Lead Opinion
We are here confronted by land, claims of historic vintage — the wrongs alleged ocr curred over two hundred years ago, and this action is itself twenty-five years old— which we must adjudicate against a legal
In another case raising land claims stemming from late-eighteenth-century treaties between Indian tribes and the State of New York, the Supreme Court recently ruled that equitable doctrines— such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility — can be applied to Indian land claims in appropriate circumstances. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. —, —,
BACKGROUND
Because of the disposition we reach here, we need not describe in great detail the long history of relations between the Cayuga Nation and the State of New York. We set forth below a concise description of the events underlying this lawsuit, as well as a more extended recounting of the case’s procedural history.
1. Historical Background
Plaintiffs allege that from time immemorial until the late eighteenth century the Cayuga Nation owned and occupied approximately three million acres of land in what is now New York State, a swath of land approximately fifty miles wide that runs from Lake Ontario to the Pennsylvania border.- This- action involves 64,015 acres of that land, encompassing the Cayuga’s “Original Reservation,” as set forth in a treaty with the State of New York, concluded on February 25, 1789 (“1789 Treaty”). In the 1789 Treaty, the Cayugas ceded all of their lands to New York, except the lands designated as the “Original Reservation,” which consists of lands on the eastern and western shores of the northern end of Cayuga Lake.
Congress passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, known as the “Nonin-tercourse Act,” in 1790, pursuant to Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power “to regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.” Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. As the Supreme Court described it, “the Act bars sales of tribal land without the acquiescence of the Federal Government.” Sherrill,
On November 11, 1794, the Six Iroquois
On July 27, 1795, the Cayuga entered into a treaty with the State of New York in which the State acquired the entire Original Reservation of the Cayugas (except for a three-square-mile area on the eastern shore of Cayuga Lake) in exchange for a promise that the State pay the Cayuga Nation $1,800 annually in perpetuity. Id. Although there is some debate about whether a federal official who signed the treaty as a witness was acting in a personal or official capacity, id., it is undisputed that this treaty was never explicitly ratified by a treaty of the Federal Government. In 1807, the State of New York purchased the Cayugas’ remaining three-square-mile parcel for $4,800. Id. Again, the Federal Government never explicitly ratified this treaty.
2. Procedural History — Liability Phase
Many years later, on November 19, 1980, the Tribe filed its complaint in this action, alleging these facts and requesting that the Court “[djeclare that plaintiffs are the owners of and have the legal and equitable title and the right of possession” to all of the land in the Original Reservation and that the Court “[rjestore plaintiffs to immediate possession of all portions of the subject land claimed by any defendant or member of the defendant class and eject any defendant claiming their chain of title through the 1795 and 1807 New York State ‘treaties.’ ” Plaintiffs also sought: (1) an accounting of all tax funds paid by possessors of the lands; (2) trespass damages in the amount of the fair rental value of the land for the entire period of plaintiffs’ dispossession; (3) all proceeds derived in the future in connection with the removal or extraction of any natural resources to be placed in a trust fund for plaintiffs’ benefit; (4) the costs of the action and attorneys’ fees; and (5) “such other and further relief as the Court deems just.”
Soon after filing the action, plaintiffs moved to certify a defendant class of landowners under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B). The District Court certified a defendant class with respect to liability and named defendant Miller Brewing Company as representative of the defendant class. In 1981, the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma was granted leave to intervene as plaintiff-in-
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After the District Court denied the motion to dismiss, and defendants filed their answer to the complaint, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, asking the Court to find the 1795 and 1807 treaties invalid under the Nonintercourse Act and federal common law and to determine that plaintiffs were the current owners of the lands in question. The District Court found that plaintiffs constituted “Indian tribes” and that they were entitled to sue under the Nonintercourse Act, but held that it could not rule on whether the United States ratified the treaties as the record was not yet complete. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
After further discovery, plaintiffs again moved for partial summary judgment, asking that the Court find that the treaties had not been properly ratified. The District Court concluded that the Noninter-course Act requires of any land-conveyance treaty with an Indian tribe (1) the presence of federal treaty commissioners at the signing of the treaty and (2) ratification, pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
In separate opinions in 1991, the District Court rejected defendants’ remaining defenses of abandonment and laches. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
Following these rulings, the District Court granted partial summary judgment on liability to plaintiffs against all defendants except the State of New York, which was excluded because it had asserted a new Eleventh Amendment defense based on the then-recent Supreme Court decision in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
In response to the State’s Eleventh Amendment motion, the United States
After a stay of the proceedings for settlement discussions that lasted over three years, the District Court concluded that the State was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, but that its officials could be sued for prospective relief. The Court denied the non-State defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting their contention that the State was an indispensable party. Having ruled on all liability issues, the Court noted that it “anticipated receiving an application for certification of an interlocutory appeal.” Defendants decided not to seek an interlocutory appeal.
