Jоhn A. CASTEEL, a/k/a Tayr Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan), Plaintiff-Appellant,† v. Darrel KOLB, Thomas Borgen, Thomas Bornick, Lynn Oestreich, Ronald Giannoni and Jane Doe 1 & 2, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 92-0519
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
Submitted on briefs June 24, 1992.—Decided April 22, 1993.
500 N.W.2d 400
†Petition to review denied.
For the defendants-respondents the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Joanne F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general.
Before Eich, C.J., Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
EICH, C.J. John Casteel, a/k/a Tayr Kilaab al Ghashiyah (Khan), an inmate at the Waupun Correctional Institution and a frеquent litigator in this court, appeals from an order dismissing his action against several prison officers and employees. He sued under a variety of federal and state statutes, seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for alleged violations of his due process rights and of state law.
The issues are: (1) whether Casteel‘s claims under
Casteel wаs the subject of many prison disciplinary proceedings throughout the years of his incarceration, and his claims against the defendants are based upon their participation in nineteen such proceedings. The trial court dismissed all of Casteel‘s claims it considered to have been raised under
I. The Federal Claims Under 42 U.S.C., Sec. 1983
The allegations in Casteel‘s complaint(s) which the attorney general interprets as purporting to raise claims under the federal civil rights act are that: (1)
There is no question that prisoners subjеcted to disciplinary proceedings have a liberty interest at stake that is entitled to the minimum due process protections discussed in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974), including notice of the charges, a limited right to present evidence and a written statement of the evidence on which the hearing committee relied and the reasons for the decision. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988).
The State of Wisconsin has codified those prоtections, and added others, in the administrative code. It follows that if prison officials ignore or violate the rules incorporating the Wolff mandates, their conduct would violate the prisoner‘s constitutional rights.2 If, however, the officers’ actions were “random” and “unauthorized,” the violation will not give rise to a claim under
Section 1983 must be preserved to remedy only those deprivations which... result from a state‘s conscious decision to ignore the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. It should not be employed to remedy deprivations which occur at the hands of a state employee who is acting in direct contravention of the state‘s established... procedures which have been designed to guarantee the very protections which the employee now has chosen to ignore. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991) (emphasis in original).
As we have noted, the factual allegations of Casteel‘s original complaint charge the defendants with violation of the Wolff procedural due process safeguards, among others. He alleges that the defendants “in bad faith and with reckless disregard and in derogation of their duties” “acted under the color of law.” His amended complaint for certiorari repeats the allegations.
In Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Wis. 1991), the inmate brought a sec. 1983 action against several prison officials, alleging various violations of his due process rights in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, he allegеd that the defendants who served on the committees failed to provide him written statements of the evidence relied on and statements of the reasons underlying their decisions, that he did not receive notice of the charges, and that he was not allowed to call witnesses in his behalf. Id. at 1396.
As in Easter House, the state could not have anticipated that prison officials whose duties were narrowly defined would act in “direct contravention” of those established duties that the state set up to guarantee constitutional protection to plaintiff. The state had no realistic opportunity tо learn of the repeated deprivations of plaintiff‘s liberty until plaintiff utilized the inmate complaint review system.... I conclude that defendants’ noncompliance with established state procedures can only be characterized as random and unauthorized conduct. 765 F. Supp. at 1398.
We apply that reasoning here and reach a similar conclusion. If Casteel had a “meaningful” postdeprivation process available to him, he lacks a remedy under the fourteenth amendment. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). And the postdeprivation remedies provided by the state will not be considered inadequate even if they fail to provide all the relief which may have been available had the plaintiff proceeded under sec. 1983. Enright v. Board of School Directors, 118 Wis. 2d 236, 256, 346 N.W.2d 771, 781 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984), citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
We are satisfied that the state certiorari proceedings available to inmates for review of prison disciplinary proceedings are both suitable and meaningful under the cases just discussed. In those
II. Casteel‘s State-Law Claims
As just noted, whether the disciplinary proceedings were convened and conducted in accord with state law is reviewable by certiorari. See State ex rel. Irby v. Israel, 95 Wis. 2d 697, 702-03, 291 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Ct. App. 1980). And when the trial court gave Casteel leave to amend his complaint to recast his factual allegations into a petition for certiorari review of the nineteen disciplinary decisions, it warned him that it could not consider any such claims based on hearings and decisions that were conducted more than six months prior to the filing of his original complaint. Because none of his claims met the six-month rule, the trial court properly dismissed them. State ex rel. Czapiewski v. Milwaukee Civil Serv. Comm‘n, 54 Wis. 2d 535, 538, 196 N.W.2d 742, 743 (1972).
