Cаsimir R. Starsiak, Jr., and Diane L. Hahn v. Janette T. Starsiak
Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PL-724
Court of Appeals of Indiana
November 4, 2024
The Honorable Amber Collins-Gebrehiwet, Judge
Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
Judges May and Crone concur.
[1] Casimir R. Starsiak, Jr. (Casimir) and Diane L. Hahn (Diane) appeal from the trial court‘s order denying their motion to correct error. They asked the court for permission to amend their complaint to add a count seeking relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and to amend their statutory claim to quiet title to include a common law claim to quiet title in personal property. Casimir and Diane now contend the trial court erred by denying their motion. Additionally, they challenge the merits of the court‘s underlying judgment, in which the court held there is no statutory right in Indiana to quiet title to personal property and that the probate court had already determined the ownership of the personal property.
[2] We do not question that Casimir and Diane hold a bona fide belief that they have a claim to the seemingly abandoned one-third share of their mother‘s estate. Based upon the record before us, however, they have no present claim to their sister‘s share and their request for relief is premature and based on spеculation. Thus, for reasons we explain below, we affirm the trial court‘s decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mildred Starsiak died intestate on February 9, 2010. Mildred had three surviving children, Casimir, Diane, and Janette Starsiak (Janette). Prior to Mildred‘s death, she held title to certain property. Casimir and Diane were appointed co-personal representatives of Mildred‘s estate. Casimir and Diane eaсh claimed their one-third share of Mildred‘s estate as her surviving issue. See
[4] On three separate occasions between May 2011 and November 2011, Casimir and Diane, as personal representatives of the estate, sent a check by certified mail to Janette in the amount of her share of the estate. Janette signеd for all three certified letters but she did not negotiate the checks. Casimir and Diane‘s counsel sent a letter to Janette advising her that her share would be deposited with the clerk of the probate court if she did not claim it by September 12, 2011. Janette signed for the certified letter, but did not claim her share.
[5] Casimir and Diane filed a motion on December 9, 2011, to pay the prоceeds of the unclaimed estate assets to the clerk of the court per Indiana Code section
[6] Janette‘s share of Mildred‘s estate remains in the аccount and as of October 16, 2017, had grown to $231,665.97.
[7] Eleven years later, on May 10, 2023, Casimir and Diane attempted to reopen Mildred‘s estate to address Janette‘s unclaimed share. They requested to be named co-personal representatives to equally distribute between them Janette‘s share held by the probate court clerk in the interest-bearing account. On Mаy 12, 2023, the probate court issued an order declining to reopen the estate. Next, Casimir
[8] On October 12, 2023, Casimir and Diane filed a “Complaint To Quiet Title” against Janette, any successors, assigns, and any other person claiming a right, title, or interest in the property in a different court. Id. at 6. Their attorney attached an affidavit as required by Indiana Code section
[9] The Court held a hearing at which Janette did not appear. Casimir and Diane argued that they had a right to quiet title to the unclaimed assets in equity under common law. The trial court took the matter under advisement and requested the submission of additional authority. Casimir and Diane filed a report with the court, citing cases they believed supported their common law right to quiet title to the personal property, in addition to citing to Indiana‘s Declaratory Judgment Act, which they claimed afforded them similar relief.
[10] On February 27, 2024, the court denied the motion to quiet title, concluding that: (1) quiet title actions are controlled by Indiana Code section
[11] Casimir and Diane filed a motion to correct error, requesting permission to amend their complaint to add a count for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and tendered an amended complaint alleging the same. The trial court denied the motion, cоncluding that Casimir and Diane “have not provided the Court a valid reason to set aside the original judgment Denying the Motion to Quiet Title under
Discussion and Decision
[12] We observe at the outset that Janette has not filed a responsive
I. Propriety of Denial of Quiet Title to Personal Property
[13] Casimir and Diane argue that the trial court erred in denying their complaint because “the trial court erroneously concluded there is no common law right to quiet title to personal property in Indiana.” Appellants’ Br. p. 6. The court concluded as follows:
20. Thus, the Quiet Title statute in Indiana applies specifically to real property.
21. There is no statute in Indiana that permits actions to Quiet Title for personal property.
Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 77. This is a correct statement of law. See
[14] However, the substance of Casimir and Diane‘s chаllenge concerns the court‘s implicit conclusion that there is no equitable action to quiet title in Indiana. The court‘s order along those lines stated the following:
22. Plaintiffs cite Citizens National Bank vs. State[, 101 N.E. 620 (Ind. 1913)] to support their theory that quiet title actions can apply to personal property.
23. However, in Citizens, the action was never purposed to be brought under Indiana Code Section
32-30-3 .24. That case did not involvе an action to quiet title to the stock, the Court in that case ruled that the relatrix was always the rightful owner of the stock.
Appellants’ App. Vol, II, p. 77.
