Following a jury trial, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, appellant, Robin Tyronne Cathcart, was found guilty of first degree assault, second degree assault, and false imprisonment.
1. Whether the sentence imposed for common law false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for first degree assault.
For the reasons that follow, we find that the sentence imposed for false imprisonment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s first degree assault conviction. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgments of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 28, 2003, appellant met Antoinette Drayton,
According to Drayton’s testimony at trial, appellant forced her to perform various sex acts and, when she again tried to leave, appellant smacked her two more times. While Drayton was lying on her back on the floor, and appellant was sitting on her stomach, appellant grabbed her by the throat with his left hand, and began punching her in the face. Drayton lost consciousness during the beating and reported having the sensation “like I didn’t even know I was there.” Drayton’s injuries included two fractures to her jaw, a broken nose, a dislocated chin, multiple hematomas to her face, and a swollen hand. Photographs of Drayton’s injuries and her medical records were introduced into evidence at trial.
Following the beating, appellant began “[wjhooping and hollering” that he was “going to go to jail for this shit.” Drayton tried to tell appellant that she needed to go to the hospital “before I die.” When appellant noticed that Drayton was “bleeding all over the damn place,” he got her a towel. Drayton, her eyes swollen, felt around on the floor for her clothes, but appellant told her, “[N]ot yet. We ain’t leaving yet.” About 45 minutes to an hour passed before appellant agreed to permit Drayton to leave the apartment.
With assistance from appellant, Drayton was allowed to get dressed and was led outside the apartment. Drayton “tried to keep walking,” but appellant grabbed her by the arm and asked her what she wanted him to do. Appellant ultimately told Drayton to go to her friend’s apartment across the street and not look back. Drayton felt her way to her friend’s apartment door at about 3:30 a.m. Thereafter, she was taken to a hospital for treatment.
Additional facts will be set forth as they become necessary to our discussion of the issues.
1. Whether the sentence imposed for common law false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate.
Excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment are expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court’s decisions outlining the narrow scope of proportionality review were summarized by Judge Raker in
In Solem v. Helm,463 U.S. 277 ,103 S.Ct. 3001 ,77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Supreme Court held a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a seven-time non-violent felony recidivist unconstitutionally disproportionate. In so finding, the Court emphasized that successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence are exceedingly rare.... The Court stated that appellate courts’ proportionality review should be guided by objective criteria, including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 292,103 S.Ct. at 3011 ,77 L.Ed.2d 637 .
In Harmelin v. Michigan, [501 U.S. 957 ,111 S.Ct. 2680 ,115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)] the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Solem. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, and writing for himself and three other justices, clarified that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin,501 U.S. at 1001 ,111 S.Ct. at 2705 ,115 L.Ed.2d 836 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ____Therefore, a detailed proportionality review based on the criteria set out in Solem is “appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Harmelin,501 U.S. at 1005 ,111 S.Ct. at 2707 ,115 L.Ed.2d 836 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
(Footnotes omitted).
In Ewing v. California,
Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution “does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.” A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.
Id. at 25,
In Thomas v. State,
When it is clear ... that the conduct underlying the simple assault or battery is in fact less serious than the assaultive conduct for which the legislature has fixed a maximum penalty, a penalty that exceeds the statutory maximum suggests disproportionality, and we give that fact heavy weight in this case.
Id. at 100,
In Stewart, supra,
The Court of Appeals has also considered disproportionality issues in Simms v. State,
In Simms, supra,
[W]hen a defendant is charged with a greater offense and a lesser included offense based on the same conduct, with jeopardy attaching to both charges at trial, and when the defendant is convicted only of the lesser included charge, he may not receive a sentence for that conviction which exceeds the maximum sentence which could have been imposed had he been convicted of the greater charge.
Id. at 724,
Here, appellant posits that, had he been charged with, and convicted of, kidnaping,
Finally, appellant relies on Epps, supra,
Life Sentence
Appellant contends that the trial court’s imposition of a life sentence for common-law false imprisonment “is disproportional in a way that is violative of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” We disagree because we believe it appropriate to focus on the actual sentence—ten years—and not the life sentence, of which, actuarially, a substantial portion was suspended.
At sentencing in the ease sub judice, the court stated, in pertinent part:
For the first-degree assault, Count 1, I sentence you to ten years in the State penitentiary. And I give you credit for the 324 days that you’ve already spent toward that.
Count 2, the second-degree assault, merges into the first-degree assault.
But there was a separate offense, that false imprisonment, Count 12, and for that I sentence you to life, suspend all but ten years.
And that ten years is consecutive to the ten years I gave you in Count 1.
(Emphasis added).
Appellant was given a sentence of “life, suspend all but ten years,” and no period of probation was imposed. See Md. Rule 4-346(a)(2005).
“False imprisonment, a common law offense, is the ‘unlawful detention of another person against his [or her] will.’ ” Marquardt v. State,
In the case of common law crimes, the only restrictions on sentence are that it be within the reasonable discretion of the trial judge and not cruel and unusual punishment. In the imposition of sentence, the court must not only consider the accused, but in cases of serious import, the example to others of like inclination.
See Lynch v. State,
“In Maryland, a sentencing judge is Vested with virtually boundless discretion.’ ” Kang v. State,
The judge is accorded this broad latitude to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing—punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. A sentence should be premised upon both the facts and circumstances of the crime itself and the background of the individual convicted of committing the crime.