3. Procedural History — Damages Phase
After the ruling for plaintiffs on all liability issues, a number of questions remained to be decided at the damages phase. Defendants argued (1) that ejectment was not a proper remedy in the case; (2) that plaintiffs should not be able to obtain prejudgment interest against the State; (3) that damages should be limited to the loss suffered by the Cayugas at the time of the treaties, as measured by the difference between the value received by the Cayugas and the fair market value of the lands at that time; (4) that the lands should be valued as a single 64,000-acre tract rather than as smaller, individual tracts; and (5) that damages should be based on a single valuation date of July 27, 1795.
The District Court issued a series of rulings in 1999 to resolve these and other issues relating to the damages proceedings. First, the District Court agreed with defendants that the land should be valued as a single parcel (“4” above) and that damages should be determined by reference to the value of the land on July 27, 1795 (“5” above). Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, No. 80-CIV-930,
The Court next decided, on July 1, 1999, fully nineteen years after the filing of the complaint seeking “immediate possession” of the land, that ejectment was not a proper remedy. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, No. 80-CIV-930,
On October 8, 1999, the District Court ruled that the State of New York “could be deemed an original or primary tortfeasor.” Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,
The Court further ruled, on December 23, 1999, that it would not allow testimony related to equitable issues to be presented to the jury and that all equitable issues would be reserved to the Court. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,
A jury trial was held from January 18, 2000 through February 17, 2000. The parties’ experts presented widely disparate estimates of the measure of plaintiffs’ damages. The jury was presented with a Special Verdict Form that asked for a calculation of current fair market value of the subject land and for a year-by-year breakdown of rental damages from 1795 to 1999. The jury was instructed not to adjust rental damages to current day value, as all adjustments would be performed later by the Court. On February 17, 2000, the jury returned a verdict -finding current fair market.value damages of $35 million and total fair rental value damages of $3.5 million. In awarding the fair rental value damages, the jury awarded the same rental value damages for each year from 1795 to 1999, in the amount of $17,156.86. The jury gave the State a credit for the payments it had made to the Cayugas, of about $1.6 million, leaving the total damages at this stage at approximately $36.9 million.
The hearing on prejudgment interest and other equitable issues was held from July 17, 2000 through August 18, 2000. Eight expert witnesses testified, regarding both the historical context and the assessment of prejudgment interest. Unsurprisingly, the experts reached substantially divergent estimates of the prejudgment interest to which the Cayugas were entitled, ranging from approximately $1.75 billion to zero (this counterintuitive calculation was based on the assumption that the jury verdict needed to be “adjusted” because the jury had expressed its verdict in “constant 2000 dollars”).
On October 2, 2001, the District Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order on the interest issue. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,
The District Court addressed various post-judgment motions on March 11, 2002. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,
On June 17, 2002, the District Court granted the parties’ motions for permission to appeal and certified for appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the issues related to liability and remedies. We granted the District Court’s certification of issues for immediate appellate resolution on December 11, 2002.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. —,
We understand Sherrill to hold that equitable doctrines, such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, can, in appropriate circumstances, be applied to Indian land claims, even when such a claim is legally viable and within the statute of limitations. See, e.g., id. at 1494 (“[T]he distance from 1805 to the present day, the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.”). Sherrill clarified that the decision does not “disturb” the Supreme Court’s holding in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
The Court’s characterizations of the Oneidas’ attempt to regain sovereignty over their land indicate that what concerned the Court was the disruptive nature of the claim itself. See id. at 1483 (“[W]e decline to project redress for the Tribe into the present and, future, thereby disrupting the governance of central New York’s counties and towns.”); id. at 1491 (“This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes in the character of the properties, preclude [the Tribe] from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks.”); id. at 1491 n. 11 (“[The Oneidas’] claim concerns grave, but ancient, wrongs, and the relief available must be commensurate with that historical reality.”). Although we recognize that the Supreme Court did not identify a formal standard for assessing when these equitable defenses apply, the broadness of the Supreme Court’s statements indicates to us that Sherrill’s holding is not narrowly limited to claims identical to that brought by the Oneidas, seeking a revival of sovereignty, but rather, that these equitable defenses apply to “disruptive” Indian land claims more generally.
