2 Stew. 214 | Ala. | 1829
So many of the points presented by the assignment of errors as it is deemed material to notice, may be thus succinctly stated.
1. Could the administrator of Wyche Cato have been properly made a defendant to the bill of the appellee?
2. Should the wards of the appellant have defended by a guardian ad litem?
3. Is the deed of gift made by the mother, who was largely indebted at the time, as against existing creditors, void per se?
4. Was it necessary to have expressed in the decree, a time when the infants, on attaining full age, should be permitted, to impeach it. ?
5. Is not the decree rendered for too large a sum?
The first point makes it necessary briefly to stale the facts. Wyche Cato, the father of the wards of the apjiellant died intestate, possessed of a considerable real and personal estate, on which the appellant administered. A part of the estate was sold by the administrator, and purchased by Martha Cato, the mother of the wards, and widow of the intestate, who made her note therefor with the appellee as security, payable six months after date. After the making of the note, she conveyed her property, without any valuable consideration, to her children, and the appellee has been compelled to pay it with interest and costs. To reimburse himself this suit was brought, to subject the property thus voluntarily conveyed, to the payment of this demand.
Perhaps it was unnecessaiy to have made the administrator a party to the bill, unless a discovery was sought from him for some purpose. It does not appear whether
The record does not make it necessary for the Court to decide in this case the abstract question, whether infants should defend by a guardian ad litem where they have a general guardian. The names of all the infants are set oftt in the bill; their names and the name of the appellant as their guardian, are recited in an order made by the Court upon the bill, and before the coming in of the answer; they all profess to answer by their guardian in usual form. From these facts appearing on the record, the Court might infer that the appellant was either appointed as their guardian to defend this particular suit, or if not appointed, that he was recognized as such, which may be considered as tantamount to a special appointment. In Virginia it has been holden, where a suit against infants in Chancery was defended by a guardian appointed by the County Court, and the answer of the guardian was received for them, and full defence made under the sanction and authority of the Court, that the infants wex-e equally bound by such- defence, as if their guardian had been appointed in foi-m ad litem, by the Chancery Court.
It. is a wrell established rale of the common law, that all conveyances made with an ixrtent to delay, hinder and defraud creditors, are fraudulent and void, axxd. our statute of frauds and perjuries is declaratory of it.
With regard to the objection that no dime is expressed in the decree when the infants shall impeach it on attaining full age, it is enough to say, that the statute prescribes the time; and that therefore it need not be repeated in the decree.
The decree is for a larger sum than appears to have been due the appellee. For that cause it must he reversed, and rendered here for the sum which seems to have been due, including interest, and the costs of the suit of Wyche Cato’s administrator against the appellee;
Decree reversed and cause remanded.
Beverleys v. Miller, 6 Munf. 99.
Laws of Ala. §44.
3 John. Ch. Rep. 481.
11 Wheaton 199.8 Wheat. 242. 4 John. Ch. Rep. 450.
Laws of Ala. 492.
The decree was rendered for $971 01.