14 S.W.2d 753 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1929
Reversing.
C.A. Casteel brought this suit against George Pennington to recover a small strip of land lying on the east side of the Dixie Highway in the town of East Bernstadt, in Laurel county. In addition to denying Casteel's title and pleading title in himself, Pennington interposed a plea of champerty and equitable estoppel. By agreement of parties the cause was transferred to equity, and the chancellor rendered judgment in favor of Pennington Casteel appeals.
Without reviewing the evidence at length, we are of the opinion that it is sufficient to show that Casteel, and not Pennington, is the owner of the land. The chief ground on which Casteel's title is assailed is that the description in the deed from John W. Mullins and wife to the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company, Casteel's grantor, is too indefinite to pass title. The description is as follows: "Three acres (3) acres of land situated in the said county near the present residence of the said grantors, said land off by the engineer of the said railroad in a convenient shape for a depot building, side tracks, cattle pens, etc."
It is apparent from the description that something was omitted. As a matter of fact, the land was laid off in a convenient shape for a depot building, side tracks, cattle pens, etc. We are therefore constrained to the view that the words "having been laid" should be inserted between the word "land" and the word "off," so as to make the clause read, "said land having been laid off by the engineer," etc. Applying the maxim, "Id certum est quod certum reddi potest," it is clear that the description furnishes the means of identifying the land conveyed, and was sufficient to put the purchaser of the particular land, or of adjoining lands, on notice, and to *208 require them to go upon the ground and see how the land had been laid off. It follows that the deed was sufficient to pass title.
The plea of champerty is not available. The contention is that James Bond, Pennington's grantor, was in possession of a portion of the strip in controversy when Casteel acquired title. Though that be true, Bond deposed that he did not claim title to any portion of the land in controversy, from which it necessarily follows that his holding was not adverse.
As Casteel proved title, and the deed to him was not champertous, it remains to determine whether the facts are such as to estop him from claiming the land. The only facts relied on are that Casteel stood by and permitted Pennington to construct a valuable wholesale grocery on a portion of the lot and never opened his mouth until after the building was completed. The rule that one who stands by and sees another purchase land or enter upon it under a claim of right, and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements under circumstances calling for notice or protest, cannot afterwards assert his own title against such person (Empire Coal Mining Co. v. Empire Coal Co.,
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.