Cavanaugh v. CavanaughCavanaugh v. Cavanaugh
WIGGINTON, Judge.
Pursuant to appellants’ motion for rehearing, we grant the motion and withdraw our earlier opinion in this cause, substituting the following opinion therefor.
This appeal involves the estate of John J. Cavanaugh which was probated beginning with a petition filed in 1977 and culminating in an order of final discharge entered
Predictably, much of the testimony presented at the hearing was conflicting. Undisputed was the fact that John J. Cavanaugh emigrated to this country from Ireland as a young man and in 1912 married Annie Mae Russell in Leon County. Four children, appellants and appellee, were born of this marriage. In time, appellants each married and eventually moved away from their parents’ home. However, appellee remained in his parents’ home until their death.
The property in question was used for farming, grazing, and as a dairy, as well as the family residence. After his return home following World War II, appellee received some vocational training in agriculture and in 1946 entered into a farming “partnership” with his father. John J. Cavanaugh contributed the land, buildings, and his breeders, and appellee purchased some cows. However, in 1965 or 1966, the partnership abandoned the dairy business and for the next ten to twelve years was limited to beef cattle production.
The various tax returns entered into evidence reflect that appellee had negligible interest income until 1974. He testified that most of his subsequently reported interest income was from the proceeds of the condemnation of a portion of his father‘s land for the right of way of Interstate 10, which severs a portion of the property. In or about 1974, appellee‘s name was placed on the accounts containing such condemnation proceeds and the interest was allocated between appellee and his father for income tax purposes. John J. Cavanaugh‘s total adjusted gross income during 1971 to 1976 was $91,486.92. In comparison, appellee‘s total adjusted gross income for that same period was $13,858.57.
On August 24, 1954, John J. Cavanaugh executed a last will and testament devising, inter alia, his real property to his wife for life, remainder to appellee. At the time the will was executed, Cavanaugh was approximately seventy years old and all of his children were adults. By this point in time, and continuing thereafter, John J. Cavanaugh had made gifts of cash and property to appellants. However, he did not give any property to appellee during his life. At the time his will was drafted, Cavanaugh‘s attorney was of the impression that the property was not homestead and he therefore did not advise Cavanaugh concerning the homestead aspects of the attempted devise made in the will.
Over the years, Cavanaugh shifted more and more of the responsibilities of running the partnership to appellee and, for the last four years of his life, completely relinquished those responsibilities to appellee. He also eventually turned over to appellee the personal duties and responsibilities of running the household. Appellee paid the bills, was responsible for providing information to, as well as directing and overseeing the accountant and lawyer regarding tax and legal matters, saw to repairs, and generally assumed the obligation of seeing that the household operated as it should.
Apparently, Cavanaugh‘s attorney was led to believe by Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh that all of the family knew of and acquiesced in Cavanaugh‘s plan of distribution. Indeed, appellants did not contest that disposition until after Mrs. Cavanaugh died in 1984, and even thereafter, until appellee made known his plans in 1986 to marry for the first time. In written closing argument, appellants explained that they did not assert their interest in the disposition of their father‘s property until their mother had passed away because they did not want to upset her and because they were of the impression she had received all of the property. Their subsequent motivating concern was that the property might ultimately fall into the hands of appellee‘s fiance.
Following his death on March 24, 1977, Cavanaugh‘s will was filed with the court and proceedings were commenced by appellee and Cavanaugh‘s attorney. There was a conflict in the manner in which appellee, as personal representative, characterized the property in the pleadings. For example, in the “Motion to Modify Order,” wherein appellee requested elimination of the personal representative‘s bond, appellee represented to the court that the property passed “by operation of law.” However, the motion in addition states that the property passed by operation of law to the widow for and during her natural life, remainder to appellee “pursuant to decedent‘s will.” Next, in the inventory, the property specifically was identified and referred to as “homestead property.” However, the schedule of distribution submitted by appellee with the petition for discharge reflects the distribution under the will to Mrs. Cavanaugh for life, with the remainder to appellee. The petition for administration states that John J. Cavanaugh was also survived by a daughter and two other sons. The attorney testified that the characterization of the property as homestead was an unintentional mistake and did not indicate his belief that the property was homestead. The mistake was corrected in the final inventory which recharacterized the property at issue as an asset of the estate that would pass pursuant to the will.
All notices required to be given in regard to the probate estate were given and notice of probate was filed and published in the local newspaper. Because they were not beneficiaries under the will, appellants were entitled only to notice by publication.1
Based on the foregoing, in its order presently under review, the trial court found that
... at the time of his death, John J. Cavanaugh was 95 years of age and for a substantial time before his death was not physically able, and did not carry out the responsibilities normally associated with the head of a family. John J. Cavanaugh‘s age and physical incapacity required that duties and responsibilities normally performed by and associated
with the head of a family be turned over to, and actually performed by, his son, John R. Cavanaugh. .. .
