173 Mass. 533 | Mass. | 1899
These are petitions for the assessment of damages caused by the taking of land in Newton and Watertown respectively, under St. 1893, c. 407. The two petitions were ordered to be tried together. At the impanelling of the jury the petitioner peremptorily challenged three jurors. The respondent then challenged three jurors, but the petitioner objected and excepted to the third challenge. The challenge was allowed, and afterwards the petitioner challenged one more juror. The exception on this point presents the first question.
If the parties’ rights were affected by the order that the two cases be tried together, so that each side had a right to but two challenges in all, which we do not decide, the petitioner is not in a position to complain of'the larger liberty given to the respondent. He has suffered no harm, so far as appears. No juror sat who was challenged by him. One qualified juror sat in place of another, nothing more, and the rule under which this came to pass was that for which the petitioner himself was responsible, and by which he already had profited. It would be unjust to grant a new trial upon this ground.
The petitioner examined one Ross as an expert as to the value of the land taken in Newton. The petitioner owned other adjoin
A witness was called by the Commonwealth as to the value of the land in Watertown which was the subject of the second petition mentioned. On cross-examination he was allowed to be asked what in his opinion was the value of the petitioner’s land in Newton, which he put at two cents a foot. He then was asked whether he had not said that the Boston land adjoining the Newton land was worth ten cents a foot. This and another question upon the same subject were excluded, and the petitioner excepted. It will be observed that the witness had not testified on direct examination concerning the Newton land, and as this exception appears under the Newton petition alone, perhaps it might be overruled on the ground that under that petition the petitioner had no right to cross-examine the witness at all. But further it was within the discretion of the court to refuse to allow the witness to be cross-examined as to his opinions or statements concerning other lands not before the court and in another municipality. See Manning v. Lowell, ante, 100. Such an examination could go only to the credit of the witness. If time was pressing, the judge had a right to cut it short. Jüxeeptions overruled.