26 Barb. 177 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1857
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from the decision of the surrogate of the county of New York, decreeing that letters of administration issue to John P. Ferrie, as next of kin to Jeanne Du Lux, a widow, who departed this life in November, 1854, intestate.
The personal estate of the decedent, amassed by her while trading in the city of New York, probably exceeded the sum of $100,000; and as none of her kin resided in New York, the surrogate, in the first instance, granted letters of collection on her estate to the public administrator. On the 11th day of December, 1854, Ferrie filed his petition with the surrogate, praying letters of administration on the estate of the decedent, on the ground that he was her child, and her only child, and consequently, her sole next of kin and heir. This was denied by the public administrator, and by distant relatives of the decedent, named Caujolle, natives and residents of France. The questions' involved in the contest were, 1st, whether Ferrie was the- son of the decedent, and 2d, if her son, whether he was legitimate.
Jeanne Du Lux was a native of Pau, Province of Beam, 1 in France, and was born November 24th, 1777. She was the
Belthazar Ferrie was a tanner, and a resident of St. Girons. When he first heard of the intimacy of his son with Jeanne Icard, he was very much displeased; and, when he found that Valentin declared it was his intention to marry her, he refused to hold any intercourse with him. Valentin soon left his father’s house, and he and Jeanne Icard went to live' together in a part of a house, belonging to Mr. Benoz at St. Girons, at the entrance of the city. They continued to cohabit together: it does not appear very satisfactorily how long; but during this period, in June, 1800, the respondent was born at this house. Valentin was present at the birth, and acted in the usual way in which any father in lawful wedlock would act on such an occasion. He had the child baptized by the curé of Ledor, as appears from the baptismal records of the church, in which he is stated to be Belthazar Pierre Feme, the son of Valentin and of Jane Icard—godfather Belthazar Ferrie, and godmother Rose Ferrie. The child (as is very usual in France) was put to nurse with country "people, with the concurrence • and consent of both parents, who continued to live together in the same intimate relation for some time, but how long it is impossible to infer from the testimony, which is very unsatisfactory on many points, particularly
When Du Lux went to Bordeaux in 1812, he commenced an inquiry, at the request of the decedent, for the respondent Ferrie; Du Lux did not succeed in obtaining any positive information respecting him; and it was not until 1815, when the decedent visited her native country, that she succeeded in finding him. She placed him in a school in Bordeaux, and proceeded to Paris; a Mght or two, however, after his arrival, he fled, and returned to the mountains, where he had been brought up. Madame Du Lux returned to Hew York; but in a short time Ferrie was discovered and taken to St. Girons, Ms birth-place, and was placed under the care of Mr. Ánere,
I. I have no doubt that Ferrie was the son, and not the nephew, of the decedent, notwithstanding that in all her correspondence for a number of years, she uniformly referred to him as her nephew. There is no evidence, however, that she had a" sister, or that either of her brothers was married, or ever had any children.
The evidence is incontrovertible, on the other hand, that she had a son, and that, although she had repeatedly spoken of the respondent as her nephew, she more frequently, in confidential conversations, and, latterly, almost uniformly spoke of him as her son, and in those conversations she discloses one reason why she called him nephew. M. Daguene says that in 1819, when Du Lux had gone away, she told him, “ I cannot call him (Ferrie) my son; the fellow looks too old;” and afterwards, “ I can’t call him my son, he is too old/* There is other testimony that this vanity, which lingered in
The respondent testifies that he lived there with country people. The woman who nursed him died while nursing him, and he was recommended to another person in the lower part of the Pyrenees. He always went by the name of Ferrie, on the mountains. She called him by that name when he came to this country. “ She said she did not like my father, because he did not see me often enough, while I was at nurse; that he was a rough kind of man, and did not treat her very well. My father’s name was Ferrie.”
Thus, to various witnesses, and on occasions demanding and eliciting a greater degree of candor and deliberation than she usually exhibited, she not only in general terms declared the respondent to be her son, but specified with some detail the circumstances of his birth, the character and fate of Valentin Ferrie, and her early connection and marriage with him. This is very different from merely mentioning him as her son. There is only one instance, I believe, in which she specified any circumstances in spealdng of a nephew; and, on that occasion, she did not speak of the respondent as her nephew. This was when she stated to Mary Morrison that she had had a sister in France, who died and left two children, a boy and a girl; that she took the children, and took
It may he safely assumed, therefore, that the respondent was the son of the decedent and of Valentin Ferrie.
II. Was he their legitimate son? There is, certainly, an absence of direct specific proof of any solemnization of a marriage between her and Valentin Ferrie. Is it necessary, however, in order to decide, whether there was a valid marriage, that there was a formal solemnization of it ?