In their post-Sherrill briefs, both the Cayugas and the United States maintain that the Sherrill decision “does not affect the award of monetary damages,” Cayuga Letter Br. at 1, and “concerned particular equitable remedies” which are not at issue here as “the district court confined its judgment to an award of damages.” United States Letter Br. at 6. Our reading of Sherrill suggests that these assertions do not present an entirely accurate assessment of its effect on the present case. While the equitable remedy sought in Sherrill — a reinstatement of Tribal sovereignty — is not at issue here, this case involves comparably disruptive claims, and other, comparable remedies are in fact at issue.
Despite the eventual award by the District Court of monetary damages, we emphasize that plaintiffs’ claim is and has always been one sounding in ejectment; plaintiffs have asserted a continuing right to immediate possession as the basis of all of their claims, and have always sought ejectment of the current landowners as their preferred form of relief. As noted above, in their complaint in this case the Cayugas seek “immediate possession” of the land in question and ejectment of the current residents. Indeed, the District Court noted early in the litigation that it was “clear” that the complaint “presents a possessory claim, basically in ejectment.” Cayuga I,
The nature of the claim as a “pos-sessory claim,” as characterized by the District Court, underscores our decision to treat this claim like the tribal sovereignty claims in Sherrill. Under the Sherrill formulation, this type of possessory land claim — seeking possession of a large swath of central New York State and the ejectment of tens of thousands of landowners— is indisputably disruptive. Indeed, this disruptiveness is inherent in the claim itself — which asks this Court to overturn years of settled land ownership — rather than an element of any particular remedy which would flow from the possessory land claim. Accordingly, we conclude that pos-sessory land claims of this type are subject to the equitable considerations discussed in Sherrill.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Sherrill opinion does not limit application of these equitable defenses to claims seeking equitable relief. We recognize that ejectment has been characterized as an action at law, as opposed to an action in equity. See, e.g., New York v. White,
As the parties are well aware, the Cayugas are seeking to enforce a “federal common law” right of action for violation of their possessory property rights, as well as seeking to vindicate their rights under the Nonintercourse Act Unfortunately, that Act is silent as to remedies, thus leaving courts to resort to the common law as a means of “assisting ... in formulating a statutory [Nonintercourse Act] damage remedy.” Therefore, in molding a remedy in the present case and in structuring a manageable trial, in the court’s opinion it may well be appropriate, and indeed necessary, to fashion a federal common law remedy, which although having some resemblance to remedies available for common law torts such as trespass, is a remedy uniquely tailored to fit the needs of this unparalleled land claim litigation. As the discussion below demonstrates, however, and has been evident for some time as the issue of remedies has come to dominate this litigation, common law prinei-pies, whether tort-based or not, are not readily transferrable to this action.
