CARA CASTRONUOVA, JOHN TABACCO, PLAINTIFFS, VERSUS ED COX, NEW YORK REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE, NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, DEFENDANTS.
No. 24-CV-2428 (RER) (LB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
May 9, 2024
RAMON E. REYES, JR., U.S.D.J.
RAMON E. REYES, JR., U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiffs Cara Castronuova (“Ms. Castronuova“) and John Tabacco (“Mr. Tobacco“) (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) brought this action pro se “challenging the constitutionality of the ballot access rules for the primary election for United States Senator (the “Primary“) that will be held by the New York Republican State Committee [], led by Ed Cox, and overseen by the New York State Board of Elections [] on June 25, 2024.” (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.“) ¶ 2). Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (“PI Motion“) to place Ms. Castronuova‘s name on the Republican Primary ballot for United States Senator. (ECF No. 3 (“PI Motion“)). Defendants Ed Cox and New York State Republican Committee (collectively, “NYRC” or “NYRC Defendants“), and the New York State Board of Elections (“NYSBOE“) (collectively with
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
New York Election Law (“NYEL“) provides for more than one route to a statewide primary ballot. Under
Yet another alternative is for candidates to obtain electorate signatures and file designating petitions to request NYSBOE to place their names on the ballot. (Zebrowski Staviski Decl. ¶¶ 6-7);
In addition to the formatting requirements and information specifications for the designating petitions, there is a geographical component; at least 100 signatures must be obtained from each of 13 of New York‘s 26 Congressional districts, or “1,300 of the required 15,000 signatures.” (Zebrowski Staviski Decl. ¶ 7). Petitions must include: “(i) the date the signature is put on the petition; (ii) the signature of the voter; (iii) the ‘residence address’ of the voter including only the street number and name[]; and (iv) ‘Town or City’ or in New York City, the ‘County.‘” (Id. ¶ 20). These specifications, referred to by the parties as the “town/city trap,” allow signatures to satisfy the geographical
Upon submission of a designating petition, the NYSBOE applies a presumption of validity to the signatures it contains. (Id. ¶ 8). Once submitted, a designating petition is viewable by, and open to objections from, the public. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 16). Objections can be made by administrative process with the NYSBOE or judicial intervention. See
Should a designating petition ultimately not be certified by the NYSBOE, candidates still have options to move forward in the race for a seat in the United States Senate. Under
Ms. Castronuova has taken some, but not all, of the steps in the process outlined above. She initially sought designation by the Republican party for nomination in the Primary and obtained over eight percent of her party committee‘s votes at the February 22, 2024, convention. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50);
II. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their pro se Complaint on April 1, 2024, alleging
On April 4 and 5, NYRC Defendants and Defendant NYSBOE each sought leave to move to dismiss the Complaint and requested a conference to oppose the PI. (ECF Nos. 11, 14). On April 5, Plaintiffs filed a letter requesting a hearing (ECF No. 15) and an Emergency Motion in support of a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion“). (ECF No. 16). The TRO Motion sought the relief of assignment of a District Judge, disclosure of why prior judges had recused themselves,7 and the “tolling of the petition deadline until such time as the matter can be heard by the [C]ourt.” (ECF No. 16 at 5).
On April 10, the Court held a hearing to discuss the TRO Motion, PI Motion, and Defendants’ anticipated motions to dismiss. (Order dated 4/8/2024; ECF No. 17). At the hearing, the Plaintiffs presented the arguments made in their filings, offered a copy of the form Plaintiffs and their supporters used to collect signatures for Ms. Castronuova‘s Designating Petition, and gave statements of fact in support of their claims. At the
On April 15, Defendant NYSBOE filed a consolidated memorandum of law in opposition to the PI and in support of their motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 19), alongside a supporting declaration of Kristen Zebrowski Stavisky. (Zebrowski Stavisky Decl.) That day, NYRC Defendants also filed a consolidated memorandum of law joining NYSBOE. (ECF No. 22 Ex. 1; ECF No. 22). To the extent Defendants have requested joint consideration of their motions to dismiss, those requests are granted.
