MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On May 4, 2009, Gina Scopa, then a pretrial detainee at the Suffolk County House of Correction (“HOC”), committed suicide by hanging herself in her cell in the medical housing unit. Her son, Anthony Cavanagh,
Cavanagh asserts that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Sco
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Ms. Scopa’s Initial Intake at the House of Correction
On April 28, 2009, Ms. Scopa was detained by the Boston Police Department and placed into the custody of the HOC. Nurse Claire Diaz completed an intake process with Ms. Scopa on her arrival at the HOC, during which she reviewed Ms. Scopa’s mental health history and completed a standard intake form. Ms. Scopa reported a history of a mental health disorder, denoted on the intake form as “major depression,”
Diaz determined that Ms. Scopa did not require critical observation and did not place Ms. Scopa on suicide watch, but did refer her for a routine mental health assessment. Detainees with intake forms like Ms. Scopa’s were considered low priority referrals for the mental health clinicians; accordingly, Ms. Scopa would not have been evaluated right away if there were referrals pending for higher priority inmates. Given her low priority status, Ms. Scopa never received this mental health evaluation.
2. Medical Housing Unit Policies and Staffing
The medical unit of the HOC consists of two areas: a clinic for treatment of regularly housed inmates, and a medical housing unit. The medical housing unit employs two forms of mental health watches: one consisting of a one-on-one watch where an officer maintains visual contact of the inmate, and the other consisting of checks by an officer on an inmate every fifteen minutes. For inmates who are placed on suicide watch, a suicide prevention policy governs monitoring and treatment of the inmate. Classification for mental health watch is made by the mental health clinicians; correctional officers do not have access to inmates’ medical or mental health records. The officers perform one-on-one observations, as directed by the mental health clinicians, but also may be asked to assume the responsibilities of a standard correctional officer in the unit on a break.
When an inmate is admitted to the unit for mental health reasons, the mental health clinicians complete a checklist indicating items that cannot be brought into the cell. Inmates who are not on mental health watch may bring any property they
On May 4, 2009, Fitzgibbon was stationed at the front of the infirmary, in the clinic section, and was tasked with operating the doors connecting the medical housing unit to the clinic. At no point in the relevant time period did Fitzgibbon leave this post. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Taranto — a security supervisor — and Coppinger began their shifts in the medical housing unit. At 3:40 p.m.,. Fitzpatrick reported to the unit to conduct a one-on-one observation of an inmate.
3. Ms. Scopa’s Admission to the Medical Unit and Subsequent Death
Ms. Scopa was admitted to the medical housing unit at or around 2:45 p.m. on May 4, 2009, due to recurrent challenges in undergoing methadone detoxification.
Accordingly, Ms. Scopa was not subject to the special processes or policies applicable to those on mental health or suicide watches. She was placed in cell # 16, which is not designated for mental health watches, and she was permitted to bring any property she had on her person into the unit, including her shoes and shoelaces. She was to be checked by way of officer-conducted rounds at irregular intervals every thirty minutes. These rounds are intended to ensure the safety of the inmates and account for all inmates in the unit.
The following activity occurred in Ms. Scopa’s cell that afternoon, as depicted on closed-circuit television (CCTV) video footage from within the cell. Around 3:07 p.m., shortly after her arrival in the unit, a correctional officer delivered Ms. Scopa’s personal affects to her. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Ms. Scopa was banging on the cell door and yelling for a nurse. Around 4:26 p.m., Nurse Samantha Thomas entered Ms. Scopa’s cell to give her anti-nausea medication. Coppinger accompanied Thomas into the cell for security purposes. They left Ms. Scopa’s cell about a minute after they entered, without conducting an inspection of any objects in the room.
Cavanagh contends that during Coppinger and Thomas’s visit to Ms. Scopa’s cell, there was a visible loop of string, specifically a shoelace potentially knotted into a noose, on the floor of Ms. Scopa’s cell. The parties agree that a loop of string, whether knotted as a noose or unknotted, in a detainee’s cell could be considered by a correctional officer to pose a significant risk of self-harm, although the defendants contend that it does not necessarily pose such a risk. Coppinger says that he does not have a specific memory of his interaction with Ms. Scopa and that he cannot definitively state whether he observed specific objects on the floor of her cell. He further contends, however, that if he were to see such an object that would pose a serious risk of self-inflicted harm in the cell of a non-mental-health watch detainee, he would take action immediately to prevent such harm.