Cayuga XI,
Thus, whatever the state of the law in this area béfore Sherrill, see Oneida II,
Our reading is not in conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
Inasmuch as the instant claim, a posses-sory land claim, is subject to the doctrine of laches; we conclude that the present case must be dismissed because the same considerations that doomed the Oneidas’ claim in Sherrill apply with equal force here. These considerations - include the following: “[generations have passed during which non-Indians have owned and developed the area that once composed the Tribe’s historic reservation,” Sherrill,
To summarize: the import of Sherrill is that “disruptive,” forward-looking claims, a category exemplified by possessory land claims, are subject to equitable defenses, including laches. Insofar as the Cayugas’ claim in the instant case is unquestionably a possessory land claim, it is subject to laches. The District Court found that laches barred the possessory land claim, and the considerations identified by the Supreme Court in Sherrill mandate that we affirm the District Court’s finding that the possessory land claim is barred by laches. The fact that, nineteen years into the case, at the damages stage, the District Court substituted a monetary remedy for plaintiffs’ preferred remedy of ejectment
Although we conclude that plaintiffs’ ejectment claim is barred by laches, we must also consider whether their other claims, especially their request for trespass damages in the amount of the fair rental value of the land for the entire period of plaintiffs’ dispossession, are likewise subject to dismissal. In assessing these claims, we must recognize that the trespass claim, like all of plaintiffs’ claims in this action, is predicated entirely upon plaintiffs’ possessory land claim, for the simple reason that there can be no trespass unless the Cayugas possessed the land in question. See, e.g., West 14th Street Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners Corp.,
We recognize that the United States has traditionally not been subject to the defense of laches. See United States v. Summerlin,
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the United States as plaintiff-intervenor is subject to laches in this ease, we do not purport to set forth broad guidelines for when the doctrine might apply. Rather, we follow the Seventh Circuit, which, after canvassing the case law, noted in Adminis
We acknowledge that we stated in Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,
The Cayugas and the United States highlight the District Court’s findings, in deciding whether to award prejudgment interest, that the Cayugas were not “responsible for any delay in bringing this action” and that the “delay was not unreasonable, insofar as the actions of the Cayuga are concerned.” Cayuga Letter Br. at 3, United States Letter Br. at 3. We acknowledge these findings, but do not believe they are dispositive for our consideration of the laches question. The equitable considerations relevant to an assessment of a possessory land claim — -which is precisely what this case was from the outset — differ dramatically from the equitable considerations in a claim for prejudgment interest, which is what the case had become at the time the District Court made these findings. The District Court itself, as discussed above, found that lach-es barred the Cayugas’ preferred remedy of ejectment. Indeed, the District Court noted that “[rjegardless of when the Cay
Our decision to reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for defendants should in no way be interpreted as a reflection on the District Court’s efforts and rulings in this case. We recognize and applaud the thoughtful and painstaking efforts, over many years, of Judge Neil P. McCurn, who presided over this and related land claims in upstate New York with fairness and due regard to the rights and interests of all parties as well as with a keen appreciation of the complexities of the subject matter and of the relevant law. Our decision is based on a subsequent ruling by the Supreme Court, which could not be anticipated by Judge McCurn in his handling of this case over more than twenty years.
The judgment of the District Court is Reversed and judgment is entered for defendants.
Notes
. This Confederation included the Cayugas, the Oneidas, the Mohawks, the Senecas, the Onondagas, and the Tuscaroras. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
. Defendants claim that the 1838 treaty of Buffalo Creek effectively ratified these treaties. Although we ultimately need not reach this question, we note that, whatever it may do, the Treaty of Buffalo Creek neither mentions Cayuga land or Cayuga title in New York, nor refers to the 1795 or 1807 treaties. See Treaty of Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550.
. The expert actually testified that the Cayugas owed the State approximately $7.6 million, though the State assured the Court that it would not attempt to collect from the Cayugas.
. Plaintiffs took the position in the District Court that monetary damages would not adequately compensate them for two hundred years of wrongful occupation. See Cayuga VIII, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5228, at *5.
. We note that even though ejectment has traditionally been considered an action at law, numerous jurisdictions have recognized the applicability of equitable defenses, including laches, in an action for ejectment based on a claim of legal title or prior possession, regardless of whether damages or an order of possession was sought. See, e.g., Pankins v. Jackson,
. Sherrill effectively overruled our Court’s holding in Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,
. After finding for plaintiffs on liability and - ruling out ejectment as a remedy, the District Court seems to have folded all of the plaintiffs’ requests for relief into its award of damages, without separate consideration of any of the requests for relief. See Cayuga XI,
. Our holding here thus does not disturb our statement in United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002), that "laches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest,” inasmuch as this case does not involve the enforcement of a public right or the protection of the public interest.
Concurrence Opinion
dissenting in part and concurring in part in the judgment.