The principles of the common law respecting marriage, are few and simple. It requires no ceremony, no solemnization by minister, priest, or magistrate. A marriage is complete when there is a full, free and mutual consent by the parties capable of contracting, even when not followed by cohabitation.
The common law also presumes marriage ; that is, it presumes every man legitimate until the contrary be shown, as it presumes every man innocent and that every man obeys the mandates of the law, and performs his social and official duties, until the contrary be shown. Suspicions, or conjectures, or rumors, will not do to rebut this presumption; however strong the suspicions, specious the conjectures, or loud and general the rumors may be.
The common law, also, will infer a contract of marriage from circumstances. This is expressly declared in the cases which I have already quoted. In Starr v. Peck, (1 Hill, 270,) the parents had cohabited for some years, and the father, being a seafaring man, went away. During his absence the child was born; and a few days after his return a marriage was formally solemnized. The parents always treated this child as if she was legitimate. This was held, erroneously I think, sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that a marriage in fact existed previous to her birth, notwithstanding the ceremony which took place afterward.
A marriage will not be inferred where there are the impediments of pre-contract, consanguinity, affinity, or corporal or mental incapacity; but these are impediments which render any marriage liable to be declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus the common law presumes marriage, and infers marriage from circumstances; but, although these principles of
At the time when the connection between Valentin Feme and the decedent subsisted, the law in France, relative to the solemnization of marriages, was very stringent, although, with regard to their dissolution it was exceedingly lax. It was provided that minors could not be married without the consent of their father or mother, &c., and all marriages contracted in defiance of this provision are declared null and of no effect. It abundantly appears from the testimony, that the father of Valentin Feme strenuously opposed his intended marriage with the decedent. This opposition was carried so far that Valentin was compelled to leave his house. He also was compelled to abandon his business connection with his father’s tan-yard, and went to work with another relative.
The same law, however, .in a subsequent section, requires that the acte of opposition shall be in writing, signified at the domicil of the parties, and to the public officer, who shall put his seal on the. original; and then there must be a judicial adjudication on the validity of the opposition, otherwise the objection has no legal effect. Nothing of this kind is shown; no proof of any of the steps, necessary to a formal opposition, is attempted ; the acte of opposition, indeed, might have been presented and filed; and so might have been the solemnization of the acte of marriage. It would be much safer to presume the latter than the former ; because the parties, notwithstanding the paternal remonstrance, changed their habitations, and published their reciprocal engagements and intention to marry, according to the law, on the 20th of the current month, before the proper officer.. This was published aloud by word of mouth before the outer and principal door of the municipal hall of St. Girons ; and, if any thing is to be presumed, it is to be supposed, if the father persisted in his
We are not without positive evidence on this subject. The declarations of the decedent herself are admissible, being connected with a question of joedigree, and not being made post litem motam. Eo controversy on the subject had been commenced when she made the declarations, and she unequivocally declared to Madame Grieser, and other witnesses, that she had been married in her youth, in France, in the revolutionary times, and that she had had a child in France, when she was
Even if there were no regular solemnization in the precise-manner directed by the French law, at that time, would their marriage contract he absolutely void? Now, only marriages contracted against the provisions of the articles in section 1, tit. 4, are declared “ null and of no effectand those articles relate only to the opposition of relatives, to cases where there is a pre-contract, to marriages -between relatives within a certain degree, and where the parties are incapable of consent; the same grounds, with the exception of the opposition of relatives, as would controvert the joresumption of-marriage according to the common law. With regard to the opposition of relatives, we have seen that it was never legally established. •The manner of the celebration, then, according to the law
On the whole, notwithstanding many difficulties in this case, notwithstanding much that is inexplicable and strange in the conduct of the decedent, and notwithstanding the want of that completeness of proof necessary to give full assurance to my convictions, I am of opinion that we are warranted from the circumstances, to pronounce in favor of an actual and sufficient contract of marriage between Valentin Feme and Jane Icard.