Between the hearing held on April 10 and April 24, more than 35 separate documents were filed in support of Plaintiffs’ claims.8 These documents include several letters and declarations by Plaintiffs, some of which attached exhibits. (ECF Nos. 24, 26, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 49; ECF No. 31, Ex. 1; ECF No. 32, Exs. 1-10; ECF No. 36, Exs. 1-8). The attachments to these letters and declarations include examples of challenges and objections made to the Petition (ECF No. 32, Exs. 1-5, 7-10) and filings in the Albany Case to invalidate the Petition. (ECF No. 32, Ex. 6; Albany Case). Plaintiffs also filed copies of general objections to the Petition, supplemental filings from the Albany Case, the “Board of Elections in the City of New York” rules for all primary elections in New York City, news articles, and a mail label from John F. Haggerty to NYSBOE. (ECF No. 36, Exs. 1-8). Plaintiffs’ letters and declarations refer to an “Exhibit P” as “proof” from a handwriting expert that two of the objectors’ “signatures are fraudulent and forgeries,” but
On April 22, Defendants filed two letters disputing some of the facts alleged and opposing all the legal arguments made in Plaintiffs’ additional filings. (ECF Nos. 33, 34). Plaintiffs filed a 42-page Amended Complaint on May 3, 2024, as a matter of course, which was entered on the docket and received by the undersigned on May 7, 2024. (ECF No. 47 (“Amended Complaint“)).
The Court has carefully reviewed all of Plaintiffs’ numerous filings to date. The filings made up and until the Amended Complaint are construed to have been filed in support of Plaintiffs’ PI Motion. (See Order dated 4/18/2024). Mindful of the need to issue this Order and decide the PI Motion in a timely manner, and in light of the Court‘s prior Order allowing the parties until April 22, 2024, to file material in support of or opposition to the PI Motion, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are not incorporated fully in this Order. (See id.) In an abundance of caution, the Court notes having reviewed the Amended Complaint in full and determined that the allegations therein do not change the outcome of the PI Motion because Plaintiffs are still not likely to succeed on the merits. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ allegations that the objections to the Petition were brought by or with the help of any individuals associated with the Defendants are true, NYEL allows for any voter to challenge a Petition, regardless of party affiliation, and regardless of whether they have counsel or work alone. (See Zebrowski Staviski Decl. ¶
In support of their PI Motion, Plaintiffs argue their rights to vote and freely associate are unduly burdened by the process in place to access the ballot in the Primary in violation of the
Plaintiffs ultimately request that this Court find the statutory scheme to petition for ballot access to the Primary unconstitutional and order Defendants to place Ms. Castronuova‘s name on the Primary ballot. (Compl. ¶ 131; see generally ECF Nos. 3, 24, 32, 35, 41, 61). In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs seek damages for the time and money expended in support of their Petition. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 65, 78, 131).
DISCUSSION
I. Preliminary Injunction Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Though the injunction “is one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies,” the “district court has
“The typical preliminary injunction is prohibitory and generally seeks only to maintain the status quo pending a trial on the merits.” Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). For prohibitory injunctions, the moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the following four elements: (1) irreparable harm; (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation; (3) the balance of the hardships tips toward the moving party; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by issuance of an injunction. See Monserrate v. New York State Senate, 599 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010); Home It, Inc. v. Wen, No. 19-cv-7070 (MKB) (VMS), 2020 WL 353098, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2020) (J. Chen).