While City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. —,
I. Procedural History
The majority sets forth an excellent summary of the extensive background to this appeal. There are, however, a few procedural aspects that bear noting.
The history of this case makes clear that the Cayuga plaintiffs
While the majority may be correct that “ejectment is [the plaintiffs’] preferred remedy,” Maj. Op. at 274, there is certainly nothing in the record to suggest that the Cayuga plaintiffs relinquished their claims for money damages. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
The District Court addressed the application of equitable defenses early in the case, when it considered the non-state defendants’ argument “that the equitable remedies of rescission and restitution are no longer available where the use and the value of the land has changed drastically, and where it is held by innocent purchasers.”
After the District Court held that the 1795 and 1807 land conveyances to New York State were invalid, Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
On November 5, 1992, the United States filed a motion to intervene. It did so both on its own behalf and as trustee to the tribe. In its Answer to the United States’ Complaint in Intervention, which, inter alia, sought trespass damages, the State alleged that the common law defense of laches barred the claims of and relief sought by the United States. The District Court never reached the question of whether laches could be asserted against the United States in this case because the parties stipulated that the court’s previous rejection of the defense as to the other plaintiffs would apply with equal force as to the United States.
Following the District Court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the question of liability, the defendants then moved to preclude ejectment as a remedy. The court found “that from the outset ejectment is one of several remedies which the Cayugas have been seeking, and their claims also have been framed in terms of ejectment.” Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
After considering the interest to be protected, the relative adequacy of various remedies, delay, misconduct, and relative hardship, the interests of third parties, and the practicability of an injunction, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936(1)(a)-(g), the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to preclude ejectment as a remedy.
II. Application of Laches to the Plaintiffs’ Claims for Damages
The issue before this court — -“the application of a nonstatutory time limitation in
The plaintiffs here seek relief under two theories, ejectment and trespass. As noted, all claims were brought prior to expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. Historically, both ejectment and trespass are actions at law. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §§ 5.1, 5.10(1) (2d ed.1993). Unless a party’s delay amounts to either an estoppel or waiver, it does not bar a party’s access to remedies at law. Id. at § 2.4(4) (“When laches does not amount to estoppel or waiver, it does not ordinarily bar legal claims, only equitable remedies.”). Furthermore, laches is not a com-píete defense to a claim. “Because laches is based on prejudice to the defendant, the bar it raises should be no broader than the prejudice shown.” Id.
A. Ejectment and Laches
An action for ejectment generally seeks two remedies, restoration of possession and damages equivalent to the fair market rent for the period the plaintiff was wrongfully out of possession, sometimes referred to as mesne profits. Id. at § 5.10(1). Reinstatement of one’s possessory interest in land is typically the most salient of the two remedies. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some jurisdictions have chosen to make the doctrine of laches available to defendants in ejectment actions where a coercive remedy is sought. See Maj. Op. at 275-76 n. 5. New York courts have held, for example, that “[a]n equitable defense is good in ejectment.” Dixey v. Dixey,
The defense of laches pertains only to the remedy sought, not the cause of action itself. The elements of laches are both delay and prejudice. City of Sherrill,
However, where a plaintiff seeks ejectment damages, rather than restoration of a possession interest, application of the doctrine of laches to such a money damage claim is rarely if ever justified. Even where reinstatement of possession is disruptive, attendant damage claims are not similarly disruptive. It is axiomatic that a menu of remedies, some mutually exclusive, may be associated with the same right and that, in different factual situations, different remedies will be appropriate. Here, the plaintiffs’ claims for possession and for fair rental value damages should be treated separately. While the element of delay found in connection with application of the defense to the possession remedy is equally present with regard to the money damages remedy, there is no corresponding prejudice to the defendant New York State (“State”) in connection with an award of money damages. The bar of laches does not rise high enough to bar the money judgment here. See Dobbs, supra, § 2.4(4).
Determining that the coercive remedy of restoration of possession is barred by lach-es requires a fact-intensive inquiry regarding the disruptiveness of that remedy. In City of Sherrill, for example, the Court found that the defendants in that ease had “justifiable expectations” which were “grounded in two centuries of New York’s exercise of regulatory jurisdiction.”
