JOSEPH J. CATTANI, APPELLANT-RESPONDENT, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN‘S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Argued November 18, 1975-Decided March 24, 1976.
69 N.J. 578
Mr. Ira C. Miller argued the cause for appellant-respondent (Messrs. Pellettieri and Rabstein, attorneys).
SULLIVAN, J. Joseph J. Cattani, claimant herein, is a retired fireman who is totally and permanently disabled from performing firefighting duties. His application for accidental disability retirement under
Cattani appealed to the Appellate Division which, with one judge dissenting, reversed the Board‘s decision and ordered that Cattani‘s application be granted. The Board of Trustees appeals to this Court. R. 2:2-1(a) (2). We reverse and reinstate the Board‘s decision denying the application for accidental disability retirement.
Cattani was employed as a fireman by the City of Trenton and, on the date in question, was attached to Engine Company No. 7 which consisted of a “pumper” normally manned by five men. On June 19, 1971 the Company responded to a two-alarm fire. It had only three firemen in its crew at the time, as one man was on vacation and, after the men had reported in, a second was temporarily assigned to another
At the scene of the fire, Cattani, assisted by the company captain removed five lengths of hose, each of which weighed about 75 pounds, from the engine. Cattani then dragged the hose into place and played water on the fire. The company captain assisted in this latter operation for a short while. In order to get at the fire, Cattani had to carry a section of hose up to the roof of an adjoining building where he continued to play water on the fire. He was also required to rip open the front of the building to uncover the burning areas. He then returned to the ground and resumed his fire hose activity there. During this period he felt nauseous and dizzy and had to be administered oxygen before returning to his duties.
When Cattani returned to the firehouse some six and one-half hours later, he became temporarily unable to move his arms and legs. He was taken to the hospital, examined by a doctor and released, he having regained the use of his arms and legs in the interim.
Some 10 days after the fire, Cattani began to have recurring episodes of paralysis of his arms and legs. Finally, on September 9, 1971 he was admitted to the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center. He remained there for about one month and was discharged with a diagnosis of basilar artery occlusion secondary to a preexisting condition of atherosclerosis and type IV hyperlipidemia. Basilar artery occlusion is an obstruction of one of the major blood vessels leading to the brain, a slow, chronic, progressive type of disorder. Hyperlipidemia is an increased amount of lipids, fats in the blood stream, and causes hardening of the arteries. Since his discharge, Cattani has remained under periodic medical supervision and takes an anticoagulant daily.
The statute involved,
“* * * may be retired * * * on an accidental disability retirement allowance; provided that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties * * *.”
Paragraph (4) of the same section states:
“Permanent and total disability resulting from a cardiovascular, pulmonary or musculo-skeletal condition which was not a direct result of a traumatic event occurring in the performance of duty shall be deemed an ordinary disability.”
The medical proofs submitted at the hearing described Cattani‘s condition, its symptoms and its severity. Dr. Leavey, the medical doctor for the Board of Trustees, expressed the opinion that Cattani‘s underlying disease could have been aggravated and rendered symptomatic by the added strain and effort of the events of June 19, 1971, but that it was not caused by them. Dr. Rowen, Cattani‘s medical expert, agreed with the diagnosis of Cattani‘s preexisting condition. He said that the stress and strain of Cattani‘s activities on June 19 probably increased the clotting mechanism in his blood and thus brought about the final closing of the
The hearing officer, whose report was adopted by the Board of Trustees, found that Cattani was totally and permanently disabled from performing firemanic duties but that his disability was not “a direct result” of his firefighting activities on June 19; rather, he found that Cattani was disabled by reason of basilar arterial occlusion, atherosclerosis and hyperlipidemia. He also found that Cattani‘s firefighting activities on June 19 did not constitute a “traumatic event” within the meaning of the statute.