Dopkowski, supra,
Here, the court, in sentencing appellant, clearly articulated its rationale for imposing a sentence above the guidelines (probation to one year) when it stated:
When you commit an act against another person in our society like you did, against her, that is not just a transgression against her. And that is what criminal law is about, an act against society as a whole.
If you don’t learn to treat other people the way you would want to be treated yourself, then you are a dangerous person.
And I’ve listened. I’ve listened to you. You said this wouldn’t have happened if she had not ... been using drugs. It wouldn’t have happened if you had conducted yourself as a good citizen and followed that.
All of those other things, I have all the faith in the world that your jury listened to that, and they totally rejected all those other things, but that they didn’t.
And it is to her benefit that she has forgiven you. I’m happy that she is able to reach that conclusion. That speaks well of her.
But I don’t think the society as a whole excuses that.
I want this to be made part of the sentencing investigation that goes with the commitment.
Madam Clerk, the photographs are to go to the parole board. I have asked them to take a look at them before they decide what they think is appropriate.
If he loved her, I would hate to see what would happen if he hated somebody.
Since we find no suggestion of gross disproportionality, we need not undertake an Epps proportionality review. As we consider the facts before us, and the court’s broad discretion in sentencing matters, we hold that the imposition of a ten-year
We note that the challenged sentences in Simms, Thomas, Epps, and Stewart were flat sentences—that is, no portion of any of those sentences was suspended. For that reason, among others, we conclude that those cases are of no comfort to appellant. Accordingly, we hold that, where a disproportionality review is sought, the focus must be on the sentence to be actually served, and not necessarily on the greater suspended portion. This is particularly so where, as here, a defendant suffers no additional exposure from a future violation of conditions of probation or parole.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for ñrst degree assault.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying defense motions for judgment of acquittal for the first degree assault charge. Specifically, he contends that “[t]he State failed to produce evidence from which the jury could have found that Ms. Drayton suffered serious injury as that term is defined by statute.” We disagree.
Since the record indicates that appellant’s motions for judgment of acquittal, both at the close of the State’s case and at the close of all of the evidence, were argued with particularity, we shall review, not the propriety of the trial court’s denial, but the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the first degree assault conviction. See Whiting v. State,
In making our review, we must determine “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chilcoat v. State,
Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CL”) § 3-202(a)(l)(2002) defines assault in the first degree and provides that “[a] person may not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical injury to another.” (emphasis added). “Serious physical injury” is defined in CL § 3-201(d) as an injury that:
(1) creates a substantial risk of death; or
(2) causes permanent or protracted serious:
(i) disfigurement;
(ii) loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or
(iii) impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
the statute [present CL § 3-202(a)(l) ] prohibits not only causing, but attempting to cause, a serious physical injury to another. Although the State must prove that an individual had a specific intent to cause a serious physical injury, a jury may infer the necessary intent from an individual’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, whether or not the victim suffers such an injury. Also, the jury may “infer that ‘one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.’ ”
Id. at 403,
In the case sub judice, appellant, while holding Drayton to the floor, punched her repeatedly in her face with his right hand while he choked her with his left. Drayton lost consciousness during the beating and suffered bilateral fractures to her jaw, a broken nose, a dislocated chin, multiple hematomas to her face, and a swollen hand. Moreover, the jury heard testimony from several witnesses who described her appearance soon after the beating.
We hold, therefore, that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for the jury to infer that appellant intended to cause serious physical injury to Drayton.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, AFFIRMED; COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
Notes
. In addition, appellant was charged with various sexual offenses, including first degree rape. He was acquitted of all of those charges.
. In his brief, appellant asks:
1. Under the circumstances of this case, is the imposition of a life sentence for the common law misdemeanor of false imprisonment unconstitutional as disproportionate, and therefore illegal?
2. Did the trial judge err in denying defense motions for judgment of acquittal for first degree assault where there was no evidence of use of a firearm, and no evidence of "serious physical injury" as defined in Md.Code, Criminal Law Article, § 3-201(b)?
. Cruel and unusual punishment is also prohibited by the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 25 provides ''[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law." Similarly, Article 16 provides “[t]hat sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter.”
. At issue in Stewart was whether a 25 year, no parole sentence, pursuant to Md.Code, Article 27 § 286(d), was cruel and unusual punishment.
. We recognize that false imprisonment is, in Maryland, a common law misdemeanor; hence, there is no statutorily prescribed maximum sentence. Therefore, deference to the legislative body is not a factor in our review. Whether the standard of review of a common law misdemean- or sentence, vis-'a-vis, a legislatively adopted sentence, is different is not before us. In any event, our decision would obviate the need for such a determination.
. Md. Rule 4-346(a) provides:
(a) Manner of imposing. When placing a defendant on probation, the court shall advise the defendant of the conditions and duration of probation and the possible consequences of a violation of any of the conditions. The court also shall file and furnish to the defendant a written order stating the conditions and duration of probation.
. COMAR 12.08.01.17(7)(a) provides:
(7) Sentence of Life Imprisonment.
(a) A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is eligible for parole after serving 15 years or the equivalent of 15 years when considering the allowance for any diminution credits awarded by the Division of Correction in accordance with Correctional Services Article, Title 3, Subtitle 7, and Title 11, Subtitle 5, Annotated Code of Maryland.
. Appellant is still eligible for his "good time” credits. See Md.Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-218 (2001 & 2005 Supp.).
. Our decision is in accord with other courts that have been asked to review the proportionality of a suspended sentence. See Williams v. State,
. Drayton's Mend and neighbor, DeEtta Johnson, was hysterical upon seeing Drayton, whom she described as looking like "death.”