[15] Although the trial court correctly found that the action in Citizens (a 1913 decision) was not brought under the quiet title statute (which was not enacted until many decades later), the claim in Citizens was an equitable action to determine the ownership of shares of stock. In that сase, the trial court had concluded that the relatrix was the owner of the stock in question and it granted the equitable remedy of mandate, commanding the bank to recognize her as the owner of the stock in question. 101 N.E. at 623. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, found that the complaint “stated a good causе of action.” Id. at 626. And in Whitman v. Whitman, 83 N.E. 520, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908), a “quiet title action” was brought to determine whether the wife‘s share under the will was calculated before or after the payment of debts. The court interpreted the language of the will and concluded that the wife‘s share was to be paid immediately and that the other legatees’ shares would be reduced by the payment of their proportionаte share of the debts. Id.
[16] Furthermore,
[17] We conclude that a common law action to quiet title to personal property is a viable cause of action in Indiana and that the enactment of the statutory provision concerning quieting title to real estate did not eliminate such claims. Therefore, to the extent the trial court appears to have implicitly said otherwise, it erred.
[18] That said, we will affirm the trial court‘s judgment if there is any legal ground in the record supporting the judgment. See In re B.J.N., 19 N.E.3d 765, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). And the trial court also concluded that “the probate Court in 49D08-1007-ES-031567 has already ruled that Plaintiffs are not the rightful and/or legal owners of the money at issue.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 78. The court further said, “Thus, this Court declines to extend the reach of the quiet title statute to award Plaintiffs personal property, in this instance money, that a prior Court has already ruled Plaintiffs are not legally entitled to.” Id.
[19] The trial court was alluding to claim preclusion. “[C]laim preclusion[]applies where a final judgment on the merits has been rendered and acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same issue or claim between those parties and their privies.” Freels v. Koches, 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). “When claim preclusion аpplies, all matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior action.” Id. “The following four requirements must be satisfied for claim preclusion to apply as a bar to a subsequent action: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies.” Id.
[20] Casimir‘s, Diane‘s, and Janette‘s interests in Mildred‘s intestate estate were determined by statute. Each was entitled to a one-third share of Mildred‘s estate through intestate succession. Casimir and Diane fulfilled their fiduciary duties to Janette as personal representatives by requesting an order to have Janette‘s share placed in an interest-bearing account due to her failure to claim her share. Thus, ownership of Janette‘s share was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment determined ownership of Jаnette‘s share of the estate per the laws of intestate succession, and Casimir and Diane proposed that Janette‘s share be placed in an interest-bearing account in order to close Mildred‘s estate. Although Janette never appeared in this or the prior action, the division of Mildred‘s estate and the rights of her heirs were determined in the prior action.
[21] Casimir and Diane‘s concerns about Janette‘s share escheating to the State should she continue to allow her share to be unclaimed are speculative and premature.
[22] Thereforе, we conclude the trial court correctly denied Casimir and Diane‘s motion to quiet title in Janette‘s share of Mildred‘s estate.
II. Motion To Correct Error
[23] Casimir and Diane also appeal from the court‘s order denying their motion to correct error. “Generally, a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs whеn the trial court‘s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. “However, where the issues raised in the motion are questions of law, the standard of review is de novo.” Id.
[24] Casimir and Diane‘s motion to correct error requested permission to amend their quiet title complaint to аdd a count seeking declaratory relief and to amend the statutory quiet title count to include additional language seeking equitable relief under common law to quiet title to the personal property. Their motion acknowledged that the court‘s order denying their motion to quiet title under statutory law was a “final judgment” and explicitly stated that they filed “their Motion to Correct Error for the purpose of amending their Complaint[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 79, 80.
[25] After the court entered its judgment denying their complaint to quiet title under statutory law, Casimir and Diane cited
(A) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a rеsponsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted, and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within thirty [30] days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justiсe so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within twenty [20] days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
They also cited cases holding that trial courts have broad discretion in allowing parties to аmend their pleadings, and contended that they have not demonstrated factors trial courts consider when determining whether to grant the request, such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment. See In re Estate of Hurwich, 103 N.E.3d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“The probate сourt has broad discretion in granting or denying amendments to the pleadings[.]“); Palacios v. Kline, 566 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The substance of the abuse of discretion
[26] In this situation, however, Casimir and Diane filed their motion to amend their pleading after final judgment was entered. We have held under principles of finality of judgments that “a plaintiff may not seek to amend his complaint after judgment unless he first has that judgment vacated or set aside under either
[27] Here, Casimir and Diane filed their request to amend their pleadings in a motion to correct error which did not allege legal error on the trial court‘s part. However, such was necessary to attempt to vacate the judgment аnd allow for an amendment to their complaint. Thus, because the judgment stands, there is nothing to amend.
[28] The trial court correctly denied the motion to correct error and stated that Casimir and Diane “have not provided the Court [with] a valid reason to set aside the original judgment Denying the Motion to Quiet Title under
Conclusion
[29] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment. The issue of the legal ownership of Janette‘s share of Mildred‘s estate has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. And the motion to correct error was correctly denied because it sought relief which wаs unavailable after final judgment and alleged no legal error.
[30] Affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
J. Alex Bruggenschmidt
Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C.
Zionsville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024