In reversing this ruling, the Appellate Division held that the work effort of June 19 was a traumatic event since it was both unusual and excessive, and that the disabling condition (acute thrombosis of the basilar artery) was the direct result of that unusual and excessive work effort.
The development of the present statutory provisions for accidental disability retirement, common to many of our public employee pension statutes, has been discussed in Russo v. Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, 62 N. J. 142 (1973); Shea v. Board of Trustees, 116 N. J. Super. 348 (App. Div. 1971); Hillman v. Bd. Trustees, Public Employees’ Retirement Syst., 109 N. J. Super. 449 (App. Div. 1970); Titman v. Bd. Trustees Teachers’ Pens. & An. Fund, 107 N. J. Super. 244 (App. Div. 1969).
Prior to 1964 the pension act in question provided for accidental disability retirement upon certification by the medical board that
“* * * the natural and proximate cause of such disability was an accident met in the actual performance of duty * * *.” L. 1959, c. 158, pp. 628-629, § 1.
In construing this provision a number of cases applied workmen‘s compensation concepts to the terms “accident” and “natural and proximate cause.” Particularly with re
This liberal application of the statute brought a legislative response. In 1964
“(1) * * * the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties * * *.”
At the same time there was added to the same section the provision that
“(4) permanent and total disability resulting from a cardiovascular, pulmonary or musculo-skeletal condition which was not a direct result of a traumatic event occurring in the performance of duty shall be deemed an ordinary disability.”
The legislative purpose was clear. These statutory changes were intended to make the granting of an accidental disability pension more difficult. We noted in Russo, supra, 62 N. J. at 151, quoting from Titman, supra, that the words “traumatic event” were a significant departure from the term “accident” previously used, plainly indicating that the Legislature did not intend that the workmen‘s compensation concept of “accident” was to be applied to an accidental disability pension statute.
In Hillman, supra, 109 N. J. Super. at 460, a similar amendment to the Public Employees’ Retirement System was held to reject the concept that an “accident” can be found in the impact of ordinary work effort upon a preexisting progressive disease.
We consider the case at hand. Here Cattani sought to bring his situation within the Hillman definition of traumatic event. His contention, sustained by the Appellate Division, was that the additional firefighting work which he was required to perform on June 19 was both unusual and excessive and constituted a traumatic event since it aggravated and accelerated his preexisting underlying disease and directly resulted in his disability.
The Hillman test of traumatic event has been applied in other cases. Conklin v. Bd. of Trustees Police & Fire. Ret. Syst., 135 N. J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 1975); Shea v. Board of Trustees, supra. However, this Court has not previously considered the correctness of such definition.
We conclude that the third prong of the Hillman test is too broad and frustrates the restriction which the Legislature intended to place on the granting of an accidental disability pension when it substituted the expression “traumatic event” for the word “accident.”
We have already noted that the statutory change clearly indicated that the Legislative purpose was to make the granting of an accidental disability pension more difficult. The present provision that it must be shown that the person “is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties” means much more than disability resulting from the aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting disease even though unusual or excessive work effort is involved.
Trauma has been defined as “a wound; any injury to the body caused by external violence.” Black‘s Law Dictionary, (4 Ed. 1951); see also, Schmidt‘s Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine (1975). The phrase “traumatic event” would ordinarily involve a mishap or accident involving the application of some kind of external force to the body or the violent exposure of the body to some external force. See 42A Words and Phrases, Trauma; Traumatic, p. 3 (4 Ed. 1951).
We recognize that the foregoing definition may not be all-inclusive and that a traumatic event may possibly be found in some situations which do not literally fall within the external force or violence concept but still might be regarded as having traumatic origin. It is clear that this is not such a case. Where, as here, the disability is the end result of a preexisting cardiovascular condition, work effort alone whether unusual or excessive, cannot be considered a traumatic event, even though it may have aggravated or accelerated the preexisting disease. However, a basis for an accidental disability pension would exist if it were shown that the disability directly resulted from the combined effect of a traumatic event and a preexisting disease.