If the issue before the Court was whether John J. Cavanaugh was the head of a family at the time that he executed his Will some twenty-three years before his death, there would be no doubt that he was. However, the Court is obligated to consider the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time the decedent died, and it is clear that at that time John J. Cavanaugh was not head of a family, and therefore, real property owned by him, and on which he lived, was not homestead.
The issue raised on appeal, of course, is whether John J. Cavanaugh was head of the household for purposes of determining whether the property on which he resided at death was homestead under the meaning of
If not devised as permitted by law and the Florida Constitution, the homestead shall descend in the same manner as other intestate property; but if the decedent is survived by a spouse and lineal descendants, the surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder to the lineal descendants in being at the time of the decedent‘s death.
Appellants argue that the property in the instant case was homestead improperly devised, and therefore should pass in accordance with
Finally, appellants submit that the test employed by the trial court is impractical and arbitrary and, as a matter of policy, the homestead should not be subverted merely because an elderly or infirm parent needs or desires assistance in the management of his affairs in his later years. They conclude that where there is a family in law, giving rise to a legal duty of support, and where the property owner actually furnishes such support, homestead status should continue notwithstanding physical incapacity, absent a lawful alienation or abandonment of the property. We agree.
In determining whether a person is the head of a family, Florida courts have traditionally used a test which requires a showing of either:
(1) a legal duty to support which arises out of a family relationship, or (2) continuing communal living by at least two individuals under such circumstances that one is regarded as in charge.... While the former requirement looks to a “family in law,” the latter looks to a “family in fact,” which arises out of a moral obligation to support.
Holden v. Estate of Gardner, 420 So.2d at 1083. While we recognize that in Holden, “[w]hether an individual is a head of family is a question to be resolved on the facts of each case,” id., we are of the firm opinion that the trial court in the instant case applied an improper analysis in evaluating John J. Cavanaugh‘s status as head of the household.
Where the circumstances show that a family in law exists, as in the instant case where John J. Cavanaugh was survived by his spouse, evidence merely showing that the decedent turned over the management of his home to another does not necessarily result in a relinquishment of the head of the household status. We can conceive of countless scenarios involving the elderly of this state leaning on others to manage the affairs of their home so as not to hold that that circumstance alone, in a twinkling, dissipates their status as head of the household.4 The fact that Mrs. Cavanaugh was living and looked to Mr. Cavanaugh as her managed by their son, was here conclusive of a finding of a family in law with a concomitant legal duty to support, and Cavanaugh‘s invalidism or illness did not establish abandonment of that status.
We are aware, to quote the trial court, that appellee “devoted himself to the care of his aged parents, accepted and carried out responsibilities as the head of the family to the exclusion of any independent personal life, and the establishment of a separate family of his own,” but we are not willing to hold that simply because appellee performed the duties and responsibilities normally performed by and associated with the head of the family, he usurped his father‘s status to that effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the property was not homestead at the time of John J. Cavanaugh‘s death.
An alternative ground was raised by appellee below and now on appeal and concerns whether appellants’ opportunity to assert the homestead status of the property devised by Cavanaugh was foreclosed by the probate of his estate. Appellee contends that the doctrine of res judicata bars appellants from essentially requesting the trial court to determine whether the property owned by Cavanaugh at the time of his death was homestead. Appellee maintains that this was precisely the same question which was included in and fundamental to the probate of the estate, and the fact that the status of the property was never addressed at length by the probate court did not alter the result for it was an issue that could have or should have been litigated and decided by the probate court. Thus, it was a justiciable issue, and “a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and puts to rest every justiciable, as well as every actually litigated, issue.” Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8, 11-12 (Fla. 1984).
Continuing, appellee states that the parties necessary to determine the status of the property were the same in both actions and the evidence upon which the issue was determined was the same, regardless of whether the determination was made at the time of the probate of Cavanaugh‘s estate or presently. Therefore, the suit is barred pursuant to the maxim established in Pitts v. Pitts, 120 Fla. 363, 162 So. 708 (1935), that probate proceedings are in rem and binding on the whole world whether the judgment is erroneous or not.
Appellee relies heavily on the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision in In re Noble‘s Estate, 73 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1954), wherein it held that a probate court has the jurisdiction to consider and determine whether the property has the status of
Competing with appellee‘s position that homestead was a justiciable issue for res judicata purposes are the history and nature of homestead and the rights and exemptions inuring thereby to the persons entitled to it under
There are no provisions in the constitution or statutes which require an election to be made to take homestead in either testate or intestate property. The surviving spouse, regardless of whether the spouse died testate or intestate, takes the fee-simple title to the homestead if there are no lineal descendants; and, if there are lineal descendants, the surviving spouse takes a life estate in the homestead with vested remainder to the lineal descendants in being at the time of the death of the decedent. This vesting of the title to the homestead is fixed by statute, and no election is required of the beneficiaries of the homestead right in order to obtain the benefit of it.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also rule 5.405, Fla.R.P. & G.P., allowing, but not mandating, that the personal representative or any interested person “may” file a petition to determine homestead.
