614 N.E.2d 770 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
Defendant-appellant Gary E. Cattren ("appellant") appeals the trial court's judgment imposing a wage order, under R.C.
After Gretchen elected to live with appellant, the trial court reduced his child support obligation by $73 per week. Appellee then filed motions to continue the wage order at its present level, to apply excess payments to arrearages, and for legal fees and expenses. After receiving a report and recommendation from the referee, the trial court granted appellee's motions, ordering appellant to pay $73 per week on the $9,000 and $10,504.56 judgments. It further imposed a wage order at the original level, $231.30 per week, and directed that $73 per week be applied to the $9,000 and $10,504.56 judgments. The trial court also awarded appellee $2,500 in additional alimony for attorney fees.
Appellant's assignment of error lacks merit. *113
Under R.C.
Appellant argues R.C.
In Wheeler v. Wheeler (1986),
"A lump sum judgment for arrearage is awarded because the parent obliged to pay regular support has not done so, and that someone else — here, the mother — has shouldered a greater burden than intended by the trial court, or, for that matter, by society.
"We recognize that our construction of R.C.
Although Wheeler dealt specifically with child support, its rationale applies to all forms of support.
Appellant argues Wheeler is distinguishable because in that case the trial court imposed the wage order at the same time it reduced the support arrearage to judgment. The holding inWheeler, however, is not dependent on whether the wage order is made at the time the support arrearage is reduced to judgment or at a later time.
Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken.
Appellant's assignment of error lacks merit.
Appellant supports his contention by arguing that a trial court must make a finding of contempt before it may award attorney fees in a post-divorce decree proceeding. He also argues that the trial court was precluded from awarding *114 attorney fees because it did not make a finding of changed circumstances and because appellee did not specifically request additional alimony.
A trial court may, in its discretion, award attorney fees in a post-divorce decree proceeding. Rand v. Rand (1985),
Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken.
Judgment affirmed.
NAHRA, P.J., and PATTON, J., concur.
"I. The trial court erred in continuing the wage order at its present level, and applying excess payments to arrearage for which there was a lump sum judgment.
"II. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay $2,500.00 toward attorney fees for the plaintiff-appellee."