16 Haw. 33 | Haw. | 1904
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
Error to the Circuit Court for the Eirst Circuit. The Kapiolani Estate, Limited, brought its action in ejectment against William H. Castle, Trustee, Philip L. Weaver and William Hoogs, defendants. A decision, trial having been had jury waived, was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
It is objected by the defendant in error that no writ of error lies to correct a judgment in a jury waived case where there is no other error in the record. Sections 1443-1444, C. L., are referred to. Section 1444 provides that writs of error shall lie to any decision or ruling by a justice or judge in any case in which jury has been waived. It is not necessary to decide whether or not the words “decision” or “ruling” are broad enough to include “judgment”. Section 1445 clearly authorizes a writ of error to correct any error appearing on the record either of law or fact, or for any cause which might be assigned as error at common law. This extends to errors arising in cases tried by a judge, jury waived, as well as to other cases, and disposes of the objection.
It is further objected, by the defendant in error, that the writ should be dismissed for the reason that all the. parties below are not made parties to the writ owler v. McIntyre, 9 Haw. 306. This is clearly the general rule and the objection would be good unless plaintiff in error has brought himself within some Well established exception. The objection is to the jurisdiction and can be raised at any time. It was not raised by motion to quash, and the whole record is now before us. The record shows that the plaintiff in error, at the time of suing out the writ of error, was the sole party in interest who could attack the judgment entered below. By the entry of separate judgments, and by the taking out and service of the writ of possession against the defendants Weaver and Hoogs, there resulted an effectual and complete severance of their interests from the interests of the defendant Castle, trustee. The interests having
Coming now to the question of the power of the court to enter several judgments, under the facts in this case, we are of the opinion that no such power existed. The defendants were sued jointly; damages might have been recovered against all; there was only one cause of action. Separate defenses would not make a judgment several which was founded on a single cause of action. A single recovery was had, under the decision filed in favor of the plaintiff. This would support only a single judgment against all the defendants. The defendants were not severally in possession of specific portions of the land claimed, as was the case in Ching On v. Amana, 6 Haw. 625. In that case several judgments were entered against the different defendants, but that was in consequence of findings against the defend
“In an action of trover there can be but one assessment of damages. Though one defendant is defaulted and the other found guilty, yet there must be one joint judgment. The verdict-which is to fix the amount of damages, fixes it as well as for the party defaulted as for the party who pleaded.” Gerrish v. Cummins, 4 Cush. 391.
The case of City Savings Bank v. Whittle, 63 N. H. 587, cited by defendant in error as an authority for the entry of separate judgments, does not conflict with the views above expressed. That case authorized separate findings against the several defendants. It does not support the entry of judgment differing from the findings.
The defendant in error, while conceding in general that only
The case is remanded to the Circuit Court.