Where plaintiffs are “challenging governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” however, they “cannot rely on the fair ground for litigatiоn alternative” for the second element, and instead “must establish a likelihood of success on the merits.” Monserrate, 599 F.3d at 154. Moreover, a court may enter a mandatory preliminary injunction—an injunction that “alter[s] the status quo by commanding some positive act,” Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc., 60 F.3d at 34, “only if it
Thus, because Plaintiffs challenge governmental action taken in the public interest and seek a mandatory injunction—an order requiring NYSBOE to place Ms. Castronuova‘s name on the Primary ballot—they must establish: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a “clear” or “substantial” likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the balance of the hardships tips in their favor; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by issuance of the requested injunction. Plaintiffs have not met this heavy burden.10
II. Plaintiffs are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits
As an initial matter, the Plaintiffs have standing. While NYSBOE argues “claims against it for declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed because it is entitled to sovereign immunity,” Plaintiffs need only to add the proper party to an amended complaint to cure this defect. See Credico v. New York State Board of Elections (“Credico I“), 751 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Nevertheless, [a] request for prospective
Plaintiffs have also alleged a particularized injury. See Murray v. Cuomo, 460 F. Supp. 3d 430, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“To be sure, the Second Circuit has made clear that alleged constitutional violations presumptively constitute irreparable harm” even though “there is no freestanding [constitutional] right to be a candidate in an election.“) (citing Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 693-94 (2d Cir. 1996)); Credico v. New York State Bd. of Elections (“Credico II“), No. 10-cv-4555 (RJD) (CLP), 2013 WL 3990784, at *9, (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013) (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection case is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of a barrier, not the ultimate ability to obtain benefits if that barrier is eliminated.“) (citation omitted). In this Circuit, “the mere allegation of a constitutional violation” sufficiently “triggers a finding of irreparable injury,” and the question of whether that injury is due to the infringement of a constitutional right bears instead on the likelihood of success on the merits analysis. See Murray, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 444-45. The Court therefore moves on to address thе likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
A. Legal Framework for Assessing Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims
Constitutional analyses of statutes start with an assessment of whether there is a constitutional right before assessing whether the statute unconstitutionally burdens or infringes that right. See Tiraco v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 963 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
If the constitutional burden is severe, then strict scrutiny applies to the statute—“the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.‘” Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). If the burden is not “severe,” on the other hand, the regulation need only be rationally related to an important state interest. Compare Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2020) (“removal of ten out of eleven qualified candidates from a ballot, resulting in the cancellation of the election” was a severe “election-related restriction“), with Ulrich v. Mane, 383 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions . . . the State‘s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.“) (citations omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court:
[M]ust weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the
First andFourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposеd by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff‘s rights.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Accordingly, “if the burden imposed is less than severe and reasonably related to the important state interest, the Constitution is satisfied.” Monserrate, 599 F.3d at 154-55. This “flexible” standard generally applies to both pre-vote and post-vote
To determine whether there has been a
Finally, “[t]he
Plaintiffs argue that the statutory scheme here violates the
B. New York Election Law Does Not Place an Unconstitutionally Severe Burden on Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Ms. Castronuova does not have a fundamental right to appear on a ballot as a candidate, but rather a “right to campaign in an attempt to qualify to appear” on the ballot. Murray, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 445. “[C]andidates’ and voters’ associational and voting rights are qualified ones. Many restrictions, such as signature requirements, not only do not burden voters’ constitutional rights to associate, but are, as a practical matter, necessary to ensure the orderly functioning of elections.” Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 469 n. 15. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reiterated that “a requirement that ballot access petitions be signed by at least 5% of the relevant voter pool is generally valid, despite any burden on voter choice that results when such a petition is unable to meet the requirement.” Prestia v. O‘Connor, 178 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1999); McMillan v. New York State Bd. of Election (“McMillan II“), 234 F.3d 1262, 1262 (2d Cir. 2000); Ulrich, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08, 411; see also SAM Party v. Kosinski, 987 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding a requirement of 45,000 signatures to “pale in comparison to the ones the Supreme Court upheld” previously, because there, that number amounted to about one percent of the relevant voters). With Republican Party active enrollment at 2,695,185 in New York State, the signature requirement of 15,000 amounts to just 0.556% of the relevant voters, well below the presumptively constitutional cap. (Zebrowski Stavisky Decl. ¶ 14).
Further, “the requirement that candidates obtain a certain number of signatures within 3[7] days to appear on the ballot for the [P]rimary election” is also not unduly burdensome. See Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at *14-*15 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787) (In Dekom, the applicable time frame was 38 days rather than 37, but the court explained why an even shorter time frame, 28 days, would also be permissible); see Libertarian Party of New York v. New York Bd. of Elections, 539 F. Supp. 3d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Litigants have previously raised the argument that a ‘signature-per-day’ requirement is too onerous without success.“) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court has been “unimpressed” with arguments based on the associated costs of collecting signatures within restricted time periods, because “[h]ard work and sacrifice by dedicated volunteers are the lifeblood of any political organization,” and “some cut off period . . . is necessary to verify the validity of signatures on the petitions, to print the ballots, and, if necessary, to litigate any challenges.” Libertarian Party, 539 F. Supp. 3d at 324, 324 n. 8 (quoting Am. Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787, 787 n.18, (1974)).