Between 5:05 and 5:10 p.m., Fitzpatrick assisted in distributing food trays to inmates in the medical housing unit, at the request of Taranto. Ms. Scopa refused her meal. At that time, Fitzpatrick ob
At 5:24 p.m., Ms. Scopa began attempting to hang herself by securing a shoelace fashioned as a noose around the top bunk bed post. She succeeded in hanging herself at 5:28 p.m. and was dead within minutes. None of the officers observed Ms. Scopa again until around 6:10 p.m.
As was his custom upon returning from a break, Taranto conducted a visual check of the three CCTV monitors in the medical housing unit. When he viewed cell # 16 on the monitor, he noticed that Ms. Scopa had “her back against the post of the bunk, slouched over in an awkward position.” He ran immediately to Ms. Scopa’s cell, looked through the window, and saw her “hanging from the bunk with what appeared to be a shoelace around her neck.” He sent a radio notification of a “man down” and entered the cell with Coppinger. Taranto and Coppinger took hold of Ms. Scopa and released her from the bunk, removing the shoelace from her neck. Numerous emergency personnel thereafter arrived at the cell, but resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful. Ms. Scopa was transported to Boston Medical Center, where she was pronounced dead. The cause of her death was asphyxia by hanging, brought about by suicide.
B. Procedural History
Cavanagh filed this action on April 26, 2012, against the four correctional officers — Taranto, Fitzgibbon, Coppinger, and Fitzpatrick — in their individual capacities, and against Andrea Cabral and Gerald Horgan in their individual and official capacities as Sheriff of Suffolk County and Superintendent of the Suffolk County House of Correction, respectively. In an amended complaint, filed on December 28, 2012, Cavanagh asserts the violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by all defendants (Count I), supervisory liability under § 1983 by Defendants Cabral and Horgan, and punitive damages under § 1983 (Count VIII), as well as the violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11(1) (Counts III and IV), negligence (Count V), wrongful death under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (Count VI), and gross negligence (Count VII).
All of the defendants moved to dismiss all counts of the amended complaint, except Count I, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
On May 8, 2014, the defendants filed the motions for summary judgment now before me.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT
Because the motion to strike is relevant to the scope of the summary judgment record and arguably material, I will address it first before considering the merits of the summary judgment motions.
A. Background
1. The Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures
Cavanagh seeks to include as part of the summary judgment record the expert report of Melvin Tucker, a retired police chief who serves as a litigation expert with regard to correctional facilities. On December 23, 2013, Cavanagh served a document entitled “Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures” on the defendants, reserving the right to supplement it with a full report following the deposition of Thomas, the nurse who entered Ms. Scopa’s cell on May 4. In that document, Cavanagh identified Tucker as a potential expert witness, described his education, publications and experience, and indicated the opinions he expected to offer.
Under a revised scheduling order, the plaintiffs full expert disclosures were due February 10, 2014, extended from an earlier disclosure deadline of December 20, 2013. On February 24, 2014, approximately two weeks after the disclosure deadline, Cavanagh supplemented his prior partial expert disclosure with a document entitled “Plaintiffs Supplemental Expert Disclo
On May 30, 2014, Cavanagh submitted a draft expert report as an exhibit to his opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants contend that this is the first time they had seen a report from Tucker. This report was unsigned and lacked lists of Tucker’s publications and cases in which he had previously provided expert testimony.
On July 10, 2014, along with his reply to the defendants’ motion to strike Tucker’s opinion, Cavanagh submitted a full expert report, apparently disclosing it to defense counsel for the first time and asking that it be substituted for the earlier draft expert report.