Thus, while at the time Cavanaugh‘s estate was in probate the nature of the property may have been a potentially justiciable issue — in the sense, according to In re Noble‘s Estate, that the probate court had the jurisdiction to consider and determine whether the property was homestead — since neither Mrs. Cavanaugh nor appellants, as homestead beneficiaries under the statute, had a specific duty to seek a determination of the property as homestead before the probate court, we cannot say that the issue was truly “justiciable” for res judicata purposes.5 The mere inclusion of the description of the homestead property in pleadings or orders in probate proceedings does not work to change the status of that property as homestead. Spitzer v. Branning; In re Estate of Donaldson, 147 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the application of appellee‘s res judicata argument to the instant case for the reason that, by its very nature, the homestead property was not a subject of the probate proceedings. Res judicata applies only
We also disagree with appellee‘s position that appellants were parties during the probate proceedings in order to establish the second element of res judicata — identity of parties. Appellants were not actual parties to the proceedings and the fact of their merely being homestead beneficiaries by virtue of
In so holding, we have not overlooked
Again, we decline to agree with appellee. Although Spitzer predated the new Probate Code, the law set forth therein, generally, as to homestead property has not changed. We reiterate: the homestead was not an asset of the Cavanaugh estate to be devised and it thereby, in that sense, passed outside of probate. If, during the course of the administration, the trial court had been presented a petition indicating the estate consisted of no more than the homestead and exempt personal property, it could have ordered summary administration and the distribution of the estate according to statute, as well as the discharge of appellee as the personal representative. See
Nonetheless, we hold that the policy consideration which was the basis of the decision in DeWitt v. Duce — that all questions of succession to property be authoritatively settled — should be as applicable to a homestead claim as to other collateral claims, whether grounded upon statutory prohibition or broader considerations. Our opinion reversing the trial court‘s decision that the property was not homestead and rejecting appellee‘s argument that res judicata applies would allow appellants to collaterally attack the probate judgment by asserting a homestead claim years after the probate judgment had become final. In this context, there is no controlling significance in the fact that appellants were not formally made parties to the probate litigation if they had actual knowledge of the proceeding, including notice that the specific property which they now claim as homestead was before the probate court for distribution, absent a showing of fraud or other circumstances preventing their participating in the probate proceeding and asserting a homestead claim.
The issue is thus presented whether the affirmative defenses of estoppel or laches — both raised by appellee below but not addressed by the trial court — would bar appellants from now pursuing a homestead claim in a collateral proceeding. The viability of these defenses depends, obviously, upon the weighing and considering of all facts and circumstances surrounding the controversy between the parties. This entails a determination, among other things, as to the extent of appellants’ knowledge concerning the probate court‘s apparent assertion of jurisdiction to order distribution of the homestead property; the extent to which appellants’ failure to act was influenced, if at all, by conduct or representations of appellee; the reasonableness of appellants’ failure to act in light of all the circumstances; and the extent of the detriment to appellee, if any, occasioned by appellants’ delayed assertion of their claim to the property. Since these are matters which must first be considered by the trial court, we find it necessary to remand this cause for further proceedings.
In sum, we reverse the trial court‘s order holding that the property was not homestead but find it necessary to remand the cause to allow the trial court to address the affirmative defenses of estoppel and laches. Additionally, should the trial court reject these defenses, it must then address the issue of whether parcels one and three of the property should be included in the description of the homestead.
REVERSED but REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SMITH, C.J., concurs.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs with opinion.
WENTWORTH, Judge, concurring.
I concur in the majority‘s disposition of the case on rehearing. While recognizing that a homestead interest is created by operation of law, I would emphasize on remand that if appellants had knowledge or notice that the property was being distributed by the probate court, their failure then to place their homestead claim before the court should preclude their doing so after entry and reliance on the order of distribution.
A probate proceeding is an in rem action which, when properly commenced and noticed, becomes binding as to the resulting adjudication. See Pitts v. Pitts, 120 Fla. 363, 162 So. 708 (1935). The judgment of a probate court may authoritatively settle questions of succession to property (see DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1981)), and a probate court has long been recognized to have jurisdiction to consider whether a decedent‘s property has the status of homestead. In re Noble‘s Estate, 73 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1954). As a result of such a determination the question of “how the title shall descend ... is consequential.” Ibid. at 874.
Policy considerations as to the finality of judgments clearly should be applicable to a homestead claim as to other collateral claims. Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938), was decided when probate
I also agree that for the purpose of estoppel there would be no significance in the fact that appellants were not formally made parties to the probate litigation. The record and briefs on appeal indicate that they had statutory notice and actual knowledge of the proceeding, including notice that the specific property which they now claim as homestead was before the probate court for distribution. There was no showing of fraud or other circumstance preventing their participation in the probate proceeding and assertion of a homestead claim. If they declined to assert such a claim while aware that the probate court was addressing the distribution of the property, thereby allowing entry of and reliance on the probate judgment based upon non-homestead status of the property, appellants should now be estopped from pursuing a homestead claim in a collateral proceeding.