Plaintiffs point to the short time frame in conjunction with the practical difficulties of: (1) getting wet signatures; (2) working to “cure the pagination errors;” and (3) “accomplish[ing] th[e] arcane task” of addressing “hundreds” of general and specific objections “attempting to throw out . . . thousands of signatures based on arbitrary” requirements. (See, e.g., ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 16, 21-25). While collecting wet signatures and responding to paper forms by mail may be painstaking and impractical in the digital age, “there is a distinction between constitutionality and wise policy,” the latter of which is more appropriately taken up “with the legislature—not the courts.” Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at *15 (citations omitted). To be sure, the statutory requirements at play are onerous, and “far more likely operate[] to restrict voter choice by keeping otherwise qualified candidates off of party primary ballots and by discouraging them from entering the race in the first place.” Ulrich, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 407. Plaintiffs’ argument that candidates must collect
The documented difficulties Plaintiffs face are substantial, but unfortunately are of the kind and character the Constitution cannot remedy under the jurisprudence this Court must follow. As was the case almost twenty years ago, “[b]ecause the Second Circuit squarely has held that petition signature requirements more onerous than those faced by [Plaintiffs] are not severe within the meaning of the
The geographic component to getting on the ballot for the presidential primary was a far greater challenge than that for getting on the Primary ballot—at least twice as great. Here,
Indeed, Judge Korman expressly contrasted
Courts also found undue burden in the presidential primary‘s requirement that each witness must be either a registered Republican within the district the signature came from or be a notary public or commissioner of deeds. Molinari, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 70-73; Rockefeller I, 917 F. Supp. at 161-62. Instead, here,
Further, while
Additionally—with respect to whether the burden itself is reasonably related to a government interest, an issue analyzed more fully below—the court in Rockerfeller found the option presented to each party in the 1996 presidential race to choose “between a 5%/1250 signature requirement and a 0.5%/1000 signature requirement” as unconstitutionally burdensome. Prestia, 178 F.3d at 89 (citing Rockefeller I, 917 F. Supp. at 164) (“We conclude that the holding in [Rockefeller I] is attributable to—and, therefore, limited to—these special circumstances surrounding the presidential primary process, and that no similar circumstances are presented here.”) The “very existence” of an alternative option given to the parties, despite one being easier than the other,
In sum, in this Circuit, courts have already found requirements akin to those in place here as not unreasonably burdensome, and this Court is not inclined to stray from those findings now. See Ulrich, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 407–11 (citations omitted); Prestia, 178 F.3d at 89; Tiraco, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 194; Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at *15; SAM Party, 987 F.3d at 276; Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 470; McMillan II, 234 F.3d 1262.
C. New York Election Law is Reasonably Related to an Important State Interest
New York State has an important interest in having a fair and timely election. Specifically, there is “an important interest in ‘requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support’ before printing a candidate‘s name on the ballot, so as to ‘avoid[] confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election.‘” Prestia, 178 F.3d 86 at 88 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)). Further, New York State need not “make a particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the рresence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access.” Hewes v. Abrams, 718 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y.), aff‘d, 884 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing first, Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986), then citing, Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442).
The ballot needs to be certified by a certain date for the election to occur, and there is an important interest in having a fair and timely Primary.
D. Plaintiffs Have not Shown Unfair, Unequal, or Disparate Treatment by the Ballot Selection Process
Plaintiffs’ claims for relief under the Equal Protection Clause fail for many of the same reasons as their First Amendment and Due Process claims, but also because Plaintiffs only point to disparate treatment due to resources and party support, which are not afforded constitutional protectiоn. Some plaintiffs have successfully argued for some protection where candidates are treated differently due to political party membership. See, e.g., Credico I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 423; Credico II, 2013 WL 3990784, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013). Plaintiffs allude to differential treatment of Republicans and Democrats by NYEL, alleging there are more Democrats in New York and therefore it is
Furthermore, the statutes at issue have survived Equal Protection claims, finding any alleged difference in treatment in candidates not to amount to discrimination. See McMillan II, 234 F.3d at 1262; Rockefeller II, 74 F.3d at 1380 (where plaintiffs claimed the signature requirement was more burdensome on Republican candidates, because New York State has far more Democrat voters, plaintiffs were unable to plead an Equal Protection claim). Plaintiffs instead point to others within their own party that have attempted to undergo the petitioning process to appear on the ballot for this Primary, and other elections, but have faced the same burdens Plaintiffs have. (See, e.g., ECF No. 38 ¶ 3; ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 2-14, 19; ECF No. 25; ECF No. 1, Ex. 2 ¶ 14). Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue the suit brought against Ms. Castronuova is “misuse” of the court system, “arbitrary, capricious and outright malicious,” and other “non-favored” Republican candidates have faced similar lawsuits. (ECF No. 32 ¶ 11-12; Complaint ¶ 130). These similarities do not help Plaintiffs, but rather show they have not been singled out in an unconstitutional manner. See Tiraco, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200 (where plaintiffs alleged they were treated unfairly in comparison to “favored” candidates, but failed to establish they were the same as those candidates in all relevant aspects, lack of ballot access did not give rise to an Equal Protection claim). Based on the information presented, those who are
Accordingly, the statutory scheme in place is reasonably related to the important state interest in elections.