2. Proposed Expert Testimony
Tucker’s opinions are based on his review of depositions and other documents in evidence, his personal knowledge of and experience in the field, and statistical reports regarding national suicide rates in jails. Tucker opines that it should have been obvious to the HOC staff that Ms. Scopa posed a substantial risk of serious harm to herself, and that all HOC staff should have been trained in supervising inmates who are at risk of suicide. He specifically opines that the HOC staffs failure “to take reasonable actions to reduce the risk that Gina Scopa would commit suicide ... demonstrated a deliberate indifference to [her] safety and well being.”
Tucker further opines that national research has established several characteristics that indicate a predisposition to suicide, including having a history of substance abuse and/or mental illness, being placed in a detention facility rather than in a holding facility and in isolation rather than in a shared cell, and being Caucasian. These predisposing factors are referenced to support his opinion that Ms. Scopa presented an obvious suicide risk, and that “a reasonable intake clinician would have flagged Scopa for removal of shoe laces (or anything else she could have used to hang herself) and would have made sure she was not put in a cell by herself (another inmate to watch her) and would have used the most suicide resistant available cell (with no protrusions to hang from).” Finally, Tucker opines that Coppinger specifically exhibited “a gross misunderstanding of his duties and obligations and a deliberate indifference to [Ms. Scopa’s] safety,” and that the other correctional officers on duty that day similarly “did not have a clear understanding of the [department] policies and procedures.”
The defendants have moved to strike
B. Analysis
1. Timeliness of Disclosure
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires that expert witness disclosures be accompanied by a written report. This report, prepared and signed by the expert, must be submitted at a time ordered by the court and must contain: “(i) a complete statement of all opinions
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1), the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) typically requires a sanction — a prohibition on the use of the inadequately disclosed witness to supply evidence on a dispositive motion, for example — “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” See Gay v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co.,
Cavanagh’s submissions prior to July 10, 2014, did not meet the requirements of Rule 26(a). The draft expert report submitted on May 30, 2014, three and a half months after the disclosure deadline, did not contain Tucker’s signature, copies of the exhibits relied on and referenced in the report, a statement of Tucker’s qualifications in the form of a C.V., a list of all recent publications, or a list of all recent cases, as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Similarly, the disclosures provided on December 23, 2013, before the disclosure deadline, and on February 24, 2014, two weeks after the deadline, did not satisfy the requirement that a written expert report accompany the disclosures.
Cavanagh contends that any failure on his part to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) was substantially justified or otherwise harmless to the defendants, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1), and that his good faith effort to comply with the rule should permit the full expert report to stand. I disagree.
Cavanagh has offered no reasonable explanation for delaying to submit the expert report. He contends that he could not provide all the necessary materials to Tucker for review until after Thomas was deposed. When Thomas did not appear for her deposition sometime prior to the February 10, 2014 expert disclosure deadline — an issue that Cavanagh did not bring to my attention in connection with a request for a deadline extension — Cavanagh determined that it would be necessary to prepare Tucker’s report without Thomas’s • testimony. Cavanagh asserts that he believed that his supplemental disclosure on February 24, 2014 satisfied the requirements of Rule 26(a), and that this submission was justifiably delayed by his efforts to locate and depose Thomas.
Lawyers are expected to know the rules governing discovery and motion practice in federal courts and in this district. That Cavanagh believed — wrongly—that his February 24 submission complied with the rule does not serve to justify its inadequacy. Nor do the apparent difficulties in deposing Thomas justify the delay in full disclosure, where Cavanagh was aware of this issue before the disclosure deadline and could have brought it to my attention for purposes of relief from the deadline. This was plainly unjustified and unreasonable. See Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v. P.R. Ports Auth.,
However, an unjustifiably delayed disclosure will merit exclusion of the delayed evidence under Rule 37(c) only if the delay also causes some harm or prejudice to the opposing party. See Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc.,
To be sure, it would be possible now to take the time and make the additional effort for the defendants in an effort to overcome any adverse effects stemming from the delayed disclosure. But Cavanagh has offered no justification for the late disclosure, instead simply disregarding clear court-imposed deadlines and failing to review the applicable federal rules, and has not demonstrated any need for the late evidence, as will be discussed briefly below. See Harriman,
2. Expert Qualification Requirements
Even if Tucker’s expert report were not precluded on untimeliness grounds, much if not all of it would be excluded due to Tucker’s lack of qualifications to testify to numerous of the opinions he offers in his report.
