47 S.E.2d 788 | S.C. | 1948
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *339 May 13, 1948. The only question which we find it necessary to determine on this appeal is whether a charitable organization or institution is liable for compensation as an employer under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of South Carolina. This question was answered in the affirmative by the Industrial Commission and in the negative by the Circuit Court. This appeal by the employee followed.
Appellant, Curtis Caughman, was employed by respondent, the Columbia Y.M.C.A., on October 1, 1946, and on the following day, while washing the walls of the Y.M.C. A. building, a scaffold upon which he and some other Negro employees were standing fell, resulting in an injury to appellant's left heel.
Respondent's status as a charitable institution is not questioned. It is a non-profit, character building institution, having for its aim the mental, physical and religious development of boys and young men. Our Workmen's Compensation Act does not specifically include charitable institutions, nor does *341 it expressly exempt them. The definitions of employers and employees who are subject to the provisions of the Act (Section 7035-2 of the 1942 Code) are very broad and comprehensive and are entirely sufficient to include charitable institutions. Under the terms of this section and Section 7035-16, certain employers and employees are specifically exempted unless they voluntarily elect to be bound, but charitable institutions are not among those enumerated in the exceptions. If they do not come within the provisions of the Act, their exclusion must be by implication. In determining whether they are excepted in this manner, we must consider the intention of the Legislature as manifested by other parts of the Act and also the general purpose and design of this legislation.
"In determining what classes of employers come under a compensation act, recourse must be had to the whole scope and scheme of the act, or to its whole scope and purpose, rather than to technical definitions of particular words or to a literal construction of particular phrases therein." 71 C.J., page 394. "Courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute; the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words. * * * A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the law-makers."Greenville Baseball, Inc. v. Bearden, Sheriff, et al.,
Having stated the foregoing general rules of construction, we now turn to the purpose sought to be accomplished by this legislation. It was stated inMarchbanks v. Duke Power Co. et al.,
In determining whether the Legislature intended that the act should apply to charitable institutions, it is also necessary to consider the status of such institutions with reference to tort liability prior to the enactment of this legislation. The question of the liability of a charitable institution to respond in damages for the negligence of its *343
managers, agents and servants has been before the courts on numerous occasions. It is one upon which there has been, and is, a conflict of decisions not only upon the question of liability but under what circumstances it exists; and among those courts adhering to the rule of non-liability, there has also been a remarkable diversity of opinion as to the correct reason or ground for so deciding. Some courts hold that there is no liability to those who avail themselves of the benefits of the charity, but impose liability where the injured person is a stranger to the institution or to its charity, or is an employee or servant, or is on the premises by express or implied invitation. An exhaustive review of the decisions of all the states and a learned discussion of the subject will be found in Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Association,
It must be assumed that the Legislature was aware of the policy established by these decisions when the legislation under consideration was enacted, and it is reasonable to suppose that if it was intended to change such policy, the Legislature would have expressly so declared, as was done in the case of the State and municipal corporations which are likewise immune from suit in the absence of an enabling act but were expressly included in the act under consideration. While some of the reasons heretofore stated for the enactment of workmen's compensation would apply to employees of charitable institutions just as much as to those in industry, there are others that do not. It could not be said that this act was intended to relieve employees of such institutions of "the uncertainties of a trial in a suit for damages" because they were not subject to suit. Nor as to such employees could our act be regarded as "substitutional in character" since there was no pre-existing liability to be substituted. *345
Our Act is not compulsory. Either the employer or the employee may elect not to be bound by its provisions. If the employer does so, he is only deprived of the common law defenses of assumption of risk, fellow servant rule and contributory negligence if sued by an employee for damages at common law, Section 7035-17 of the 1942 Code; Nuckolls v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co.,
We are not undertaking to say that the act was intended to impose liability for compensation only upon such employers as were subject to suit at common law for damages. The question might arise under circumstances different from those now before us. But we are of opinion that considering the act as a whole in the light of the well settled law of this state as to the non-liability of charitable institutions in tort actions, it was not intended that the act should apply to such institutions. There may be good reasons why it should be made applicable to them, but that is a matter for the General Assembly.
The question involved has been passed upon in comparatively few other jurisdictions. The dearth of authority may be largely due to the fact that in perhaps most of the states, the courts impose liability at common law upon charitable institutions for injuries to their employees caused by the negligence of their agents or servants. In these jurisdictions the reasons here given for excluding such corporations from the provisions of the workmen's compensation act would not apply. To illustrate: It was held in the recent case ofSchneider v. Salvation Army,
In the Zoulalian case, the Court said: "It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Stat. 1911, chap. 751, and acts in amendment thereof); but we are unable to agree with this contention. While it is provided by section 2 of part 1, that `the provisions of section 1 shall not apply to actions to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by domestic servants and farm laborers,' it does not follow that all other employees who may be injured in the course of their employment are within the terms of the act. Undoubtedly *347 the rules of law declared by this court relating to persons injured while in the employ of charitable institutions may be changed by the Legislature, still that such change was made by the Workmen's Compensation Act is not to be inferred in the absence of a plain intention on the part of the Legislature to that effect."
After a careful review of the authorities in the Hartfordcase, the Court reached the following conclusion: "From a consideration of the American authorities on the subject * * *, it becomes clear that the trend of the decisions, notwithstanding the broad general terms expressed in the various statutes by which compensation is provided, as applied to `all' corporations and `public agencies' for injuries sustained by workmen in their employ arising out of and in the course of their employment, is toward a construction that, in the exercise of their charitable functions, in effect exempts charitable corporations from the operation of the law as applied to individuals, or to the ordinary business corporations. The reasons usually assigned for such conclusion are that by common law no liability existed; that the Legislature presumably was aware of such state of the law; and that in the absence of special language by virtue of which such liability was created, the presumption must be that the legislature intended that the exemption that existed at common law should not be disturbed."
It is unnecessary to determine the other questions raised on this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
BAKER, C.J., and FISHBURNE, STUKES and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. *348