Since Cattani‘s disability does not stem from an injury or wound produced by external force or violence, he has not satisfied the requirement of a traumatic event and his application for an accidental disability pension under
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the decision of the Board of Trustees is hereby reinstated.
PASHMAN, J. (dissenting). The majority today reverses a determination by the Appellate Division and denies a claimant‘s application for an accidental disability retirement allowance under
While my Brethren are apparently satisfied that justice has been done, I remain disturbed that they have unnecessarily deprived Joseph J. Cattani of benefits, which within the factual context of this case, he so richly deserves.
The majority bases its decision on a narrow construction of the governing statutory provision which provides for accident retirement benefits upon proof that a “member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties. . . .” [Emphasis supplied]. After engaging in a coldly-analytical review of claimant‘s inherently hazardous occupation (that of a fireman), his activities at the time of his injury, his physical condition prior to the injury, and the nature of the injury which he sustained, the majority concludes that claimant‘s proofs fail to bring him within the statutory ambit of
Joseph J. Cattani, the claimant-respondent herein was formerly employed by the Trenton Fire Department as a fireman. Now 35 years old, Cattani began serving in that Department in 1966 at which time he enrolled in the Police and Firemen‘s Retirement System, making him technically eligible for the accidental disability benefits which are at issue in the instant case.
Arriving at the scene of the fire, Cattani, with the assistance of the Captain of his unit, unloaded five sections of two and one-half inch hose from the back of the pumper. Cattani then singlehandedly dragged the hose line weighing 400 pounds towards the burning building, a function normally performed by three men. Cattani in his five years of service had never carried this heavy load by himself. With some initial assistance from the Captain, Cattani then positioned the hose so that it could be trained upon the fire. After readying it, he directed a stream of water at the fire by himself, a task which, because of the weight of the hose and the force of the water; normally requires the efforts of four men.
Cattani thereafter performed “ventilation work” at the front of the burning building. This job entailed the removal of plywood and corrugated steel panels from the burning structure. This too was a function which Cattani had rarely performed before this occasion because it usually was accomplished by members of a ladder company. Not only was Cattani assigned to this task, but as with the other tasks, he was ordered to undertake the “ventilation work” by himself; ordinarily, it requires at least two men to perform.
Upon completion of this work, Cattani returned to the hose which he had originally positioned when his company arrived at the fire. Resuming his duties there, he singlehandedly manned the fire hose for the next two and one-half hours. A feeling of nausea and the inability to breathe caused Cattani to briefly leave his duties to receive medical attention. Although he subsequently returned to his position, on two other occasions during the evening he had to report to the attending ambulance for treatment. Following each medical visit, Cattani resumed his fire-fighting activities. After the fire had been extinguished, Cattani assisted in rolling the hoses for storage on the fire truck, a task which had Engine Company No. 7 been fully manned he would not have had to perform.
Upon returning to the fire station, Cattani was unable to move his arms or legs, or speak, and was rushed to a nearby hospital. In the succeeding two weeks, he experienced several similar attacks of paralysis warranting medical attention.
On September 6, 1972, Cattani filed an application for an accidental disability retirement allowance pursuant to
The hearing officer in his report denied accidental disability benefits because he found that the activities in which Cattani had engaged on June 19, 1971 did not constitute a “traumatic event” as that term is employed in
Cattani appealed the decision of the Board of Trustees, and the Appellate Division reversed the determination of that body. The court‘s per curiam opinion stated:
During a substantial portion of the lengthy period in which the claimant was on duty at the fire, he was engaged singly in performing tasks which, because of their strenuous nature, under normal operating procedures customarily are performed by three men for the most part. The claimant‘s disabling condition (acute thrombosis of the basilar artery) was the direct result of that unusual and excessive work effort.
