they did nothing ‘by virtue of his office.’ It seemed to us to be the policy to require that all public officers, when sued about their оfficial acts, should be sued in the county where they transact their official business. And the same policy is extended to exеcutors, administrators, and guardians, where they are sued.
Stanley v. Mason,
The language of section 420 more especially pertinent tо the inquiry is that an action against a public officer for an act done by virtue of his office shall be tried in the county wherе the cause of action or
some pari thereof
arose, and our eases-just referred to, construing the statute, are in accord with аuthoritative decisions in other States, in which it is held that where the cause of an alleged grievance is situate or exists in оne State or county and the injurious results take effect in another, the courts of the former have jurisdiction. In the ab-
*434
sauce of a statute, doubtless tbe courts of either would entertain the suit
(Nanville County v. Worcester,
We are of opinion that his Honor made correct decision in directing a change of venue, and the judgment is
Affirmed.