201 Conn. 39 | Conn. | 1986
This is a medical malpractice action commenced June 11, 1982, in which the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the two year statute of limitations provided by General Statutes § 52-584.
The documentation submitted in connection with the defendant’s motion for summary judgment established the following facts which are essentially undisputed: After she had discovered a lump in her left breast in late July, 1979, the plaintiffs’ decedent, Elaine S. Foster, consulted the defendant, Stephen R. Rubenstein, a physician who practiced general internal medicine. The defendant examined Foster, palpated the lump and ordered a mammogram. In early August, 1979, the defendant informed Foster that the mammogram was negative for cancer, that she merely had a tendency toward cysts, and that it was nothing to worry about. In January, 1980, after she discovered another lump, this time in the area of the left axilla, Foster spoke to the defendant on the telephone concerning her condi
The plaintiffs claim that, during the period of July, 1979, through April, 1980, the defendant negligently failed to prescribe or recommend further diagnostic tests or treatment for Foster and negligently failed to obtain the opinion of or refer her to a physician who specialized in the recognition and treatment of potential malignancies. The defendant contends that, even if that is so, Foster discovered her “injury,” which he maintains was her cancerous condition, by May 1, 1980, and that her suit, which was not commenced until June 11,1982, is barred by General Statutes § 52-584.
The plaintiffs maintain, however, that all of the information available to Foster in May, 1980, indicated and led her to believe that the cancer, confirmed by the operation on May 1,1980, was a new growth or mass, not related to the condition for which she had previously been examined and diagnosed by Rubenstein in July and August of 1979. The plaintiffs claim that Foster was justified in her belief because the defendant told her, in August, 1979, that there was no evi
The plaintiffs argue that there was no evidence submitted with the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and no facts established that showed when Foster discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that she had cancer in her left breast when she was initially examined and diagnosed by Rubenstein or that her condition at that time was related to the cancer discovered on May 1, 1980. The plaintiffs claim, on appeal, that Foster first became aware of that possibility when she was advised to that effect by Horace Stansel of the Yale Medical School in April, 1982, and that she did not therefore discover her “injury” until that date.
The trial court, Gaffney, J., found that the plaintiffs’ decedent discovered her “injury” no later than May 1, 1980, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum of decision the trial court stated: “The plaintiffs’ action was brought more than two years from the date when the injury was sustained or discovered. It was, therefore, on the date of suit a stale claim. Prevention of such claims is a legitimate purpose of a statute of limitations.”
The defendant claims that, on the facts established by the documents submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment, § 52-584 bars the plaintiffs’ action. He asserts that Foster’s “injury” was the allegedly misdiagnosed cancer and that the documentation showed that Foster admitted she discovered that “injury” no later than May 1, 1980, when she underwent the left modified radical mastectomy. The defendant argues that, since § 52-584 mandates that an action for malpractice by a physician be brought within two years from the date an “injury” is first discovered, the plaintiffs’ decedent was required to bring suit no later than May 1,1982. He asserts, therefore, that, since suit was not brought until June 11,1982, there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred as a matter of law by the two year provision of § 52-584 as determined by the trial court. We disagree and conclude that the defendant did not meet his burden on his motion for summary judgment of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue as to the time when Foster discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered her “injury,” a material fact necessary to determine the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations.
This court has previously stated that § 52-584 “requires that the injured party bring suit within two years of discovering the injury. ... In this context injury occurs when a party suffers some form of ‘actionable harm. ’ ” (Emphasis added.) Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 460, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).
The defendant’s affidavit and the other documents submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment pinpoint when the defendant examined Foster and initially diagnosed her condition and when she became aware that she had cancer. They do not, however, disclose when Foster discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that the defendant was negligent in his examination, diagnosis, and treatment and the causal nexus, if any, between his alleged negligence and the metastasis of her cancer. There was, therefore, remaining a genuine issue of material fact which was not resolved and the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
In Burns v. Hartford Hospital, supra, cited as authority for our position, we nonetheless affirmed the decision of the trial court which held, on a motion for
In Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 473 A.2d 1221 (1984), we also indicated that the time when a plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered “actionable harm” is the time used in determining when the two year period of limitation of § 52-584 begins to run. Id., 738-39. Again, however, we affirmed the ruling of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment that the statute was a bar to the plaintiff’s cause of action because the plaintiff was aware of the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and her injury and thus knew that she had suffered “ ‘some form of actionable harm’; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, supra”; more than two and one-half years prior to commencing suit. Id., 739.
The legislative history of § 52-584, while neither extensive nor conclusive, supports the position that the term “injury” in the statute should be interpreted as “actionable harm.” “ ‘In determining the true meaning of a statute when there is genuine uncertainty as to how it should apply, identifying the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself by examining the legislative history of the statute under litigation
Other jurisdictions have also held that a plaintiff must have discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the essential elements of a possible cause of action before the statute of limitations commences to run. “A cause of action will not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” (Emphasis in original.) Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, 117 N.H. 739, 743, 378 A.2d 1138 (1977). “We hold that the statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant has knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable person on notice of the nature and extent of an injury and that the injury was caused by the wrongful conduct of another. The overwhelming majority of state appellate courts which have addressed the issue here have adopted the ‘legal injury’ construction of the word here ‘injury’ used in statutes of limitation governing medical malpractice actions. The focus is on the plaintiff’s knowledge of facts, rather than on discovery of applicable legal theories. Decisions by the appellate courts of California, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah and West Virginia support this interpretation of the word ‘injury.’ ” Mastro v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Colo. 1984); see Graham v. Hansen, 128 Cal. App. 3d 965, 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1982); Yamaguchi v. Queens Medical Center, 648 P.2d 689 (Hawaii 1982); Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974); Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723, 669 P.2d 248 (1983); Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, supra; Silverman v. Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 403 A.2d 18 (1979); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.
A trial court may appropriately grant a motion for summary judgment only when the affidavits and evidence submitted in support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, remaining between the parties and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 384; Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 738; Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., 190 Conn. 8, 11, 459 A.2d 115 (1983); Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 268, 422 A.2d 311 (1979); United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 377-78, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). “A ‘material’ fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.” United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, supra, 379. The factor which is dispositive of the present case for the purpose of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is whether § 52-584 bars the plaintiffs’ suit. That in turn is determined by. when Foster discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered her “injury”; that is when she discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that she had suffered some form of “actionable harm.” We are not persuaded that no genuine issue exists as to that material fact.
It is clear that the repose portion of § 52-584 which provides that “no action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of” bars the bringing of suit more than three years after the alleged negligent conduct of a defendant regardless of when a plaintiff discovers the proxi
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
‘.‘[General Statutes] Sec. 52-584. limitation of action for injury to person OR property. No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”
In the trial court, the plaintiffs claimed that the earliest indication that the plaintiff may have had cancer in her left breast in the period between July, 1979, and April, 1980, was July 21, 1980, the date of a Waterbury Hospital physician’s examination report which, for the first time, the plaintiffs contend, established the possible existence of cancer during that period. That date would also be within the two year period of limitation of § 52-584 and, in view of our decision, it is immaterial which date is used.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1949)] Sec. 8324. limitation of action for injury TO person OR property. No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropodist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within one year from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counter-claim may be interposed in an action which has been brought within the year at any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”
General Law Committee, Pt. 1, 1957 Sess., pp. 142-155.