JULIA G. CASTANEDA v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY; DIRECTOR OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY аnd BOARD REVIEW; and WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.
No. 1-24-0457
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
March 21, 2025
2025 IL App (1st) 1240457-U
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Tailor and Justice Gamrath concurred in the judgment.
SIXTH DIVISION. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinоis, County Department, Law Division. No. 2023 L 050316. Honorable Daniel P. Duffy, Judge, presiding.
¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the decision by the Illinois Department of Employment Security Board of Review is affirmed because the Board‘s decision was not clearly erroneous where the claimant did not qualify for late filing privileges under section 2720.120(b) of the Illinois Administrative Code.
¶ 2 Defendant-Appellant‘s Illinois Department of Employment Security (Department), Director of Illinois Department of Employment Security and Board of Review (Board) appeаl from an order of the circuit court reversing the Board‘s denial of Julia Castaneda‘s (the claimant) application for the late filing of a certification for unemployment benefits. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court аnd affirm the decision of the Board.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The claimant was employed as a Walmart cashier prior to being terminated for attendance policy violations in March 2022. In April 2022, it was determined by a claims adjudicator that the claimant was ineligible for benefits due to being terminated for misconduct under Section 602A of the
¶ 5 In May of 2022, the claimant received a “UI Finding” letter from the Department regarding her apрlication for benefits. The letter stated her certification date was May 17, 2022. The letter
¶ 6 After a hearing on October 12, 2022, the claimаnt‘s determination was set aside by a Department referee. The referee found that the claimant‘s conduct was not willful or deliberate and she had not been warned about Walmart‘s attendance policy. The claimant was determined eligible for benefits beginning March 27, 2022.
¶ 7 On November 16, 2022, the claimant requested a backdate certification for the time she missed while her appeal was pending. In December 2022, the claimant was interviewed by a claims adjudicator. She explained that she did not certify for benefits because she was waiting on the decision from her appeal. The claims adjudicator denied her request for backdate certification because she failed to certify on time and the failure was not due to any scenarios in
¶ 8 In her appeal, the claimant stated she “had no idea” that she had the responsibility to certify for benefits while her appeal was pending. She noted that “nobody explained that to her, nоt even [through] the mail.” In January 2023, a hearing was held with a Department referee where the claimant explained that she had a bad memory. But when submitting her claim for benefits, she read through all the instructions on the letters sent by the Department and again when she filed her apрeal of the local office determination. She later admitted to the referee that she had received two letters from the Department but did not read the instructions in the letters and that it was her
¶ 9 The claimant appealed the referee‘s determination to the Board. After a review of the record, the Board issued a final administrative decision affirming the referee‘s ruling. The Board noted that the claimant received two letters from the Department that clearly explained she must continue to certify for her benefits while the decision of the appeal was pending.
¶ 10 In the circuit court, the claimant filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board‘s final administrative decision. The court reversed the Board‘s decision because the claimant was “unaware” of the certification requirement. The court explained that the term “unawareness” required a subjective application, rather than an objective application. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 12 The circuit court reversed the Board‘s final determination on December 12, 2023. The State timely filed a motion to reconsider оn January 9, 2024. The court denied the State‘s motion to reconsider in part on February 6, 2024. The State timely filed a notice of appeal on March 5, 2024. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to
¶ 13 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 As an initial matter, we note that Castenada did not file a brief in this appeal, аnd on October 21, 2024, we entered an order taking the case for consideration on the record and the appellant‘s brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 131-33, (1976). A reviewing court will not serve as the advocate for an appellee who does not file a brief. First National Bank of Ottawa v. Dillinger, 386 Ill. App. 3d 393, 395, (2008). Nonetheless,
¶ 15 On appeal, the Department and the Board argue that the denial of the claimant‘s request to back date her certification of benefits was not clear err because she did not meet the requirements for late certification in
¶ 16 A. Standard of Review
¶ 17 The Department and the Board claim “the claimant never argued that the term ‘unawareness’ in the Code referred to subjective rather than objective, awareness” and “the law in Illinois is well-established that, if an argument is not presented in an administrative hearing, it is waived and may not be raised for the first time before the trial court on administrative review.” Khan v. Dep‘t of Healthcare & Fam. Servs., 2016 IL App (1st) 143908, ¶ 25. We note this court reviews the Board‘s final determination, not the determination of the cirсuit court, the referee, or the claims adjudicator. Universal Sec. Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec. 2015 IL App (1st) 133886. This court‘s review begins with the presumption the factual findings of the Board are “prima facie true and correct” and will be reversed only if the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 18 “An administrative decision is clearly erroneous ‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Beggs v. Board of Educ. Of Murphysboro Community Unit School Dist. No. 186, 2016 IL 120236 ¶ 50; AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill.2d 380, 391 (2001) (quoting the definition of “clearly erroneous” from United Stated v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
¶ 19 B. The Board‘s Finding of Awareness
¶ 20 The
¶ 21 The purpose of the Act is to alleviate the economic insecurity and hardship resulting from an involuntary loss of employment.
¶ 22 “The Administrative Code has the force and effect of law, and the rules of statutory construction apply when construing its provisions.” Ress v. Office of the State Comptroller, 329 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142 (2002). And a reviewing court must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of its own rules and regulations unless that interpretation is “plainly errоneous or contrary to the clear language of the provision.” Id. at 142.
¶ 23 The claimant told the Department referee that when submitting her claim for benefits, she read through all the instructions on the letters sent by the Department and again when she filed her appeal of the local office determination. She admitted to the referee that she had received two letters from the Department but contradicted her previous statement by saying she did not read the instructions in the letters. Here, the record supports the contention thаt the claimant was aware of her rights under the Act because she testified that she read the instructions but had a bad memory. During her hearing, the claimant stated she had “no idea” that she was required to certify for benefits while her appeal was pending. She also noted that “nobody explained that [to her], not even [through] the mail.” But she conceded that this oversight was her own mistake, and she was at fault.
¶ 24 We find Perez v. Department of Employment Security, 2023 IL App (1st) 221928-U instructive in this matter. In Perez, the claimant missed her first three certification dates on April 6, April 20, and May 4, 2020. She first certified for benefits on May 18, 2020, and subsequently began receiving unemрloyment benefits. At her hearing before a Department referee, she stated that she believed the process for certifying was “automatic” and “did not understand she needed
¶ 25 Additionally, the record does not indicate that the Department or the claimant‘s employer failed to discharge their responsibilities under the Act. See
¶ 26 As previously discussed, an agency‘s decision is clearly erroneous when the reviewing сourt is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 395. Here, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the Board has made a mistake. The record demonstrates the claimant was aware of the certification process because she read the letters advising her of the process, but she either ignored the instructions or did not remember them. Hence, the Board‘s decision finding the claimant failed to
¶ 27 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 The evidence in the record showed that the claimant was aware of her rights under the Act and had adequate notice of the necessary requirements for the Department to process a late filed certification claim. We conclude that the Board‘s decision was not clearly erroneous when it decided that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she did not meet any of the factors necessary to be eligible for a late claim as outlined in the Code. Accordingly, we affirm the Board‘s decision and reverse the decision of the circuit court.
¶ 29 Circuit court judgment reversed; Board decision affirmed.