Expert testimony that is based on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge must comply with Fed.R.Evid. 702, which requires that such testimony be “based upon sufficient facts or data” and the result of the expert’s reliable “application of [reliable] principles and methods ... to the facts.” An expert providing such testimony must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. Consistent with Rule 702, scientific or specialized expert testimony must be excluded if it is unreliable or irrelevant. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
The defendants challenge the substance of Tucker’s opinions on two grounds. First, they assert that Tucker lacks the requisite knowledge, experience, and skill to opine on the mental health of Ms. Scopa at the time of her detainment, taking particular issue with Tucker’s effort to provide a mental health evaluation of Ms. Scopa. J agree. Although I find Tucker’s qualifications potentially adequate for stating an opinion as to appropriate correctional institution policies and protocols for ensuring inmate safety, Cavanagh has not laid the proper foundation for the admission of the portion of Tucker’s expert testimony evaluating Ms. Scopa’s mental health. Tucker points only to general national statistics, some of which are not even indicative of a greater suicide risk, as support for his opinion that Ms. Scopa possessed certain predisposing characteristics that made her at an obvious risk for suicide. Cavanagh has accordingly not met his burden of demonstrating that Tucker’s opinion on this issue is the product of the application of reliable principles and methods, or that his experience “is a sufficient basis for the opinion.” See Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Second, the defendants contend that many of Tucker’s opinions are irrelevant to this action. I agree with this conclusion as well. The assertions, for example, that the supervisory staff failed to train the correctional officers properly as to suicide prevention and that a reasonable mental health clinician would have deemed Ms. Scopa to pose a suicide risk, are irrelevant to the question whether the correctional officers who are defendants here were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk posed by Ms. Scopa. See Fed.R.Evid. 402. These opinions simply do not have a “valid ... connection to the pertinent .inquiry” of whether the particular defendants here had actual knowledge of Ms. Scopa’s serious risk of self-harm and were deliberately indifferent to that risk. See Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods.,
Accordingly, I will grant the motion to strike, noting also that — even if considered — Tucker’s report would not forestall
III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The only remaining theory of liability in this matter is that the four correctional officers violated Ms. Scopa’s constitutional rights as a pretrial detainee in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by acting in deliberate indifference to her substantial, known risk of serious self-inflicted harm, through three failures or omissions: (1) failing to recognize obvious characteristics indicating Ms. Scopa’s predisposition to suicidal tendencies, classify her as suicidal, and implement the procedures accompanying this classification, including removing her shoelaces and placing her in a suicide-resistant cell; (2) failing to conduct proper and timely cell checks and rounds in accordance with the unit’s policy requiring irregular thirty-minute checks; and (3) on the part of Coppinger, failing to notice— when he entered Ms. Scopa’s cell an hour before her death — an obvious white loop on the floor resembling a noose that presented a clear and serious risk of harm to Ms. Scopa.
The defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no triable issue of fact that would permit a jury to find in Cavanagh’s favor. Specifically, they assert that they had no knowledge that Ms. Scopa presented a risk of suicide and therefore were not deliberately indifferent to that risk; that any failure to conduct timely and sufficiently thorough cell cheeks was not a proximate cause of Ms. Scopa’s death; and that Coppinger did not observe the object on the floor that presented a risk to Ms. Scopa’s safety and therefore did not have the knowledge required for liability under the deliberate indifference standard.
A. Standard of Review
The purpose of summary judgment practice is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
A “genuine” issue is one that, based on the supporting evidence, “a reasonable jury could resolve ... in favor of the non-moving party,” and a “material” fact is one that has “the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Sanchez v. Alvarado,
If the moving party satisfies the burden of showing, based on evidentiary material, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate by reference to spe
B. Qualified Immunity
During motion to dismiss practice, the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity from all of the plaintiff’s claims. In addressing the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss, I did not take up the question of qualified immunity as to the only count that I determined would remain — Count I — because the defendants conceded that the count stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Perhaps thinking that my decision implicitly rejected their qualified immunity arguments even after evidentiary development, the defendants did not raise this defense again in their initial summary judgment submissions. At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, however, I directed the submission of briefing on the qualified immunity issue and now consider whether the remaining defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that basis.
