Cassese v. Brooklyn HospitalCassese v. Brooklyn Hospital
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Antoinette Cassese, now deceased, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pino, J.), entered July 30, 1984, which, at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence during a bifurcated trial by jury on the issue of liability only, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
This action was commenced by Antoinette Cassese in September 1980 to recover damages for personal injuries which she sustained on July 5, 1980, at about 4:30 a.m. when she fell in the bathroom of her room at the defendant Brooklyn Hospital where she was a patient. The complaint asserted a first cause of action based upon a claim of ordinary negligence. A second cause of action, which was later withdrawn by stipulation of the parties prior to trial, was based upon alleged medical malpractice. Following Mrs. Cassese’s death from causes apparently unrelated to her fall, her son Anthony Cassese, the administrator of her estate, was substituted as the plaintiff.
In the bill of particulars, the plaintiff presented two theories of liability against the defendant hospital, the first alleging negligent supervision by the hospital employees, and the second asserting that the hospital maintenance staff failed to remedy an unsafe and dangerous condition, despite actual and constructive notice.
During a conference with counsel prior to the commencement of the trial, and after reviewing the hospital records and considering the plaintiff’s offer of proof, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not proceed on a theory of negligent
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the jury could not render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff under any rational interpretation of the evidence (see, Calvaruso v Our Lady of Peace R. C. Church,
We also find no merit to the plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of his witnesses concerning an alleged postaccident conversation with an unidentified head nurse. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly ruled that the proffered testimony did not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule (see, Loschiavo v Port Auth.,
Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions on this appeal, the record indicates that the trial was fair and the trial court’s conduct did not prejudice the plaintiff’s case.
We have examined the plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Niehoff and Spatt, JJ., concur.