Castilla v. K.A.B. Realty, Inc.Castilla v. K.A.B. Realty, Inc.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of the defendant and third-party plaintiff which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) by adding a provision thereto, upon searching the record, awarding the third-party defendant summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for common-law indemnification; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
... ``` Wait, where do I put the `Spolzino, J.P., Ritter, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of the defendant and third-party plaintiff which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) by adding a provision thereto, upon searching the record, awarding the third-party defendant summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for common-law indemnification; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured by a dangerous and defective electric saw while working on a construction and renovation project in a building owned by the defendant third-party plaintiff K.A.B. Realty, Inc. (hereinafter KAB). He commenced this action against KAB to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging negligence and violations of the
In support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on its third-party causes of action for common-law and contractual indemnification, KAB demonstrated, prima facie, that it was neither negligent in the happening of the accident, nor had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the manner of the work that caused the injury (see Brown v Two Exch. Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172 [1990]; Damiani v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 23 AD3d 329 [2005]). In opposition, Marin failed to raise a triable issue of fact. However, in its opposition papers, Marin did demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff was its special employee at the time of the accident and, therefore, that Marin was the plaintiff‘s employer within the meaning of the
However, KAB‘s third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification was not similarly barred. The exclusivity provisions of section 11 of the
However, in support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action, in effect, to recover damages for breach of contract, KAB failed to demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see McArthur v Muhammad, 27 AD3d 532 [2006]). Thus, that branch of the motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; McArthur v Muhammad, supra).
Spolzino, J.P., Ritter, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of the defendant and third-party plaintiff which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) by adding a provision thereto, upon searching the record, awarding the third-party defendant summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for common-law indemnification; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured by a dangerous and defective electric saw while working on a construction and renovation project in a building owned by the defendant third-party plaintiff K.A.B. Realty, Inc. (hereinafter KAB). He commenced this action against KAB to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging negligence and violations of the
In support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on its third-party causes of action for common-law and contractual indemnification, KAB demonstrated, prima facie, that it was neither negligent in the happening of the accident, nor had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the manner of the work that caused the injury (see Brown v Two Exch. Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172 [1990]; Damiani v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 23 AD3d 329 [2005]). In opposition, Marin failed to raise a triable issue of fact. However, in its opposition papers, Marin did demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff was its special employee at the time of the accident and, therefore, that Marin was the plaintiff‘s employer within the meaning of the
However, KAB‘s third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification was not similarly barred. The exclusivity provisions of section 11 of the
However, in support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action, in effect, to recover damages for breach of contract, KAB failed to demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see McArthur v Muhammad, 27 AD3d 532 [2006]). Thus, that branch of the motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; McArthur v Muhammad, supra).
Spolzino, J.P., Ritter, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.