1. Legal Standard
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
In an effort to maximize the efficient use of judicial resources, the Supreme Court has stated that it is not necessary to analyze the first prong of the qualified immunity test where doing so will “have no effect on the outcome of the case.” Pearson,
The second prong of the test assesses “whether the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the defendant fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional.” Maldonado,
2. Analysis
a. Clearly Established Right
It was and is clearly established that “police officers violate the fourteen amendment due process rights of a detainee if they display a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the unusually strong risk that a detainee will commit suicide.”
Establishing “deliberate indifference” requires proof of “(1) an unusually serious risk of harm (self-inflicted harm, in a suicide case), (2) defendant’s actual knowledge of (or, at least, willful blindness to) that elevated risk, and (3) defendant’s failure to take obvious steps to address that known, serious risk.” Manante,
b. What an Objectively Reasonable Official Would Believe Under the Circumstances
Although the right Cavanagh alleges is clearly established, to avoid qualified immunity the bounds and contours of a violation of that right must also be sufficiently clear such that no reasonable official could believe that the conduct of these officers at the time constituted deliberate indifference and therefore a violation of Ms. Scopa’s constitutional right. Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
Under this standard, the question is whether any reasonable officer in the position of each of the defendants at the time would have reasonably believed that “his actions, or willful failure to act, amounted to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the serious risk” that Ms. Scopa would harm herself. Bowen,
i. Deliberate Indifference to Ms. Scopa’s Mental Health History and Needs
Cavanagh initially contended that all four defendants recklessly disregarded certain indicators and predisposing factors that should have warned the officers that Ms. Scopa posed a risk of self-harm.
It is undisputed that Ms. Scopa was never identified as a suicide risk within the HOC, either through a formal process or through informal observations by the HOC staff.
Although other HOC staff, such as the clinicians who evaluated Ms. Scopa on her initial intake and her intake into the medical housing unit, may have known that these factors can correlate with suicidal ideations, there is no evidence that the defendant officers were aware of such correlations, their validity as a predictive measure of suicide risk, or their application to Ms. Scopa. In fact, it is undisputed that the defendants were not trained to make such assessments. There is no genuine dispute, therefore, that the defendants did not have actual knowledge of Ms. Scopa’s risk of self-harm.
Mere failure to perceive a significant risk does not satisfy the knowledge
In Bowen, another jail suicide case, the First Circuit concluded that even if a correctional officer had been trained in suicide screening, there was no evidence that he could have prevented the suicide of an individual who exhibited no manifestations of suicidal potential to the officer. Bowen,
Similarly here, Cavanagh has not adduced any evidence that would permit a
ii. Deliberate Indifference Through Inadequate Cell Checks
Cavanagh asserts that the defendants’ failure to conduct proper cell checks at irregular thirty-minute intervals also constituted deliberate indifference to Ms. Scopa’s safety and her serious risk of self-harm. There is arguably a genuine fact dispute as to when the cell checks were conducted and whether they complied with HOC policy.
As discussed above, Cavanagh has not adduced any evidence demonstrating that the defendants had actual knowledge of or were willfully blind to Ms. Scopa’s risk of self-harm. Such knowledge is required for any deliberate indifference claim. See Farmer,
Indeed, the existing ease law at the time suggested that inadequate cell checks would not serve as a basis for liability for á suicide absent other indicators of suicidal risk. See Bowen,
in. Coppinger’s Deliberate Indifference to a Visible, Looped Shoelace
Finally, I turn to whether Coppinger is entitled to qualified immunity for his action or inaction while inside Ms. Scopa’s cell. As a threshold matter, I assume for the purposes of this analysis that a reasonable officer would have observed a looped shoelace on the floor of Ms. Scopa’s cell, which is a genuinely disputed fact here, and further that Coppinger’s failure to notice the shoelace, examine it further to determine if it was knotted as a noose, and remove it from Ms. Scopa’s cell constituted deliberate indifference to or willful disregard of a clear, serious risk of harm to Ms. Scopa.
