Cecil R. McDONALD, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 07-13-00111-CR
Court of Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.
April 24, 2013.
Discretionary Review Stricken June 24, 2013. Rehearing Overruled June 20, 2013.
360 S.W.3d 360
concurrent cause “clearly sufficient” by itself to have resulted in Kendrick‘s death. See Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351. Nor was there any evidence that appellant‘s conduct in striking Kendrick was “clearly insufficient” by itself to cause Kendrick‘s death. See id. The jury, as sole factfinder, was free to believe, and draw reasonable inferences from, the evidence that Kendrick was alive when appellant entered the bedroom on April 6; that Kendrick stopped moving after appellant struck him in the cheek and “dented” him; that, in a panic, appellant then disposed of Kendrick‘s body; and that appellant lied about his and Kendrick‘s whereabouts the morning of April 7 and thus conclude appellant killed Kendrick by striking him. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that appellant‘s conduct in striking Kendrick alone caused his death. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; see also
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of appellant‘s legal insufficiency issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
break the causal chain leading from the appellant‘s acts to [the complainant‘s] death.” 686 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, aff‘d, 742 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). In Rojas v. State, the appellant argued that the expert‘s testimony presented a different cause of death (asphyxiation) than that named in the indictment (shooting with firearm). However, the medical examiner testified that the official cause of death was the complainant‘s gunshot wound, and the gunshot wound was an equally important cause of the death even if asphyxiation had been the immediate catalyst. The Court of Criminal Appeals thus concluded a rational jury could have found that the gunshot wound ultimately caused the complainant‘s death, whether she died before or after the plastic bag was placed on her head. 986 S.W.2d 241, 246-47 (Tex. Crim.App.1998) (upholding capital murder conviction); see Jones v. State, 740 S.W.2d 497, 498-99 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref‘d) (upholding murder conviction and concluding, even excluding expert testimony, there was sufficient evidence to prove appellant‘s striking complainant with fireplace poker caused her death even though “[a]s a direct consequence, she died of asphyxiation” when her unconscious body fell into position where she could not breathe).
Cecil R. McDonald, pro se.
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
OPINION
MACKEY K. HANCOCK, Justice.
Appellant, Cecil McDonald, a.k.a. Cecil Trimble, has filed in this Court his “Direct Appeal” in which he again attempts to mount an appeal from his conviction for murder in trial court cause number 2000-434,614. In his notice of appeal, he again maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to file an appeal from his conviction. However, having reviewed our own records, we see that a direct appeal from his conviction was disposed of on its merits by this Court by our opinion of August 29, 2007 in which we affirmed his conviction. See McDonald v. State, No. 07-06-0276-CR, 2007 WL 2472426, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7139 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 29, 2007, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused McDonald‘s petition for discretionary review. See In re Trimble, No. PD-1435-07, 2008 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 45
Despite having received appellate review of his conviction, appellant has continued to urge ineffective assistance of counsel and has continued to seek additional review of this same conviction. In December 2011, he attempted to perfect another appeal from his conviction. See McDonald v. State, 07-11-00491-CR, 2011 WL 6304146, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 9941 (Tex.App.-Amarillo, Dec. 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). By our opinion in that case, we dismissed his appeal, having concluded that we were without jurisdiction over it. See id. Appellant persisted and, one year later, in December 2012, attempted to file another notice of appeal, this time by way of his “Application for a Certificate of Appealability.” See McDonald v. State, 07-12-00512-CR, 2012 WL 6096985, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10190 (Tex.App.-Amarillo, Dec. 7, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We again concluded that we were without jurisdiction over the appeal and, accordingly, dismissed it. See id. In his ongoing efforts, he filed the instant appeal. Though each of appellant‘s pro se submissions to this Court has been labeled differently, the substance of appellant‘s submissions has been the same: he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his conviction in trial court cause number 2000-434,614. In the instant appeal, we reiterate our conclusion that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from the same 2001 conviction and, accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See
Before doing so, we add the following observations and instructions. “Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort.” Brager v. State, No. 0365-03, 2004 WL 3093237, at *2, 2004 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 2203, at *5 (Tex. Crim.App. Oct. 13, 2004) (en banc) (not designated for publication) (quoting Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis.2d 311, 127 N.W.2d 225, 226 (1964)). This inherent judicial power “is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities.” Id. at *2-3, 2004 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 2203, at *6 (citing State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (en banc), and quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex.1979)).
In response to appellant‘s multiple attempts to file subsequent appeals from the same 2001 judgment of conviction in trial court cause number 2000-434,614, one which has already been the subject of a direct appeal and petition for discretionary review, we admonish appellant against filing another notice of appeal in this Court in which he lodges a direct, substantive attack against the trial court‘s judgment of conviction in 2000-434,614. Based on our repeated disposition of his attempted subsequent appeals, appellant‘s persistence suggests that he does not genuinely pursue appellate review of his conviction—he has received such—and that he, instead, has engaged in bad faith abuse of the
While appellant‘s efforts in furtherance of the same course of action in the face of clear and repeated conclusions that we lack jurisdiction over such an appeal suggest bad faith abuse of the judicial process and this Court‘s resources, any further attempts by McDonald to file a direct appeal of his conviction in trial court cause number 2000-434,614 will be deemed such by this Court. In that event, the Court will consider its broad range of inherent powers, including its power to sanction, which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, or in the preservation of its independence and integrity. See id.; Johnson, 821 S.W.2d at 612 (citing Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ), for the proposition that a court‘s inherent power to punish exists to extent necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of judicial process such as any significant interference with traditional core functions of Texas courts).
Pursuant to this Court‘s inherent power to control its docket, we hereby direct appellant to refrain from filing additional direct appeals from trial court cause number 2000-434,614. See Brager, 2004 WL 3093237, at *2, 2004 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS, at *5; see also