Julius Jerome Cawthon and Josephine Cawthon brought suit against the Baldwin County Board of Education (Board), its members *239 both individually and in their official capacities, the Baldwin County School District and Margiе Humphries, bus driver, for the wrongful death of their minor child, Robert. Waco Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, the issuer of the business automobile liability policy to the Board, filed an action seeking a declaration of its obligations under that policy in regard to the wrongful death suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Waco on its motion contending it was not obligated to prоvide coverage, to defend or to indemnify any defendant in the wrongful death suit. The appeals by the Cawthons and by the Board and other defendants in the wrongful death suit are consolidated in this opinion.
Robert Cawthon, age 10, was struck and killed as he was crossing a heavily-trafficked highway in order to get to his bus stop. The evidence shows that Robert was serving as look-out for the аpproach of the bus and that, upon espying the bus, he first returned to the building where his two sisters were waiting, informed them the bus was coming, then proceeded ahead of them to the highway whereupon he was struck by an on-coming automobile while crossing to the bus stop. The evidence conflicts whether the school bus was approaching Robert’s stop at the time of thе accident or was still at the previous stop. However, it is uncontroverted that the prior stop was less than one-tenth of a mile away and that the bus was clearly visible to Robert at the time of the accident.
Further controversy exists in the evidence regarding Robert’s action in crossing the highway prior to the arrival of the school bus. Up until four to six weeks prior to Rоbert’s death, the Cawthon children had always waited for the school bus to arrive before crossing the highway under the protection and supervision of the school bus and driver. The Cawthon children’s behavior changed at this time due to an incident in which Eunesia, Robert’s older sister, was so late that the school bus had to leave her behind. Humphries, the bus driver, stated in her deposition thаt she told her transportation supervisor about the incident and about Eunesia’s recurring tardiness the same day she had to leave Eunesia behind, that the supervisor told her complaints hаd been received about the school bus delaying traffic on the highway, and that he told her to leave Eunesia if the child was not on time. Humphries stated that the following school day she tоld Eunesia (in a lecture apparently overheard by all the occupants of the school bus) people had complained about the school bus holding up traffic and from then on Eunesia would have to be outside waiting on the bus with the other children or she would be left. Humphries stated she did not discuss with Eunesia on which side of the highway she should be waiting or whether by “other children” she meant Robert and the younger Cawthon child or the “other children” who also boarded at that stop, all of whom waited at the bus stop itself because *240 they did not need to cross the highway. Robert’s sisters and another student who rode the school bus at that time testified by deposition that Humphries told them explicitly that if the children were not waiting at the bus stop when the school bus arrived, they would be left behind. It is uncontroverted, however, that in the four to six-week period following this incident, Humphries repeatedly arrived at the bus stop to find the Cawthon children already across the highway at the stop. Humphries testified that during this period, she did not discuss with the Cawthon children on which side of the highway they should be waiting, that she did not know how the children were crossing the highway (supervised or otherwise) and that she made no inquiry of the children in that regard.
Appellants contend the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee because questions of fact exist whether liability for Robert Cawthon’s death comes within the provision of the policy issued by appellee providing coverage for “bodily injury caused by an accident and rеsulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto.” In
Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greene,
Insofar as Georgia law is concerned, we have been unable to find, nor have counsel cited us to any opinions discussing what constitutes the loading of а school bus under a provision of a policy of insurance
*241
such as the one sub judice. Although the factual dissimilarities in
Greene,
supra, have been noted, it can be discerned from the languagе employed therein — as indeed it is virtually conceded by the parties — that the loading of school children as well as the unloading thereof is included in the “use” of a school bus. A child crоssing a road while a school bus is standing guard with its lights flashing, its stop signals activated and all visual signals functioning is under the protection of the school bus and any injuries arising during this phase of operation fall within the purview of the policy and statutory language of OCGA § 33-24-51. See
Greene,
supra at 124. Appellee would have this court follow the holding in
Eden Prairie Independent School Dist. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
We hold that independent, voluntary actions taken by a school child cannot, alone, initiate the loading procedure and that typically the process of loading a school bus is initiated and controlled directly by the bus driver and indirectly by the regulations and policies regarding the loading of school buses issued by the driver’s supervisors. It is not necеssary, however, to decide when a bus driver normally initiates the loading procedure or at what point in time control of school children intending to board a school bus passes tо the bus driver so as to constitute the process of loading. “Use” of a school bus insofar as the loading process is concerned depends, as do most cases involving the “use” of a vehicle, on the factual context of each case. See
Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Booker,
Judgments reversed.