The parties do not dispute that a looped shoelace in an inmate’s cell could be considered by a correctional officer to pose a significant risk of self-harm. Cavanagh has not demonstrated, however, that it was
It is clear from the ease law that deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence. Farmer,
Accordingly, at the time of Ms. Scopa’s death it was not “beyond debate” that failing to take action in response to viewing a looped shoelace on the floor of a detainee’s cell, absent any other indicators of suicidal tendencies, was so clear a violation of the detainee’s Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment right that “every ‘reasonable official would have understood’ ” that this inattention violates that right, al-Kidd,
IV. CONCLUSION
The circumstances which give rise to this case are tragic. But tragedy does not justify disregard of orderly processes for the timely resolution of liability. Nor does tragedy overcome well-settled legal principles which guide the resolution of liability. Based on the summary judgment record before me, liability may not be imposed
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that:
The correctional officer defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs expert report, Dkt. No. 66, is GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that
The motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendants Taranto, Fitzgibbon, and Coppinger; Dkt. No. 51, and the motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant Fitzpatrick, Dkt. No. 54, are GRANTED.
Notes
. Although the plaintiff’s name is spelled "Cavanaugh” in some of the filings, it appears that the proper spelling is "Cavanagh.”
. The parties dispute whether the indication that Ms. Scopa had been diagnosed with "major depression” accurately depicts Ms. Scopa’s clinical diagnosis. The defendants assert that it was Diaz’s understanding that this box could be checked on the form where an inmate suffered from any form of depression— not necessarily major depression — whereas Cavanagh contends that Diaz would only check the box if Ms. Scopa suffered from major depression. The parties agree, however, that an individual can be depressed without presenting a risk of hurting herself.
. After intake on April 28, Diaz assigned Ms. Scopa to the medical housing unit for drug detoxification. She was transferred to a regular female housing unit two days later.
. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Taranto had left the unit for his dinner break, during which time Coppinger and Fitzpatrick were responsible for monitoring the inmates in the medical housing unit. From 6:03 p.m. until 6:10 Coppinger was occupied with a disruptive detainee in another cell.
. Fitzpatrick retained separate counsel and filed a motion to dismiss only after I ruled on the other defendants’ motion to dismiss. I granted Fitzpatrick's motion consistent with my ruling on the motion of the other defendants.
. Fitzpatrick filed his own motion for summary judgment separately from the other defendants.
. The day before the hearing on the defendants’ summary judgment motions, plaintiff's counsel submitted two DVDs with additional CCTV video footage. The first DVD provided video footage taken from the hallway outside of Ms. Scopa’s cell — which had not previously been presented — and the complete video footage from inside Ms. Scopa’s cell, which had been offered in part previously. The second DVD contained clips of the video footage to which the plaintiff wished to draw attention. The defendants objected to the introduction of the DVDs due to their untimeliness. The only CCTV video footage that was properly part of the summary judgment record is that submitted as Exhibit Z to the defendants’ statement of material facts, Dkt. No. 53. The belated submittal of additional materials by plaintiff’s counsel after the record on which summary judgment was sought and had been closed and contested in writing is of a piece with his litigation practice — and apparent strategy' — of seeking to forestall timely and orderly resolution of the dispositive motion record by untimely submission of additional materials following the conclusion of briefing. See infra Section II. I decline to consider such vagrant submissions and note in the alternative that the additional video submissions add nothing material to the record.
. Although Fitzpatrick does not join this motion by the other defendants, my ruling applies equally to him.
. In the memorandum Cavanagh filed following the motion hearing in this matter, he indicated that he no longer opposes Fitzgibhon's motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, it is my obligation to assess whether summary judgment is warranted for each defendant on the record before me. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), committee notes on Rules — 2010 amendment.
. As a formal matter, constitutional due process rights of pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, as Cavanagh alleges. Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty.,
. In addition to conceding that summary judgment may enter as to the claim against Fitzgibbon, see supra note 9, Cavanagh scales back on this argument generally in his supplemental briefing, stating that it is irrelevant whether Ms. Scopa was placed on a mental health watch because the duty to investigate dangerous objects applies to all inmates. This reformulation, however, is simply another way of asserting that the defendants should have known that Ms. Scopa would or did possess a dangerous object. This assertion is inextricably tied to the premise that an object permissibly possessed by Ms. Scopa — her shoelaces — was rendered dangerous by her mental health issues.
