Causey v. . Davis

Mar 21, 1923
Versions:185 N.C. 155
116 S.E. 401
1923 N.C. LEXIS 40
*157 HoKE, J.

In an action of tbis character, a plaintiff may sue for a breach of the contract of carriage or in tort for a breach of duty imposed by the law. Peanut Co. v. R. R., 155 N. C., 148; C. S., 3475, and cases cited.

Where the suit is for breach of the contract, the damages are such as were in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the same was made, and when for tort recovery may be had for all the direct damages and such consequential damages as may be reasonably and ordinarily expected to result from such an injury at the time the same is committed. See Penn v. Tel. Co., 159 N. C., 306. In estimating the amount of recovery for breach of contract, or for consequential damages occasioned by a tort, the claimant is properly restricted, as stated, to those that are the natural and probable results of his wrong, and if a plaintiff seeks to recover additional damages by reason of special circumstances, it must be shown that these circumstances were known to the parties in the one case at the time of contract made, and in the other at the time of tort committed, and under conditions that afforded the defendant a fair and reasonable opportunity of avoiding or preventing the'additional damages claimed. This was the principle approved and applied in the Peanut Co. case, supra. In that case the special circumstances claimed as justifying an award of additional damages were not known to the parties at the time of shipment, and were therefore not competent in an action for breach of contract merely, but plaintiff offered to show that after the carriage of the goods was entered upon, and when they had reached the town of Rocky Mount, defendant company was fully informed of all the special circumstances calling for prompt delivery, and with that knowledge had negligently failed to forward the goods from Rocky Mount, or some intervening point, to their destination, and it was held that the evidence tending to establish these facts was competent on the question of damages.

But in the present case the damages in our opinion have been properly restricted whether the suit be treated as in contract or tort, there being no evidence offered that the railroad had any knowledge of plaintiff’s purpose in going to Franklinville at the time she bought her ticket or took passage in the train at Sanford. Nor is there any evidence that the railroad was at any time informed of the purpose of plaintiff’s journey in time to have corrected the alleged default or prevented the special damages claimed. Development Co. v. R. R., 147 N. C., 503.

In any aspect of the matter, therefore, plaintiff can recover only the actual damages suffered, to wit, the additional cost of her trip. That being the only damages ordinarily to be expected from the default alleged, and there being no knowledge of any special circumstances affect *158 ing tbe question of damages brought home to defendant in time to have prevented the additional injury complained of.

The cause, in our opinion, has been correctly tried, and the judgment is affirmed as entered.

No error.