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Casias v. Zia Co.
596 P.2d 521
N.M. Ct. App.
1979
Check Treatment

*1 Wоrkmen’s Acts. See generally, N.M.Digest, Workmen’s Compen- «=»

sation, No. 11. As stated in Gonzales Copper

Chino 222 P. 903

(1924): kept well in mind

theory which the Workmen’s Com-

pensation Acts of the several states were more,

adopted was to substitute human-

itarian and system economical of compen- injured

sation for workmen or their de-

pendents death; in case of their pro- speedy

vide a inexpensive and method such might be made employees such dependent or those

upon them and which harmony is more in

with modern of industry methods torts, common-law liability for

usually involved long, tedious expen-

sive litigation, produced and often ill feel- ** ing employer between employee.

(Emphasis added.)

Affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WOOD, J., HERNANDEZ, C. J., con-

cur. CASIAS,

Ramon R. Plaintiff-Appellee, COMPANY,

The ZIA Employer, and Unit Fidelity ed Guaranty States Compa Melendres, Silver, ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‍Walter K. J. John ny, Insurer, Defendants-Appellants. Hannаhs, Montgomery, Andrews & Santa Fe, defendants-appellants. for

No. 3842. Wentworth, Tucker, John L. Steven Court of Appeals of New Mexico. Jones, Wertheim, Gallegos, Snead & Santa Fe, plaintiff-appellee. May 17, 1979.

OPINION WALTERS, Judge. Appellants plaintiff-appellee urge' Casias total was awarded *2 79 at an continuing incorrect rate body” resulting disability, because the in accident 7, occurred on October 1976 he and degenerating ability became to function and pain totally permаnently and disabled which operative “accident” constitute 28, 1977, during which time the percentage brings about “accidental of state Moorhead; disability, on the of injury” date (see 52-l-41(A), N.M.S.A.1978), upon Herndon, supra. which based, maximum is in- Sutin, opinion Herndon cited in the creased from 78% to Appellants 89%. con- above, discussing the issue of “accidental tend the lower rate ap- should have been plain- injury” within thе factual context of plied against weekly wage on 4, inability fall on 1975 and her tiff’s 7, 52-1-20, October 1976 because N.M.S. 1975, 2, September continue work A.1978, provides for determination of the wrote: weekly wage “at the time of the accident.” that no decision argue Defendants It appears, from an analysis of the two any Mexico that condition New “holds sections to, above referred that terms dеvelops pain but which does “time (§§ A, of the accident” -20 ‘inju- body of the result malfunction B(l), -(2), -(3), -(4); injury” and of “time accident,’ ry required caused (§ B); (§ “date of disability” 52-1- 40); (§ of injury” “date accidental 52- support position, In defendants 1-40), were used in the rely strongly Department v. on Towle Workmen’s with some Act Highway, A.2d Transportation, 318 State It, course, lack of selectiveness. is more a (Me.1974) the court 71 where held frequently compensa the case workmen’s claimant, who sweeping operator, a street tion suits that the date of the strain a postural suffered a over and the all coincide. But “personal a time had not suffered when lapse there a any of time between arising out of and incidents, appeals those present of the note, employment.” We course of his nature have they resulted and become however, that if court also stated that the the fiber from which the decisions La aggravates or acceler- the stress of labor Inst., Mont Military v. New Mexico 92 N.M. development preexisting of a ates 1979); (Ct.App., 595 774 Hern P.2d infirmity causing an internal breakdown Schools, don Albuquerque v. Pub. structure, part personal a (1978) (rev’d N.M. 593 P.2d 470 rule by accident does occur. This on issue of only)); fees Moor in Nеw Towle is the rule Mexico head Gray v. Ranch 90 N.M. case. applicable in the instant to the facts (Ct.App.1977); and De La Copper Torre Kennecott Corp., fashioned. Each of those cases either inter preted the limitation [now covered “based mence running 561 P.2d at P.2d at employment suffers an accident occurrence,” mately accident, Moorhead, supra, disability” lеads to rather rather when “the a later than applicable because if the claimant does N.M.S.A.1978] from the accidental section of “malfunction at supra law on disable course time of the at to com but ulti at of his is dis were Act (2) preexisting back root under ruptured disc evidenced an the strain on caused or accelerated accident incurred County As we read In the accidental continues in [*] 410] pain, (4) which pain, (3) ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‍Commissioners, today, instant [*] [*] Lyon [Lyon v. Catron pain subsequently suffers if he normal while [*] the accident ruptured from a by a severe back initiated his (1) working. employment, employment experiences [*] suffered previous disc is nerve [*] 4, 1975;

