Cato v. SnedeckerCato v. Snedecker
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2022, plaintiff pro se Jason ET Cato (“Plaintiff“), who at all relevant times was incarcerated in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS“) at Marcy Correctional Facility (“Marcy“), commenced this action pursuant to
On December 12, 2023, the Court vacated its previous order, Dkt. No. 8, and accepted Plaintiff‘s second amended complaint as the operative pleading in this matter, Dkt. No. 15. The Court also denied Plaintiff‘s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP“) pursuant to
Upon sua sponte review of the Third Amended Complaint under
On September 29, 2025, after the parties had engaged in discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (“Motion“) seeking judgment as to each of Plaintiff‘s remaining claims. Dkt. No. 64. In his opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff also sought summary judgment (“Cross-Motion“) as to his claims. Dkt. No. 66. Defendants replied. Dkt. No. 67.
For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge‘s report-recommendation that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012);
“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.‘” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
III. DISCUSSION
Because no party has filed objections, the Court reviews the Report-Recommendation for clear error.
Magistrate Judge Evangelista first noted that Plaintiff did not properly respond to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. Dkt. No. 68 at 2-3. But in deference to Plaintiff‘s pro se status, Magistrate Judge Evangelista treated Plaintiff‘s opposition as a response to the Statement of Material Facts and independently reviewed the record when evaluating the Motion. Id. at 3-4.
A court grants summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A. Defendant Blackmer
As to Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Blackmer, Magistrate Judge Evangelista first outlined the relevant law concerning exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“). Dkt. No. 68 at 13-16. Before a prisoner can bring an action for claims under Section 1983 arising from his incarceration, the PLRA requires that he exhaust any available administrative remedies. See
Magistrate Judge Evangelista also explained that the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement “hinges” on the availability of the administrative remedies. Id. at 21. Under Ross v. Blake, an administrative procedure is unavailable when (1) “it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) it is “so opaque
Turning to Defendant‘s Motion, Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that the Court grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff‘s claim for failure to intervene against Defendant Blackmer because Plaintiff “fails to demonstrate that he took the first step of the inmate grievance process” regarding this claim. Id. at 19. Magistrate Judge Evangelista stated that Defendants had submitted sworn declarations from the Inmate Grievance Program Director and the Marcy Inmate Grievance Program supervisor asserting that DOCCS had no record of Plaintiff filing a grievance against Defendant Blackmer related to the alleged failure to intervene incident on December 11, 2022. Id. at 17 (citing Dkt. No 64-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 64-3; 64-4). Plaintiff, on the other hand, failed to submit any evidence refuting Defendants’ evidence or otherwise showing that he had submitted a grievance regarding the events underlying this claim. Id. (citing Dkt. No. 66 at 8).
Magistrate Judge Evangelista also concluded that Plaintiff did not demonstrate that any of the Ross exceptions applied to this claim. Id. at 22-23. As such, Plaintiff‘s administrative remedies were available to him. Id. Finally, because the time in which Plaintiff was required to file his initial grievance expired, any renewed attempt to exhaust would be futile, thus Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Blackmer with prejudice. Id. at 24.
B. Defendant Snedecker
As to Plaintiff‘s claims for excessive force, Magistrate Judge Evangelista noted that “to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force, an incarcerated individual must prove
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Snedecker “sexually assaulted him during a pat frisk” on January 5, 2022. Id. at 26 (citing Dkt. No. 23 at 9). After reviewing the record, Magistrate Judge Evangelista determined that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the motivation behind why Snedecker conducted the pat frisk that led to the alleged sexual assault.” Id. at 27. Specifically, even though Defendant Snedecker declared that he conducted the pat frisk according to standard procedure “over the clothes,” Defendants do not address Plaintiff‘s allegations that Defendant Snedecker placed at least one of his hands inside of Plaintiff‘s pants or that he performed the pat frisk after commenting on Plaintiff‘s race and religion. Id. at 27 n. 11 (citing Dkt. No. 64-7 at 2; Dkt. No. 64-10 at 69-70; Dkt. No. 64-12). Thus, Magistrate Judge Evangelista concluded that a reasonable factfinder could credit Plaintiff‘s testimony and find that Defendant Snedecker conducted the pat frisk “to humiliate Plaintiff or derive sexual arousal or gratification from the contact.” Id. at 27 (citing Josey, 2025 WL 2880706, at *5) (internal quotes omitted).
Magistrate Judge Evangelista concluded similarly as to Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Bradbarry for alleged sexual assault during a pat frisk on December 11, 2022. Id. at 28-29. Plaintiff specifically alleged that Defendant Bradbarry placed his hands in the backside of Plaintiff‘s pants and inserted a finger into Plaintiff‘s rectum with the intent to humiliate Plaintiff, while Defendant Bradbarry declared that he never sexually assaulted Plaintiff and that he only performed the pat frisk in furtherance of promoting safety and security. Id. at 28 (citing Dkt. No. 64-10 at 131-33, 135, 151-152; Dkt. No. 64-6 at 2). After review, Magistrate Judge Evangelista found that these conflicting accounts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presented genuine issues of material fact that could not be resolved at summary judgment. Id. at 29.
Plaintiff‘s Cross-Motion
Finally, Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommended that Plaintiff‘s Cross-Motion for summary judgment be denied. Id. Magistrate Judge Evangelista found that Plaintiff had not supported his conclusion that he is entitled summary judgment with any evidence, and undermined his own request “by conceding that there are ‘genuine issues of facts‘” regarding the exact issues on which he seeks judgment as a matter of law. Id.
D. The Court‘s Review
After reviewing the Report-Recommendation and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds no clear error and adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista‘s recommendation to grant Defendant‘s Motion as to Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Blackmer and deny it as to Plaintiff‘s claims against Defendants Snedecker and Bradbarry. The Court also adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista‘s recommendation to deny Plaintiff‘s Cross-Motion.
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 68, be ADOPTED for the reasons stated herein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant‘s Motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 64, be GRANTED as to Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to intervene against Defendant Blackmer; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to intervene against Defendant Blackmer be DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant‘s Motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 64, be DENIED as to Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force against each of Defendant Snedecker and Defendant Bradbarry; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff‘s Cross-Motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. No. 66, be DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 1, 2026
Albany, New York
Anne M. Nardacci
U.S. District Judge