City of Sherrill would thus support a finding that restoration of possession, following two hundred years of unlawful possession, is a sufficiently disruptive remedy that it may satisfy the prejudice element of the laches defense. However, the proof involved with the remedy of damages will be radically different than that involved with a claim for an injunction, specific
The majority concludes that the plaintiffs’ “possessory land claims” are barred in their entirety by City of Sherrill and reasons that the plaintiffs, having been denied the right to possession, cannot prove the elements of their claims for money damages. However, current possession is not an element of a legal claim for ejectment. A legal claim for ejectment consists of the following elements: “[pjlaintiffs are out of possession; the defendants are in possession, allegedly wrongfully; and the plaintiffs claim damages because of the allegedly wrongful possession.” Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, N.Y.,
B. Trespass
While the, majority does not appear to apply the laches defense to a claim for trespass damages, it nevertheless dismisses the plaintiffs’ trespass claim on the basis that it is derivative of the ejectment claim and requires proof of possession. The fact that “possession” is an element of a claim for trespass does not require dismissal of the action, however. The trespass claim is not predicated upon the plaintiffs’ possessory claim, nor is there any relationship between the two claims that necessitates dismissal of the trespass claim. Indeed, the plaintiffs may be able to prove the right to possession
The majority’s contention that the plaintiffs cannot make out,their claim for damages because their claim for coercive relief fails treats the special defense of laches , as if it were in the nature of a statute of repose. However, nowhere in City of Sherrill is the “right” of possession addressed; the Court writes always about the “remedy” of possession. See, e.g., City of Sherrill,
C. United States as Plaintiff
The United States is a plaintiff in this case. “The principle that the United States are not ... barred by any laches of their officers, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a sovereign Government to enforce a public right, or to assert a public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt.” United States v. Beebe,
The majority explains its application of the defense of laches to claims asserted by the United States by suggesting that the doctrine that the United States is not subject to the defense of laches “does not seem to be a per se ” rule. See Maj. Op. at 278. For this point, it relies upon Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
First, the Court in Clearfield Trust limited its application of non-statutory time bars to those claims brought by the United States that were not subject to any statutory time bar. Id. at 367,
After relying on Clearfield Trust to open the door for application of laches to claims by the United States, the majority then finds that the defense is appropriate in the instant case. In doing so, it relies on a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that three Supreme Court cases support the application of laches in cases such as this one. United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc.,
However, neither Administrative Enterprises, nor the cases cited therein, support the application of laches to the United States in the instant case. Of the three cases cited by Administrative Enterprises, only one specifically addresses the applicability of a delay-based defense like laches in a suit brought by the United States.
These cases cannot support the proposition that this Court has the authority to craft a federal common law defense of laches against an Indian land claim sought by the United States. Indeed, Administrative Enterprises “three main possibilities for when laches might apply against the United States,” Maj. Op. at 279, are not present in this case. With regard to Administrative Enterprises ’ first “possibility,” egregious delay, while two hundred years is surely a significant length of time, the majority fails to consider the nature of that delay and to what extent it may be excused. With regard to Administrative Enterprises ’ second “possibility,” the absence of an applicable statute of limitations, here Congress did enact a statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims for damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a).
III. The Import of City of Sherrill
The majority sees “no reason why the equitable principles identified by the Supreme Court in City of Sherrill should not apply to this case, whether or not it could be technically classified as an action at law.” Maj. Op. at 276. However, the clear language of City of Sherrill confines its holding to the use of laches to bar certain relief, not to bar a claim or all remedies:
“The question whether equitable consideration should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida Indians .... ” City of Sherrill,125 S.Ct. at 1487 (quoting Oneida II,470 U.S. at 253, n. 27 ,105 S.Ct. 1245 ) (emphasis added).
“In contrast to Oneida I and II, which involved demands for monetary compensation, OIN sought equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the imposition of property taxes.” Id. at 1488 (emphasis added).
*289 “When the Oneidas came before this Court 20 years ago in Oneida II, they sought money damages only. The court reserved for another day the question whether ‘equitable considerations’ should limit the relief available to the present-day Oneidas.” Id. at 1489 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief has deep roots in our law.... It is well-established that lach-es, a doctrine focused on one side’s inaction and the other’s legitimate reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for equitable relief” Id. at 1491 (emphasis added).
