From the allegations of the complaint set out in the foregoing statement of facts it appears that plаintiffs built a plant for the purpose of furnishing the tenants of their own building with heat, light, and power; that the completed plant proved to be large enough, when economically run, to
“The term ‘public utility’ as used in this act shall mean and embrace every corporation, сompany, individual, association of individuals, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whаtsoever, and every town, village or city that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or cоntrol any plant or equipment or any part of a plant or equipment within the state, for the conveyancе of telephone messages or for the production, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power еither directly or indirectly to or for the public.”
The state claims that by furnishing heat, light, and power to the tenants of their own building the plaintiffs became a public utility; that the furnishing of such commodities to any one else than to one’s self is furnishing it to the public within the meaning of the statute. It is obvious that such a construction is too narrow, for it would constitute the owner оf every building furnishing heat or. light to tenants, as well as every householder who rents a heated or lighted room, a public utility. Thе legislature never contemplated such a construction to be given the words “public utility.” They must receive a construction that will effectuate the evident intent of the legislature and not one that will lead to a manifest absurdity. It was not the furnishing of heat, light, or power to tenants or, incidentally, to a few neighbors that the legislature sought to regulatе, but the furnishing of those commodities to the public, that is, to whoever might require the same. Wis. River Imp. Co. v. Pier,
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to frame a definition for the word “public” that is simplеr or clearer than the word itself. The Century Dictionary defines it as-“of or belonging to the people at large, relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation or community, not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.” The New International defines it as “of or pertaining to the people; relating to or affecting a nation, state or community at large.” The tenants of a landlord are not the рublic, neither are a few of his neighbors or affew isolated individuals with whom he may
While we find it quite easy to ascertain the true spirit and intent of the law, yet we deem it inexpedient and unsafe to attempt to define in more specific terms thаn the statute what does and what does not constitute a public utility. Each case will depend upon its own peсuliar facts and circumstances and must be tested by the statute in the light of such facts and circumstances. The law should receive a construction that will effectuate its true purpose, however difficult that may be. No resort should be had to any arbitrary standard or to any fixed line of demarcation on the ground that they are easy of apрlication, or for any other reason. The statute was intended to include those, and only those, who furnished the commodities therein named to or for the public. It was not intended to affect the relation of landlord and tenant, оr to abridge the right to contract with a few neighbors for a strictly incidental purpose, though relating to a service covered by it.
The conclusions we have arrived at render it unnecessary to determine whether or not the statute unreasonably abridges the right to contract, and whether or not that portion of it prescribing penalties is unconstitutional on the ground that they are excessive.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.