60 Ga. App. 626 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1939
In a criminal case “the bill of exceptions shall be tendered and signed within twenty days from the rendition of the decision.” Code, § 6-903. “When a number of days is prescribed for the exercise of any privilege, or the discharge of any duty, only the first or last day shall be counted; and if the last day shall fall on Sunday, another day shall be allowed in the computation.” § 102-102 .(8). As disclosed by the bill of exceptions and the record, the judgment was rendered on April 17, 1939, and the bill of exceptions, as shown by the recital therein, was presented to the judge on May 8, 1939, and signed by him on the same date. If we exclude April 17, 1939, the date on which the decision complained of was made, as the first day of the period, and reckon twenty days thereafter, the last or twentieth day would fall on Sunday, May 7. Hence, the last day for tendering the bill of exceptions being Sunday May 7, the following day, May 8, is super-added by the Code, § 102-102 (8), and the bill of exceptions tendered and signed on Monday, May 8, was in time. The motion to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that the bill of exceptions was not tendered and certified within the time limited by law, is denied. Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Cottonseed Oil Co., 22 Ga. App. 337, 339 (96 S. E. 14); Wood v. State, 12 Ga. App. 651 (78 S. E. 140); Hill v. State, 14 Ga. App. 410, 412 (81 S. E. 248); Morgan v. Perkins, 94 Ga. 353 (4) (21 S. E. 574); Rusk v. Hill, 117 Ga. 723 (45 S. E. 42); Texas Co. v. Davis, 157 Ga. 538 (122 S. E. 62); Jackson v. Harris, 165 Ga. 873, 879 (142 S. E. 273).
The defendant by demurrer raised the point that “there were two separate and distinct offenses charged in one and the same accusation, in that it set out an offense defined in the Code, § 26-6103, and a separate offense defined in § 26-6102.” Section 26-6103 declares: “Any person who shall keep and maintain, either
Special ground 2 complains that the judge, in his charge, did not define reasonable doubt. This exception was decided adversely to the plaintiff in error in Floyd v. State, supra, where it is said: “When the charge to the jury embraces a section of the Code which contains technical words or expressions, the meaning
Counsel in his brief undertakes for the first time to raise the point that the judge did not charge the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence. The opinion of the trial court was not invoked on this question and therefore was not given; and therefore, by the organic law of this court, we have no right to entertain the exception. May v. Lee, 57 Ga. App. 893 (197 S. E. 50).
The evidence authorized the verdict, and sufficiently identified the plaintiff in error' as the person named in the indictment and the man on trial.
Judgment affirmed.