This opinion elicited a dissent and defendant appealed as of right pursuant to R. 2:2-1(a) (2). Today, this Court reverses the Appellate Division decision.
This reversal by the majority is premised largely upon its interpretation of
Nonetheless, while agreeing with the majority‘s modification of the Hillman criteria, I must distinguish my position from its all-too-narrow interpretation of “traumatic event.” Although a “traumatic event” may, as the majority observes, envision a mishap or accident which involves “the application of some kind of external force to the body or the violent exposure of the body to some external force” ante at 586, it cannot properly be confined to such a construction.1
We do not think there is any merit in appellant‘s contention that deceased‘s accident was not a traumatic injury within the meaning of the Compensation Act. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines trauma as “a wound, any injury to the body caused by external violence,” and traumatic as “caused by or resulting from a wound or external violence.” While there was in the instant case no physical force or bodily blow generally associated with the word traumatic, there was direct physical injury resulting from the accident which caused damage to his mouth, throat, stomach and lungs. The tendency of modern decisions is toward a more liberal construction of the word traumatic injury. [212 S. W. 2d at 543].
See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S. W. 2d 87 (Ct. App. 1932) (employee‘s preexisting abrasion became infected with tularemia from handling rabbits under orders from employer; held to be “traumatic accident“).
In several other cases whose factual patterns approximate that of the instant case, courts of other jurisdictions have found traumatic injuries to have occurred. In Metcalf v. Dep‘t of Labor & Industries, 168 Wash. 305, 11 P. 2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1932), for instance, the employee suffered a cerebral hemorrhage while sawing a log. Because of the unusual manner in which he was forced to accomplish the task and the undue haste with which he worked (the log
In Calland v. Industrial Comm‘n, 55 Ohio App. 306, 9 N. E. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 1937), the deceased husband of appellant was held to have sustained a traumatic injury within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision. The husband, who was described as “a robust man, in apparent good health,” served as a shipping clerk for a furniture company. In this capacity, he had assisted in the loading of light freight usually with the aid of mechanical devices which, as the court described, were “designed to eliminate lifting and the sudden exertion of heavy direct lifts.” On the particular day in question, Calland had loaded one of his employer‘s trucks and proceeded to drive it to its nearby destination. Upon his arrival, Calland assisted another man in the unloading process. In addition to the light items which were delivered, there were two heavier pieces of furniture, a chiffonier and a dresser. Both of these had to be carried and maneuvered up a narrow and winding flight of stairs. This difficult task “required a sustained and prolonged exertion on the part of Calland, to which he was not accustomed.” Not only did the unusual exertion necessitate the use of different and unused muscles on his part, but it required his performing tasks for which he had little dexterity or experience. The bodily strain to which he was subjected caused the rupture of a blood vessel in his brain, and ultimately, his death. In reversing a lower court determination, the appellate court found Calland‘s death to be within the statutory ambit:
Calland sustained a traumatic injury, to wit, a ruptured blood vessel in the brain. Trauma, in the form of sustained pressure, burst
that blood vessel. There is not any evidence in the entire record from which reasonable minds might arrive at a conclusion that the ruptured blood vessel was proximately caused or produced by factors inherent in the nature of Calland‘s usual employment. Not even the most strained interpretation of the evidence could give rise to an inference that anything which Calland did in the performance of his usual duties had so much as the remotest bearing on the accidental injury that he suffered on November 23, 1933. On the contrary, the record does establish the fact that the rupture of the blood vessel was produced by an over-exertion which was distinctive in character and definite as to time and place of occurrence. [9 N. E. 2d at 738].
In the instant case, there is ample evidence with which to reach a comparable result despite the majority‘s judgment to the contrary. The claimant engaged in several activities for which had little or no prior experience. In several of these tasks, he singlehandedly performed work which normally required the efforts of several men, and in which it may be inferred, he overexerted himself. As a result of this extended and sustained activity, Cattani, like the more unfortunate Calland, suffered an internal injury of obvious severity. Hence, the conclusion that this injury was a product of a traumatic occurrence should follow as logically in this case as it did in Calland.