When to the inference from circumstances, and the declarations of the decedent, we add the presumption that the law invariably entertains in favor of marriage, the difficulty is considerably diminished. In the language of the decision from which I have already quoted, “we are to presume against a notorious act of immorality, almost as strongly as we would against the commission of a legal crime.” And this may be a rational and true presumption even in France; for, although illicit cohabitation may be more common, and less disreputable in that country than in this, yet there is a dis- / grace attending it in all Christian lands, which must be re-/ pugnant, if not revolting, to eveiy person not entirely lost to< shame—to every person, especially to every woman, who possesses the smallest measure of self respect, or who in any degree cherishes that sentiment, which seems to be as deeply seated as any of the parental emotions—the desire to transmit to one’s offspring an untarnished name. Unhappily, in all countries we have too many instances of this indifference to character, and this disregard for family honor; but, are we to presume it ? Are we to establish it as a fact without evidence, and strong evidence ? There is no reason, inevitably necessitating the presumption of illegal cohabitation in fhip particular case. Whatever might have been the conduct of the decedent in the subsequent part of her career, I think the evidence is sufficient to show that her conduct was correct at this early period, at Biert, Massat and St. Girons. There is
Whatever may be the conclusion at which an unbiased mind may arrive, after a careful examination of the testimony in this case, it cannot, as I have intimated, be unaccompanied with doubt. But, I think, much of this difficulty may be explained by giving due consideration to the mental and moral peculiarities of the decedent.
She presented a remarkable example of caprice, inconstancy, and irascibility. And yet she exhibited industry and application. But she was unstable in every thing, except her vanity and her love of money. If the respondent was indeed her son, why did she so repeatedly, for a great number of years, call him her nephew ? and on the other hand, if he was indeed her nephew, why did she so persistently call him her son ? At a very advanced period of her life, she had a horror of looking old, and of being thought old. Perhaps she was not singular in this; but, it certainly is unusual for a mother, or an aunt, to look with repugnance, or hate, on her son or nephew, for fear that the comparison between them would make her appear old. After a long interval of separation, and after manifesting a great desire that this respondent should be restored to her, she treated him in the most insulting manner, and compelled him to leave her house. At one time she expressed a great desire that he should have her whole property; at another time, that it should be given for public charity. Her temper was extremely violent, and she was continually engaged in quarrels. Possessing a fortune of over $100,000, she lived alone, in the garret of her house, in William street; and no doubt she would have been much better provided with the comforts of life, were she the inmate of an alms-house. Sometimes very agreeable; sometimes exceedingly disagreeable; now bland and affable; in an instant, without any apparent provocation, rude and insolent. Like the character in Martial’s celebrated epigram, she was at once “ touchy, testy, and pleasant.” (Difficilis, facilis,, ju
I had proceeded thus far in my inquiries, before I perused the final opinion of the surrogate. We have arrived at the same conclusions, by a course, in some respects, different. With his usual care and discrimination he has fortified his position with the sanction of authority, from French and English jurisprudence; while I have trusted, principally, to fundamental principles, derived from natural and positive law. I have little hesitation in thinking, that the result is authorized by sound considerations of policy and practicability— considerations, to ¿which, in questions of doubtful import, our law very commonly has recourse. If positive proof of a conventional marriage were required in every case, there are few people who would not be exposed to the impution of illegitimacy. This would be still more frequently the result, where the marriage of a contestant's progenitors occurred at a remote period, in a distant country, or, like the principal events of this case, at an epoch of social commotion and fierce political strife.
In conclusion, to recapitulate, I do not entertain the least doubt, that the respondent was the son of the decedent, and of Valentin Ferrie. I infer from the proof and the circumstances of the case, that a contract of marriage was entered
The proceedings before the surrogate should be affirmed with costs.
Pbabobt, J. concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent, principally, on the question of fact. The conduct of father and mother, to the child, was not such as would be exhibited to a lawful child; they both deserted him before he was four years old,.and the mother never inquired for him until he was nearly twelve years- old, and then, after she fpund him, let him (when he fled from her) remain without notice, until a miscarriage led her to seek him again. The father did not die until 1812, yet by 1804 she had formed a lias on with Du Lux, which was continued until 1813, when she married merely to conform to the usages of this country. In all her correspondence before her marriage to Du Lux, she was described by her maiden name ; she was so described in the various preliminaries to that marriage, and even when she stood at the altar before the priest of her religion at the ceremony of marriage, which is deemed a sacrament, in her church.
She never allowed Feme, the applicant, in his correspondence, to call her mother. He never did it; and when a friend
Although it is not necessary for a child to produce the acte of marriage to prove his legitimacy, yet the absence of that record in a country where it is absolutely indispensable as between husband and wife, and- where it is required by law,, and is the custom of the people, is strong evidence that there was. no marriage; and is only to be rebutted by strong proof. The clearly established illicit connection between the father and mother for over seven months before the birth of the child, is a strong legal presumption that their subsequent intercourse was of the.same character.
If the mother is to be believed, she had a child—a son—when she was but 15 years old, and that child died. If the child died or was born when she was near that age, it was not this applicant, for he was born when his mother was 23 years of age. This would show (as 'the intimate companion and confidante of her youth said of her at that period, and that she
Decree of surrogate affirmed.
MitoheU, Gierke and Peabody, Justices.]