Tommy Edward Cates appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain drug evidence seized from his apartment, contending that such evidence was illegally obtained without a warrant and in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Cates’ motion.
*263
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we are required to accept such court’s ruling on disputed facts unless it is clearly erroneous. Additionally, we must defer to the trial court’s judgment on the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Davis,
Construed most favorably to the ruling of the trial court, the facts show that, on March 21, 1997, Investigator John Alley, a member of the Narcotics Division of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department, arrested Melvin Hunter. Hunter told Alley that he was en route to purchase marijuana from Cates and that Cates also sold methamphetamine. 1 Hunter then agreed to act as a confidential informant, and, in Alley’s presence, Hunter phoned Cates and set up a buy for half an ounce of methamphetamine. 2 Hunter also informed Alley that Cates possessed weapons, that he was planning to go to Florida, and that Cates’ supplier had recently dropped off a new shipment of drugs.
Hunter was then escorted to Cates’ apartment by Alley and three other narcotics officers, Phillips, Oliver, and Dingee. Hunter entered Cates’ apartment with marked money to purchase the drugs and a microphone concealed beneath his clothing, which allowed Phillips to hear what was going on inside. The narcotics officers, who were dressed in plain clothes, waited outside the apartment while the buy took place.
As he listened to his radio receiver, Phillips heard the following: (1) Hunter moving through the apartment into Cates’ bedroom; (2) Hunter asking Cates when he would be returning from Florida, although the answer to the question was obscured by static; (3) Cates asking Hunter how much money he was carrying; (4) Cates measuring and preparing the methamphetamine being sold; (5) Hunter counting the money for the purchase; (6) Cates telling Hunter to hurry; (7) other voices in the room, including the voice of a child; (8) Cates chastising his child; and (9) Cates asking Hunter to look out the window to see who was there. Based on the content and cadence of Cates’ speech, Phillips believed that Cates was becoming nervous as the drug buy progressed.
At that point, the blinds were moved, and Phillips and Alley saw someone looking out the window at them. Neither officer could identify who looked at them, and they believed that they had been seen *264 by the perpetrators, thereby alerting Cates that he had been set up. The officers then entered Cates’ apartment without a warrant, 3 believing that Hunter was in danger, that children within the apartment might be placed in danger, that Cates and others might attempt to destroy or conceal evidence, and that Cates might attempt to flee to Florida.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even where probable cause exists, intrusion of a person’s home without a warrant is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment unless such intrusion is preceded by consent or exigent circumstances.
Steagald v. United States,
Deferring to the trial court’s determinations with regard to facts and credibility, as we must, we cannot say that the denial of Cates’ motion to suppress was clearly erroneous.
Davis,
supra. There was evidence that the officers believed that the “buy and bust” set up by them had gone sour, specifically that they had been seen by the perpetrators and that Cates had grown nervous about the situation. Combined with the information that Cates possessed weapons, the officers reasonably believed that the informant was in danger inside the apartment. Furthermore, the officers reasonably believed that Cates might attempt to destroy evidence. See
Merriman v. State,
Contrary to Cates’ argument,
Carranza v. State,
Judgment affirmed.