III. Consideration and Balance of the Potential for Harm to Plaintiffs, the Hardships of the Parties, and the Public Interest Weighs Against Issuance of Injunctive Relief
Finally, in denying injunctive relief, the Court balances the relative harms and hardships to the parties and considers the public interest at stake. In assessing the potential harm Plaintiffs face in the absence of an injunction, the same considerations for the burden placed on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights apply. (See supra Part II.B); see Green Party of New York State v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2004). As for the potential harm to Defendants and the public were an injunction to be granted, the same considerations in assessing New York State‘s important interest
As Defendants note, were the Court to invalidate the rules and intervene to place Ms. Castronuova‘s name on the ballot despite her Petition falling short of the statutory requirements, many other petitions would also seek to be reassessed under a new standard. Such a change would not only cause great confusion and potentially delay the election, but also be unfair to any candidates that expended great effort and expense to accomplish the hefty task of successfully petitioning to be placed on the ballot.
Plaintiffs also claim they are unable to “campaign, fundraise[,] and build support” on Ms. Castronuova‘s behalf absent injunctive relief. (See, e.g., ECF No. 40 at 2). While it is true that the petitioning process, and defending the petition against challenges and litigation, poses logistical limitations to the time and funds available to campaign, there are no rules, orders or restraints in place legally prohibiting Plaintiffs from campaigning. As Defendants noted on the record at the April 10 hearing, Plaintiffs may indeed campaign for the election of Ms. Castronuova in the Primary. Also, as Defendants also noted at the hearing, should Ms. Castronuova‘s name not appear on the ballot, her supporters that wish to vote for her in the Primary may indeed write her name in. Therefore, the balance of the parties’ respective harms and interests weigh against issuing an injunction.
IV. The Initial Complaint Would Have Been Dismissed with Leave to Amend
The Court writes further to inform Plaintiffs that, had they not filed an Amended Complaint prior to issuance of this Memorandum and Order, the Court likely would have
Courts are required to give special consideration to pro se litigants. Appearing without counsel, pro se plaintiffs are not expected to meet the same standards required for formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court must therefore look to the strongest argumеnts that could be raised based on the allegations contained in a pro se complaint. Id.; Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). If there is any possibility that “a valid claim might be stated,” the Court must give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
A district court must dismiss a pro se complaint that, “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
As mentioned throughout this Memorandum and Order, Plaintiffs’ original Complaint is deficient in several respects. For example, Plaintiffs did not name a
Plaintiffs may, when filing a response to any forthcoming motions to dismiss, attempt to persuade the Court as to why these deficiencies have been cured in the Amended Complaint, or how they could be cured by the filing of a second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs have not estаblished likelihood of success on the merits of their allegations, as required by the extraordinary injunctive relief sought. Plaintiffs may choose to immediately appeal the decision to deny the PI Motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Adams v. City of New York, 371 F. App‘x 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary injunction pursuant to
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ requests for a preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 3, 24) are denied with prejudice, and Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 22) are denied without prejudice. Plaintiff‘s request for an extension of time to file an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 46) is denied as moot.
Defendants shall respond to the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47) within 21 days of this Order, whether by answer, motion, or otherwise. Plaintiffs shall have 14 days to oppose any forthcoming motions to dismiss, and Defendants may reply 7 days thereafter. Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint—or any other motions—only upon prior written request and grant of leave to do so.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to mail copies of this Order to Plaintiffs at the addresses listed on the docket and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Hon. Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: May 9, 2024
Brooklyn, NY