. That Ms. Scopa never received the mental health evaluation for which she was referred at initial intake — and at which she arguably could have been flagged for a mental health watch based on her depression and recent hospitalizations for drug overdoses — is not a failure attributable to these defendants, who have no involvement with or access to the mental health screening process.
. Nor do the interactions by three of the defendants with Ms. Scopa demonstrate that they were on notice of any mental instability, especially where they had limited or no contact with her. Fitzgibbon was not in the medical housing unit but rather was working in the front of the infirmary. Consequently, he had no interaction with Ms. Scopa or any
. Cavanagh asserts that numerous of Ms. Scopa's characteristics, including her ethnicity, her need for detoxification due to recent consumption of psychotropic medication, her history of mental illness, and her placement in an isolated cell within a detention facility (as opposed to a shared cell in a holding facility), rendered her an obvious suicide risk, based on national statistics on the characteristics of individuals who commit suicide in jail. The only evidence he offers in support of these statistics is the expert report of Tucker, which I have stricken from the summary judgment record. See supra Section II.
Even if Cavanagh had presented admissible evidence of these predisposing factors, he has not presented evidence that would impute knowledge of these factors to the officers in order to satisfy the knowledge requirement for deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan,
. Rounds in the medical housing unit at the HOC are to be conducted for non-mental-health watch inmates at irregular thirty-minute intervals, and are to be documented in the unit logbook. No rounds were recorded in the logbook after 3:07 p.m. on the day of Ms. Scopa’s death. The defendants assert that they considered the distribution and collection of food trays, which occurred at 5:03 p.m. and 5:19 p.m., respectively, to constitute cell checks that adequately substituted for rounds. The defendants further contend that cell checks were performed at 3:37 p.m., 4:08 p.m., 4:20 p.m., 4:21 p.m., 4:25 p.m., 5:03 p.m., and 5:19 p.m., based on the CCTV footage. However, a sheriff's department investigator concluded that unit rounds were not timely completed on the afternoon of May 4, 2009. There is accordingly a genuine fact dispute regarding what constitutes an adequate cell check during routine rounds and whether this standard was met.
. I make this assumption despite questions of fact on the record before me, namely, whether the object on the floor was in the shape of a loop or noose, and whether it could not go unobserved to someone who entered the cell, including a reasonable officer with Coppinger's knowledge, experience, and characteristics at the time.
A review of the CCTV footage, to the extent what it depicts can be deciphered, could support the following narrative. Before Coppinger enters the cell, Ms. Scopa can be seen dropping an object on her bed, but it is unclear what the object is. At the time Copping-er and Thomas arrive, there are several, largely unidentifiable, items on the floor by Ms. Scopa’s bed. One of the objects could plausibly be a loop. At 4:25 p.m., the cell door opens, and Thomas stands in the doorway talking to Ms. Scopa. Coppinger is visible but does not enter the room until after the nurse approaches Ms. Scopa. Coppinger walks within approximately two feet of Ms. Scopa's bunk, over the objects on the floor, and toward the window on the far side of the bed. Thomas turns her back to Coppinger and Ms. Scopa, appearing to prepare the medication. Coppinger variably looks out the window and back at Ms. Scopa while Thomas administers the medication. Thomas leaves the room, and Coppinger appears to have a brief exchange with Ms. Scopa (or at least to have looked at her) and then follows Thomas out of the room. Based on this plausible narrative, I find that reasonable fact-finders viewing the CCTV footage could reach different conclusions on what Coppinger saw or should have seen.
. There is some indication in the record that Coppinger had an earlier interaction with Ms. Scopa that afternoon in which she requested medical attention and informed Coppinger that she was undergoing detoxification for methadone. This interaction, standing alone, would not have put Coppinger on notice of any suicidal predisposition Ms. Scopa may have been exhibiting, however.