UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EUGENE CASTELLE
18 Cr. 15 (AKH); 21 Civ. 4694 (AKH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
January 18, 2022
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.:
On May 1, 2019, Petitioner1 Eugene Castelle (“Petitioner“) was charged in a superseding indictment with participating in an illegal gambling business, in violation of
BACKGROUND
On May 31, 2019, Castelle was convicted by a jury of racketeering conspiracy, in violation of
Castelle was also charged with, but acquitted of, one count of attempted extortion. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 55. Castelle allegedly attempted to extort the founder of a construction and demolition company in New York. Id. at ¶ 55. That attempt failed, however, because the
In advance of trial, the Government made a plea offer to Castelle, under the terms of which the Government would accept a guilty plea to Count One (the illegal gambling charge) and would dismiss Count Two (the attempted extortion of Breeze Demolition) and Count Three (the wire fraud). The Government made the offer shortly after Castelle‘s co-defendants Joseph Cammarano and John Zancocchio had been acquitted of the charges against them. As part of its plea offer, the Government proposed an applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment. Castelle‘s trial counsel—Gerald McMahon—recently served as Castelle‘s counsel in a related racketeering case in Brooklyn Supreme Court, in which Castelle achieved a favorable result. Second McMahon Decl. at ¶ 8. According to Castelle, McMahon advised him that he faced an estimated Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment if he were convicted on Counts One and Three but acquitted on Count Two. See id.; McMahon Decl. at ¶ 3; Second McMahon Decl. at ¶ 10. McMahon advised that this was just an estimate, and that the Government likely would request a longer sentence, up to the statutory maximum of 20 years imprisonment. Second McMahon Decl. at ¶ 13.
Petitioner rejected his counsel‘s advice and chose to be tried. The trial began May 21, 2019 and ended May 31, 2019 with a jury verdict finding Petitioner guilty of the first and third counts, illegal gambling and racketeering, and not guilty of the second count, attempted extortion.
In October 2019, I sentenced Castelle to an above-Guidelines sentence of 77 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release, a $100,000 fine, and forfeiture of $188,955 in criminal proceeds. See Judgment, ECF No. 659. I found by a
Petitioner appealed his conviction. On January 6, 2021, the Second Circuit affirmed and, on January 8, 2021, Petitioner was ordered to surrender to the Bureau of Prisons. Shortly after, Petitioner moved for compassionate release, arguing that he was at high risk of being infected of COVID-19, and that his family needed him. I denied the motion.
Petitioner now moves to vacate, set aside and correct his sentence pursuant to
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
To obtain collateral relief under Section 2255, a defendant must demonstrate “a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000). This is a “significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
Where a motion for collateral relief under Section 2255 and the files and records of the case show conclusively that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court need not grant an
II. Analysis
Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when McMahon calculated the possible applicable sentencing guidelines range to be lower than the Court‘s ultimate calculation at sentencing and that, but for this error, he would have accepted the Government‘s plea offer and received a lesser sentence. See generally ECF No. 767.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant has the burden of: (i) showing that his representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms[,]” thereby overcoming the “strong presumption” that his counsel‘s conduct was reasonable and (ii) “affirmatively prov[ing] prejudice,” that is, “but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 693–94 (1984); accord. United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under the first prong of the Strickland analysis, the reviewing court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, bearing in mind that there are countless ways to provide effective
To satisfy the second prong, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 693–94. A defendant cannot establish prejudice by merely showing that counsel‘s errors had “some conceivable effect” on the result; the question is whether the errors undermines the reliability of the proceeding. See id. at 693.
The Constitution does not guarantee a “right to be offered a plea [agreement] . . . nor a . . . right that the judge accept it.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012). However, “[i]f a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). “As part of this advice, counsel must communicate to the defendant the terms of the plea offer, and should usually inform the defendant of the strengths and weaknesses of the case against him, as well as the alternative sentence to which he will most likely be exposed.” Purdy v. United States, 208 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2000). Because “[r]epresentation is an art,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, counsel rendering advice may reasonably consider a range of factors, including “the defendant‘s chances of prevailing at trial, the likely disparity in sentencing after a full trial as compared to a guilty plea (whether or not accompanied by an agreement with the Government), whether the defendant has maintained his innocence, and the defendant‘s comprehension of the various factors that will inform his plea decision.” Purdy, 208 F.3d at 45. When a defendant alleges that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to reject the plea offer, a defendant can
Petitioner fails to satisfy either Strickland prong. Petitioner‘s failure is clear from the trial record and affidavit of his trial counsel; an evidentiary hearing is not required or warranted. Puglisi, 586 F.3d at 214.
First, he has not demonstrated that McMahon acted unreasonably. McMahon based his calculations on the counts as charged, and advised Petitioner that the sentence could be longer, up to the statutory maximum. Petitioner was warned adequately of the risk he would take if he rejected the plea and went to trial. Strickland imposes a high burden on defendants to establish unreasonable conduct, and Petitioner fails to satisfy that burden. Counsel is not required to divine a result through a crystal ball.
McMahon urged Petitioner to accept the plea offer. Petitioner rejected counsel‘s advice, no doubt hoping that he could beat the case, as happened with Joseph Cammarano and John Zancocchio—Castelle‘s former co-defendants. Petitioner gambled and lost. As McMahon stated at sentencing, ECF No. 767, Ex. A, Petitioner declined the government‘s plea offer and chose trial. He cannot attribute his gamble to any inadequacy of counsel.
Petitioner also cannot establish prejudice. He says, without corroboration or proof, that he would have accepted the plea offer had McMahon told him of the sentence that he would get, but offers no proof that he would have accepted the government‘s offer of plea.
Petitioner also cannot show, even if he pleaded guilty, that his sentence would not have been given an upwards variance to account for his racketeering recidivism, just as it was after trial and a jury verdict. I was no more obliged to sentence according to the Guidelines following a plea than following the jury verdict.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Because I find Petitioner‘s arguments meritless, his emergency motion for bond is denied as moot. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate the motions (ECF Nos. 767, 771,2 783). Additionally, the hearing conference scheduled for January 19, 2022 is canceled. I also decline to issue a Certificate of Appealability because Petitioner has “not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 18, 2022
New York, New York
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN
United States District Judge