151 Wash. 2d 221 | Wash. | 2004
Stanwood School District No. 401 (Stanwood) and Edmonds School District No. 15 (Edmonds) were granted direct review of a Snohomish County Superior Court order that denied their motion for summary judgment dismissal of a lawsuit commenced by Jason Castro.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jason Castro was injured on May 9, 1997, when a fight broke out during a high school soccer game. The three-year statute of limitations on any tort suit based on Castro’s injuries began to run on January 27, 1999, when he turned 18 years old. Pursuant to RCW 4.96.020(4), Castro served claims for damages against Edmonds and Stanwood on December 6 and December 7, 2001, respectively. He then filed a negligence complaint in Snohomish County Superior Court against both districts on March 1, 2002.
The districts moved for summary judgment dismissal on the ground that the action was time barred notwithstanding the tolling provision under RCW 4.96.020(4). The districts based their argument on our decision in Medina v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Benton County, 147 Wn.2d 303, 53 P.3d 993 (2002), asserting that Medina clarified that the tolling provision acts only to extend the otherwise applicable statute of limitations, if necessary, until the end of the 60-day “waiting period” after filing a nonjudicial claim under RCW 4.96.020. Under this interpretation of the tolling provision, Castro’s lawsuits would be time barred.
The trial court denied the districts’ summary judgment motion by an order dated March 10, 2002, interpreting the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020(4) to temporarily stop, but then resume, the period of time within which the plaintiff must file suit. This interpretation essentially adds 60 days to the end of the otherwise applicable statute of
ANALYSIS
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment order is de novo. Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas County, 118 Wn.2d 852, 854, 827 P.2d 1000 (1992). Additionally, interpretation of a statute is a matter of law subject to de novo review. See, e.g., State v. Karp, 69 Wn. App. 369, 372, 848 P.2d 1304 (1993).
RCW 4.96.020(4) provides:
No action shall be commenced against any local governmental entity for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to and filed with the governing body thereof. The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty-day period.
Although the parties present opposing interpretations of the statute’s tolling provision, we essentially resolved the interpretation in Medina. In Medina, we considered among other issues whether RCW 4.96.020(4) violates the due process protections of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because the tolling language is too confusing. We found that the tolling language is clear and unambiguous and held that the statute does not violate due process protections. Medina, 147 Wn.2d at 314-15.
In Medina, we provided definitions to support our finding that the term “toll” was not ambiguous. First, we looked to the standard dictionary definition for “toll”: “ ‘to take away: make null: REMOVE <[]the statute of limitations>.’” Medina, 147 Wn.2d at 315 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2405 (1986)). We also
Additional language of the statute directs this interpretation as well. The statute expressly states that the “period of limitations . . . shall be tolled during the sixty-day period.” RCW 4.96.020(4) (emphasis added). We must assume that use of the word “period,” as opposed to “statute,” by the legislature was purposeful. The common dictionary definition of “period” in this context is “a temporal unit of measure.” Webster’s, supra, at 1680.
Finally, this interpretation of the statute’s tolling provision under RCW 4.96.020(4) is consistent with the tolling statute of general application, which provides:
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
RCW 4.16.230. As the general tolling statute explains, a tolling period generally does not take away from the time limited for the commencement of an action.
Under RCW 4.96.020(4), the tolling provision temporarily stops, but then resumes, the period of time within which the plaintiff must file a lawsuit against a local governmental entity. Essentially, the provision adds 60 days to the end of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.
Alexander, C.J., and Madsen, Sanders, Ireland, Bridge, Chambers, Owens, and Fairhurst, JJ., concur.
Black’s Law Dictionary does not define “period,” but defines “limitations period” as a “statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in court.” Black’s Law Dictionary 939 (7th ed. 1999).