Toni Cato-Riggs (“Appellant”) appeals denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Appellant was сonvicted of first-degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder in 1994. She is a state prisoner. The sole basis for her petition is that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel in connection with the 1994 conviction. The district court denied Appellant’s petition on 18 March 2001. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant’s conviсtion stems from the shooting death of her husband, Anthony Riggs, in 1991. The Michigan Court of Appeals provides a detailed description of the relevant facts in People v. Riggs,
In March 1991, Appellant’s husband was shot to death in Detrоit, Michigan. Charges of first-degree premeditated murder, inter alia, were filed against the Appellant, and she retained an attorney for representation in the matter. At the April 1991 preliminary exаmination of charges, the 36th district court found “insufficient evidence” had been presented and dismissed the charges against Appellant. The prosecutor appealed this dismissal. In June 1991, the district court’s decision was affirmed, but the prosecutor continued to appeal the dismissal.
In April 1992, while the prosecution’s subsequent appeal of the district court’s decisiоn was pending and Appellant continued to be represented by counsel, Appellant traveled from Michigan to Texas. In Texas, she became associated with several people engaged in narcotics trafficking. As a result of this association, Appellant became the target of an undercover drug investigation.
On 23 February 1993, Appellant met in Detrоit with two persons she believed to be narcotics dealers to discuss Appellant’s participation in upcoming narcotics activity. These “dealers” were actually spеcial agents Richard Crock (“Crock”) and Joseph Peterson (collectively, the “Agents”) of the Drug Enforcement Agency. During this meeting, which was surreptitiously videotaped by the Agents, Appellant detailed her involvement in her husband’s death.
On 17 November 1993, while the prosecution’s leave to appeal the dismissal of charges to the Michigan Supreme Court was pending, Crock arrested the Appellant pursuant to an arrest warrant for federal narcotics violations. Shortly after her arrest, Appellant was confronted by Crock and Sergeant William Ricе (“Rice”) of the Detroit Police Department. Rice was the officer in charge of the state investigation into the murder of Appellant’s husband. Crock played a portion of thе videotape of the 23 February 1993 meeting, wherein Appellant inculpated herself in her husband’s death. After playing the videotape,
In the сourse of preliminary proceedings, Crock testified about his investigative efforts. In simplest terms, Crock testified that Appellant became a subject in an ongoing drug investigation sometime in 1992. Crock contacted Rice concerning the Appellant after Appellant became part of the investigation. At that time, Crock became aware that homicidе charges had been brought against Appellant in state court, and that Rice’s investigation of the Appellant was ongoing.
Crock contacted the Appellant on 23 February 1993 and arranged a meeting with Appellant. Additionally, Crock contacted Rice on or about 23 February to “formulate plans” to meet with the Appellant.
On 23 February, Crock, posing as a high-levеl narcotics dealer, met with Appellant in Detroit. Crock and the Appellant began to discuss past narcotics activity. In the course of this discussion, Appellant expressed сoncern that an associate may eventually testify against her in connection with her husband’s death. After a lengthy discussion regarding Appellant’s involvement in illegal narcotics, the two began to discuss possible roles that Appellant could fill in Crock’s “organization.” During the conversation, Appellant told Crock about the pending appeal of the murder chargе, and that she was represented by counsel.
After Appellant expressed a desire to participate in Crock’s narcotics operation, Crock told her that certain “concerns with her past” had to be addressed. Crock began to discuss the death of Appellant’s husband and expressed a desire to “help.” Initially, Appellant stated that she had nothing to do with her husband’s murder, but Crock persisted. He claimed that her story “didn’t add up.” After more cajoling, and a pre-planned telephone call concerning the possibility that one of Appellant’s associates decided to cooperate with authorities in connection with the murder, Appellant succumbed. She confessed to formulating a plan with others to murder her husband for pecuniary gain.
Crock’s primary purpose in meeting with Appellant on 23 February was to advance his drug investigation. Though not a primary goal, he also sought to induce Appellant to make statements about her husband’s murder.
At trial, and over Appellant’s objection, various videotapes of Appellant’s conversation with Crock were plаyed for the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, Appellant was convicted and subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without parole.
Following sentencing, Apрellant filed an appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. She claimed, inter alia, that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the Agents questioned her about her husband’s murder during the pendеncy of the state-initiated appeal concerning dismissal of those charges, and her incriminating videotaped statements were admitted at trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Appellant’s subsequent application for leave to appeal. On 11 January 1999, the United States Suрreme Court denied Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On 10 January 2000, Appellant filed the instant habeas petition in the United States District Court
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s denial of Appellant’s habeas petition de novo. Fair v. United States,
III. ANALYSIS
Appellant principally relies on Massiah v. United States,
While a prolix analysis of Appellant’s cases is unnecessary, it suffices to say that the we agree with the palmary analysis of the district court. After review of the matter, we too conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is neither contrаry to established United States Supreme Court precedent, nor is it an unreasonable application of that precedent. See Williams v. Taylor,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
Notes
. The trial court suppressed the statement to Rice.