In reaching this conclusion, I categorically reject the majority‘s fanciful distinction between the phrase “traumatic event” and “traumatic injury.” Trauma is a medical term of art which has reference to the effect which an injury has on an individual. It is, therefore, inaccurate, if not meaningless, to associate the term with the description of an event. In this regard, the statutory language, “traumatic event,” may be no more than an unfortunate way of referring to an event which resulted in a traumatic injury. To argue otherwise is to vest an incident with amorphous qualities through the use of a term trauma-whose meaning and scope are inherently delimited by medical dimensions.
After completing its labyrinthic construction of “traumatic event,” the majority finds it unnecessary to consider
While acknowledging that the 1964 amendments to
Permanent and total disability resulting from a cardiovascular, pulmonary or musculo-skeletal condition which was not a direct result of a traumatic event occurring in the performance of duty shall be deemed an ordinary disability.
This amendment does not, as the majority itself admits, ante at 586, preclude claimants with these conditions from receiving the higher accidental disability benefits. Rather, the provision only conditions the receipt of such benefits upon proof that the disability caused by one of these underlying conditions was the direct result of a traumatic event.
Application of this principle is perhaps best illustrated in Hillman v. Board of Trustees, supra. The claimant in that case was a maintenance man, whose “health was apparently good.” As an employee of the State Department of Transportation, he was covered by the Public Employees’ Retirement System. On the day in question, Hillman had been ordered by his superior to report to work in order to assist in the Department‘s efforts with regard to a snow emergency. Upon arrival, he was assigned to operate a piece of snow-removal machinery with which he had little previous experience. During his operation of the machine, one of its wheels dropped into a hole. In his efforts to regain control of the steering mechanism which had been wrenched from his hand, Hillman suffered a severe heart attack which precluded his returning to his official duties. Like the claimant in the instant case, Hillman filed an application for benefits under a statute which had been amended by the addition of a provision identical to the 1964 amendment to
. . . The event-namely, the sudden wrenching of the steering wheel out of petitioner‘s hands and his struggle to regain control of the front-end loader-aggravated Hillman‘s preexisting arteriosclerotic heart disease, causing it to become permanent, chronic and
totally disabling. Finally, the event was clearly undesigned, unexpected and unusual. There can be no question that petitioner‘s present disability is a “direct result” of the traumatic event. As this court said in Titman, “the word ‘direct’ connotes relative freedom from remoteness, whether in terms of time, intervention of other attributive causes or the like, or a combination of such factors.” 107 N. J. Super. at 247. The heart attack made chronic what had previously been an asymptomatic condition. Dr. Schulz testified that were it not for the attack, Hillman, who had theretofore been relatively healthy and accustomed to heavy work, could have lived and worked normally and indefinitely. [109 N. J. Super. at 461; emphasis supplied].
Courts in other jurisdictions which have construed statutes requiring the certification of a “traumatic” disability, have similarly permitted an employee‘s recovery despite preexisting conditions. Metcalf v. Dep‘t of Labor & Industries, supra; Griggs v. Lumbermen‘s Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S. E. 2d 180 (Ct. App. 1939).
The majority today relies on a very narrow interpretation of the governing statute to deny the deserving claims of a fireman whose selfless efforts are worthy of emulation. While I recognize the restrictive policy which underlies
Therefore, I must affirm the result reached by the Appellate Division and dissent from the majority‘s disposition of this matter.
For reversal-Chief Justice HUGHES, Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CLIFFORD and Judge CONFORD-5.
For affirmance-Justice PASHMAN-1.
Notes
We recognize that the foregoing definition may not be all-inclusive and that a traumatic event may possibly be found in some situations which do not literally fall within the external force or violence concept but still might be regarded as having traumatic origin. Ante at 586.