53 Ga. App. 360 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
Lead Opinion
C. V. Cauble filed garnishment proceedings against the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, seeking to obtain money which Cauble claimed was due by the company to Mrs. Emma E. Allyn, the beneficiary of an insurance policy issued by the company. The garnishee filed an answer denying that it was indebted in any sum to Mrs. Allyn, or that it had in its possession or control any money or property of hers. The plaintiff traversed the answer. This issue was tried, under an agreed statement of facts, by the judge without the intervention of a jury, and a judgment overruling the traverse and sustaining the answer was rendered. Thereafter the plaintiff’s motion for new trial was overruled, and exceptions were taken to that judgment. It appears from the agreed statement of facts that at the time of Mr. Allyn’s death he and his wife were living in the city of Eecife, Pernambuco, Brazil; that Allyn hád a policy of life insurance issued by the garnishee, in which his wife was named as the beneficiary; that the amount due to her on the. policy was $877.04; that proofs of death were duly submitted to the insur
It clearly appears from the foregoing statement that the National City Bank did not, as the agent of Mrs. Allyn, hold the check for the purpose of collection, but that it bought the check in good faith and for value before it was overdue. We have found no decision, and counsel for the plaintiff has cited none, which holds that a garnishee would be liable after it had issued a check covering an indebtedness due to the payee, where the summons of garnishment was served after the issuance of the check and its delivery to the payee, and subsequently to its negotiation in due course and for value to a third party. The cases cited in behalf of the plaintiff are easily differentiated by their facts from this case. The judge did not err in overruling the traverse of the garnishee’s answer, or in refusing to grant a new trial. As the
Judgment affirmed on the main bill of exceptions; cross-bill dismissed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. In view of the fact that the garnishee owed the defendant, on February 4, 1932, a sum certain, and on that clay mailed to the defendant an ordinary cheek drawn on a bank as payment of this sum, the garnishee was not liable to a creditor of the defendant on a summons of garnishment served on it after the delivery of the check but before it was presented by the defendant for payment. In Hiatt v. Edwards, 52 Ga. App. 152 (182 S. E. 634), it was said that, “while a check is not complete payment, still it is conditional payment until dishonored, and in this sense amounts to such payment as will forestall garnishment. . . The rule is settled in this State, even in a case where the mere taking of a negotiable instrument by a creditor from his debtor does not operate as a payment of the debt, so as to preclude the creditor from suing the debtor on the original indebtedness, that, ‘as a condition precedent to final judgment [the instrument] must be surrendered to the maker, or accounted for by showing that it is not in any event enforceable against him.’ This ‘condition precedent must have been complied with before judgment in [the creditor’s] favor could legally be awarded.’” The garnishee having delivered to Mrs. Allyn its check, I am of the opinion that Mrs. Allyn might not sue on the policy without surrendering or accounting for the check. If Mrs. Allyn herself could not obtain a judgment against the garnishee, neither could a garnishing plaintiff obtain a judgment. The plaintiff could obtain no better position than its debtor. For these additional reasons I think the action of the lower court was correct.