Casteel also contends that Wis. Adm. Code ch. DOC 303, governing the prison disciplinary process, is unconstitutional. But under
Casteel maintains that
Finally, we agree with the state that Casteel‘s argument that the disciplinary process violates the constitutional provisions prohibiting bills of attainder is without merit. A bill of attainder is, in simplest terms, a legislative act that determines guilt and inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 171 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1969). Casteel has already been sentenced; and the provisions of Wis. Adm. Code ch. DOC 303, which impose disciplinary sanctions for prison rule violations, simply are not within the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder. Even at its most severe, the disciplinary process cannot extend a sentence imposed by the court.
By the Court.—Orders affirmed.
SUNDBY, J. (dissenting). This appeal presents an irenic paradox. Wisconsin Adm. Code ch. DOC 303 was adopted to comply with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Wolff Court made clear that disciplinary proceedings to which inmates are subjected must meet constitutional standards regarding due process: “There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” Id. at 555-56. If the Department of Health and Social Services had not adopted chapter DOC 303, Casteel would have stated a claim against the respondent corrections officials for violating his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process. However, under our decision, because chapter DOC 303 exists, respondents may flout the disciplinary procedures provided thereunder without fear of personal liability. This result defies common sense and I dissеnt from it.
The court‘s error results from a misapplication of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (due process clause not implicated by merely negligent acts by state officials), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In these cases, the Court held that inmates had no right to predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be
In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), the Court made clear that when a state official abuses his or her authority, and as a consequence violates a person‘s right to procedural due process, that official mаy be subject to liability under
The proper result in this case can be easily understood if one concentrates on the Constitution and not the administrative code. After all, chapter DOC 303 simply expresses the commands of the Constitution. If a prison official ignores chapter DOC 303, he or she does not escape personal liability under sec. 1983. It
Respondents argue that in any event, Casteel does not state a claim cognizable under sec. 1983 because he has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in certiorari to review the corrections officials’ violations of chapter DOC 303. Respondents’ argument fails for several reasons. First, an adequate postdeprivation remedy satisfies the fourteenth amendment only if a predeprivation remеdy is not practicable. In Zinermon, the court said:
This is where the Parratt rule comes into play. Parratt and Hudson represent a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, in which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide.
494 U.S. at 128. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976), prescribes a weighing process which determines what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case. See Lewis v. Young, 162 Wis. 2d 574, 583, 470 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Ct. App. 1991)
Even if a postdeprivation remedy was all the process due Casteel, I would nonetheless conclude that certiorari is not an adequate remedy. The defects of certiorari as a remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights are manifold. First, issuance of the writ is discretionary with the court, unless certiorari is prescribed by statute as the method of appeal.2 State ex rel. Park Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. O‘Malley, 59 Wis. 2d 217, 219, 207 N.W.2d 622, 623 (1973). Before a court will grant a writ of certiorari, it must appear that not only has some error been committed, but that the error has caused substantial harm. State ex rel. Hippler v. City of Baraboo, 47 Wis. 2d 603, 609, 178 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1970). The argument may well be made that, in the absence of some special damage, mere vindication of a constitutional right does not constitute “substantial harm.” Second, certiorari has a very limited period of limitation of six months. Firemen‘s Annuity and Benefit Fund v. Krueger, 24 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 128 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1964). The United States Supreme Court could well
In Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Wis. 1991), the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin concluded that the state had provided the inmate with adequate postdeprivation remedies, through the inmate complaint review system, and through certiorari. 765 F. Supp. at 1400. The court concluded that although the prisoner could not recover damages, this did not make the remedy inadequate.
The conclusion of the court herein that certiorari is an adequate postdeprivation remedy is especially troubling for two additional reasons. First, the majority does not limit that holding to an alleged deprivation of procedural due process. Thus, the availability of certiorari would preclude a sec. 1983 action brought by a plaintiff for a state offiсial‘s violation of his or her rights under specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Also, the court‘s decision would extend to the substantive component of the due process clause which bars arbitrary, wrongful government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
Second, if certiorari is held to be an adequate postdeprivation remedy for a denial of procedural due process, a sec. 1983 action will never lie where public officials ignore or frustrate the use of prescribed notice and hearing procedures. Wherever there is no statutory provision for judicial review, the action of a public
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
For all purposes of discipline and for judicial proceedings, the Waupun correctional institution and the precincts thereof shall be deemed to be in Dodge County, and the courts of that county shall have jurisdiction of all crimes committed within the county. Every activity conducted under the jurisdiction of and by the institution, wherever located, is a precinct of the prison and each precinct is part of the institution.