“... the Oneida’s long delay in seeking equitable relief ... evokes the doctrine[ ] of laches ...” Id. at 1494.
The City of Sherrill opinion is not support for the application of the equitable defense of laches as a bar to money damages in this case.
The City of Sherrill Court’s analysis, which underpins its holding, is framed by the nature of the equitable remedy that the Oneida Indian Nation sought there. See
Further, the Supreme Court in City of Sherrill addresses at length an Indian land claim case, Felix v. Patrick,
Finally, the City of Sherrill Court expressly noted that, “the question of damages for the Tribe’s ancient dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II”
Further, even assuming laches could apply to the money damages award in this case, there is nothing in the record before us to support a finding of the disruptive nature of the monetary award. The City of Sherrill decision certainly supports affirming the District Court’s denial of repossession as an equitable remedy, based on the District Court’s findings that the equitable considerations involved in the case did not permit it. See Cayuga X,
IV. Conclusion
While City of Sherrill may have “dramatically altered the legal landscape” of Indian land claims, Maj. Op. at 273, it does not reach as far as the majority reads it. City of Sherrill holds that laches can bar a tribe from obtaining the disruptive remedy of re-assertion of tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, the case supports the proposition that the nature of forward-looking, disruptive remedies generally will serve as equitable considerations that can bar such equitable remedies as re-possession, even against the United States. An award of money damages is not an equitable remedy, nor is it forward-looking or disruptive in the way dispossession inherently is. Nothing in City of Sherrill suggests a total bar on the ability of Indian tribes to obtain damages for past wrongs where Congress has explicitly provided for it.
City of Sherrill serves as strong support to affirm the District Court’s refusal to award possession to the plaintiffs, and I join in the judgment to that extent. How
While I do not join entirely in the majority’s resolution of this case, I wholeheartedly concur in its comments concerning Judge McCurn’s tireless and thoughtful attention to this complex and challenging case for over two decades.
. "Cayuga plaintiffs” refers collectively to the Cayuga Indian National and the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe.
. Notably, at that time, the defendants did not raise the defense of laches, an equitable defense, to any of the plaintiffs' non-equitable claims. Cayuga I,
. Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the District Court did not find “that laches barred the possessory claim,” Maj. Op. at 277, but rather concluded that equitable considerations prevented the award of the equitable remedy of possession.
. Fair rental value damages, as a monetary remedy, had been sought since the filing of the case.
. The power of a court sitting in equity to award monetary relief as, or in place of, an equitable remedy has long been recognized. Cathcart v. Robinson,
. Although the Oneida II majority did not reach the question, it did observe that "it is far from clear that this [laches] defense is available in suits such as this one [for money damages], ...." Oneida II,
. The cases cited by the majority in support of this point, to the extent that they suggest that Indian land claims are to be treated different from non-Indian claims, strongly suggest that Indian claims are entitled to more protection, rather than less, as a result of strong federal policy protecting tribal title from application of state law. See Oneida II,
. There are issues on appeal concerning the rulings by the District Court that the plaintiffs have a right to possession because the land transfers were illegal.
. Heckler concerns estoppel, not laches, but does confirm as "well settled” precedent that "the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.”
. Another case, NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., is relied on by the majority for the proposition that “laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be applicable to suits by government agencies Maj. Op. at 278 (quoting
. That § 2415(a) applies only to actions for money damages supports the conclusion that laches cannot be applied to bar a claim for money damages, but may be applied to bar a claim for equitable relief.
. It is also telling that Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the majority ”relie[d] heavily on the fact that the Tribe is seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction.” Id. at 1496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original and added).
. The contention that a damages award for either past fair rental value or present fair market value would "project redress into the present and future,” Maj. Op. at 275, in order to bring that award within the scope of the City of Sherrill holding vitiates any reasonable meaning the Supreme Court could have intended that phrase to have.
. The District Court did not conclude, as the majority suggests, that the "doctrine of laches bars the possessory land claim presented by the Cayugas here.” Maj. Op. at 277. Indeed, the District Court concluded, on then-existing precedent, that laches did not bar the plaintiff's claims, Cayuga I,