78 Ga. 81 | Ga. | 1887
Caudle obtained a judgment in the city court against Rice. Reuben Arnold and William Gay were his attorneys. Rice, after the judgment of Caudle had been obtained, purchased from Kimbro a judgment which, he alleges, Kimbro had obtained against Caudle. This latter judgment was obtained in the superior court. Rice applie I to the city court to set off the judgment which he had purchased, against the judgment which Caudle had obtained against him. Pending this motion, Caudle appeared in the superior court and moved to set aside the judgment establishing the judgment of Kimbro against Caudle, upon the ground that no such-judgment ever existed and the same had been improperly established by that court. Rice withdrew his application to set off the judgment which he had purchased against the judgment which Caudle had obtained against him, and appeared in answer to the motion of Caudle to set asido the established judgment of Kimbro against Caudle, and answered the same, and filed an equitable proceeding In which he alleged the foregoing-facts, and prayed that the judgment which had been assigned to him by Kimbro should be set off against the judgment of Caudle, and also asked for an injunction to restrain Caudle from proceeding with his judgment until the motion to set aside the proceedings establishing the judgment which he had purchased from Kimbro was determined. Reuben Arnold and William Gay appeared and prayed to be made parties to the proceeding, alleging and showing to the court that they were the attorneys that procured the judgment of Caudle against Rice, and that they had a half interest in the same. The court refused this application of Arnold and Gay, and this is excepted to; and the injunction prayed for by Rice was granted, and this also is excepted to.
There are two questions made by this record:
When Arnold and Gay are made parties to this proceeding, and the court is satisfied that they have an interest in this judgment, no injunction should be granted against them to prevent their using the judgment to obtain the fees to which they are entitled.
Judgment reversed.