167 Pa. Super. 440 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1950
Opinion by
On February 6, 1946, claimant, the appellant here, along with 186 other employes of Atlantic Steel Castings Company, in the City of Chester, went out on strike. They did not return to work until about March 18,1946. The purpose of the strike was to force the employer to pay specific additional wage payments to the employes for the period between August 2, 1944 and November 18,1945, or to arrange for payment on acceptable terms. On November 19, 1945, the employer acceded to all of the demands of the union as to the future and wages payable since that date are not involved in the present proceeding. The National War Labor Board had issued an order on October 19, 1945, directing that these additional wage payments be made. And it was the contention of appellant’s union that the employer had contracted to pay the additional wages in amounts specified by the directive order of the War Labor Board. To the claims for unemployment compensation filed by these employes, both the Bureau and the Referee applied the disqualification period, of from four to five weeks, prescribed by §402(d) of the then applicable Act of May 29, 1945, P. L. 1145, amending the Unemployment Compensation Law. The Board of Review in a single opinion and order affirmed the decision of the Referee and disallowed all of the claims for the temporary disqualification period of §402(d) but without prejudice to their right to unemployment compensation thereafter. This is an appeal by one of the striking employes from the order of the Board. Appellant contends that his unemployment was not “due to a voluntary suspension of work” within the intent of the above section of the Act.
In the main there is no serious dispute as to the factual background of this appeal. The findings of the
On October 22, 1945, upon settlement óf a previous strike relating to the payment of a night shift differential in wages, not material in the present case, the settlement agreement provided “that all questions with respect to the retroactive pay on the wage ranges on Form 10 should be postponed until January 15, 1946, at which time the company would reconsider said matter with the union”. In the meantime the company did not comply with the War Labor Board’s- directive, as to retroactive payments. Prior to January 15', 1946,‘the union insisted that the company commit itself to the full payment of these back wages as directed. The total amount involved was about $134,000. The company’s then financial position was not good and in response to the union’s demand, it, on February 2,1946, proposed to settle the claims on the basis of 50% thereof “conditioned upon . . . the Company’s ability to. borrow such sum upon the security of its plant . . .” The union rejected the offer. On February 6, 1946, the company made its final proposal, that the discussion of settlement be postponed for an additional three months or, in the alternative, that the union accept the company’s offer of February 2, 1946, on the basis of 50% of the back wages, with security for payment by assignment of the company’s claim for a refund on Federal taxes theretofore paid by it, in the event, the company should be unable to borrow the-money involved. In. refusing, the
The effect of appellant’s contention stated simply, is that the new collective bargaining agreement entered into in October 1944, contemplated, in the application of the higher wage rate ranges, that each employe would automatically enjoy a wage increase at a rate which would be in the same relative position or grade' in the new wage range as his former rate had in the old range. It is these increases which were the subject of the War Labor Board’s directive and which ultimately were assumed by the company in settlement of the strike. It is not suggested that there was any understanding in writing to this effect. The contention is that such agreement was made verbally when the parties agreed upon the new schedule of wage ranges operating prospectively. Neither the War Labor Board nor the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, made any finding as to whether there actually was an agreement to the above effect. But since the appellant, who had the burden of proving the existence of an agreement failed to satisfy
Under §402 (d) of the 1945 Act temporary disqualification of an employe results from “voluntary suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute”. And appellant concedes that the present unemployment resulted from a labor dispute but he contends that the suspension of work was not voluntary. No other question is involved in this proceeding and under the findings, amply supported as they are by the evidence, the Board was fully justified in its conclusion that claimant’s unemployment was due to his voluntary suspension from work resulting from a labor dispute.
If the employes were entitled to the wage increases under an agreement with the company, suits in assumpsit would have afforded an adequate remedy under a normal procedure. On the assumption of the existence of an agreement, since the employes suspended work and
Claimant’s unemployment in this case clearly was due to a voluntary suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute and he accordingly was ineligible for compensation for the period involved under §402 (d) of the 1945 Act.
Order affirmed.
Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc., v. N. W. L. B., 143 Fed. (2d) 145, 148, 149 (1944), Cert. denied 323 U. S. 735; N. W. L. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 144 Fed. (2d) 528 (1944), Cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774.