the fall on June injury was (Ct.App.1972); Gomez pain severe that disabled her. If this Corp., Hausman strain caused or “collapse” accelerated a LaMont, (Ct.App.1971); weakness, from back it was a malfunction Herndon, supra. body an (3) disabling many event occur injury; not, if it did it was not *3 years months after or the work-relat- accidental. injury Whether the was acci- accident, LaMont, Gomez, supra, ed dental due the strain to over a three compensable; and then become or it month of time was an issue of fact may product “acci- be the of a new decided in favor. resulting bodily dent” from the mal- It is necessary reconcile to these decisions ultimately function induced relating limitation, to statute Moorhead; Herndon; original injury, compensation issues, and rate of be- Torre, supra. De La cause at might first blush one believe that (4) compensation, being The in entirely propositions different were deter- relationship bear tended to some to mined and be confused. We capaci wage earning the workman’s believe the decided cases have refined the Co., Drilling Kendrick v. Gackle meaning of to entitlement and the amount 113, 71 N.M. 376 P.2d 176 of compensation very some princi- to basic wage- as of the measured time that ples, always having Court in mind that e., affected, earning capacity is i. the Act expresses itself the intention and LaMont; disability. Moor policy of that employees this State who head, supra. suffer disablement as a injuries result of The logic which dictates that the reason causally work, connected to their shall not ing expressed con in the decided cases be become dependent upon pro- the welfare together, respect sidered with to limitations grams State, Codling v. Aztec Well and rate compensation, is demonstrated Servicing Co., 89 N.M. 549 P.2d 628 by pointing out under 52-1-29 (Ct.App.1976), but shall receive por- some employee must, with exception, give one tion of the wages they earned, would have notice “of the accident and of the had it not been for the intervening disabili- within thirty days occurrence,” after ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‍their ty, LaMont, supra; and that the funda- but “at all events not later sixty days mentаl reason adoption for its pro- was to after the occurrence of workman, tect the accident.” City, Clark v. Electronic requirements These 90 have interpreted N.M. been 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.1977). equate Those principles “injury” “accident” with in those may be summarized as fol- suffered, lows: cases sim where a latent ply eligible because an (1) workman The statute of limitation does not be- be requirеd report every inci gin to run when a non-disabling acci- dent, not, peril disabling whether or at the occurs, dent but rather when the of losing for failure to do so should or knows should know that he at he has some later time become disabled from compensable sustained a inju- ry insignificant as a The seemingly result of the incident. accident. Duran v. Co., New Jersey Zinc. court’s 83 N.M. discussion this matter Montell 487 (1971); Orndorff, v. 1343 680 67 N.M. supra. (1960), is of the policy illustrative considera (2) tions for interpretation. such an The con payable is not until and struction adopted

unless a fol long v/ork-related there been pro- lowed duces an jurisdiction, g., e. Langley which becomes disa- bling. Navajo Lines, Freight Inc., Willcox v. 369 United Nuclear Sapin Stores, Homestake (1962); Brown v. Safeway Inc., (Ct.App.1971); (Ct.App. Pacheco N.M. v. Springer 1970). Corp., Big flatly, Anaya stated formula, then, Industries, Inc., Three to determine “[cjompensation paid, to be is ex- amount paid only disability.” when there is a It is 52-1-20 provisions from the §§ tracted clear from these cases “date of acci- pro- -42. and 52-1-41 and injury” dent” and “date come to applicable quotient multiple or vides mean “date when injury mani- daily hourly monthly, which a or workman’s fests itself.” multiplied or to ob- wage shall be divided Thus, tо apply the same construction weekly wage; tain his all provisions is not minimum establishes the maximum and unique startling. A Subsection defines disabili- for total amounts that “wages” as the money rate at which serv the workman’s ty, regardless of recompensable ices are under the contract in- graduated weekly wage, requires of hire “at the time of the accident.” Sub when one hundred crease until *4 requires computation section B of benefits weekly wage in the percent average monthly, daily the weekly, hourly or allowed; and the maximum State became remuneration which the workman was amount of total dis- 52-1-42 makes the earning injury.” “at the time of the percentage of dis- ability, multiplied by the further subsections under B all refer to for the ability, the to be recovered amount apparent “time оf the accident.” that degree partial of disabili- court-determined Legislature the used the two terms inter help- may be ty. hypothetical A illustration We, changeably indiscriminately. ful: therefore, apply meaning the “date when compensable injury

the manifests itself” or $1,260.00 the W a month at 1. earned when “date the workman knows or should perma- time he suffered a total and compensable inju know he has a compensable injury nent and disabili- ry” to all portions the of Workmen’s 1977. 52-1- on Section Compensation Act where the terms “time monthly B(l) requires that accident,” of injury,” “time of “date of dis multiplied by 12 and then wage be ability,” “date injury,” of accidental or divided 52. used, import, words of similar recogniz are = $15,120 x 12 $1,260 ing doing that acknowledge so we = = average ($290.77) W’s reality possible injuries $290.769 latent and that wage. weekly рayment partial is a substi weekly average 2. that Assume wages tute for formerly earned July 1977 was wage in the state on workman at the longer time when he can no provides earn wage. $210.50. the same Section travesty What a it would be a percentage that, award a of a lower the workman for total wage injured employee earned if he maximum of shall receive a 89% had wage received increases between the weekly wage, or: average date of the accident and the date he was no = ($187.35) x 89% $187.345 $210.50 longer inflation, able to work. In times of provides further that 3. present, such as the might he well be rele re- totally injured workman shall a gated to the system State’s welfare to meet ceive, during period of his disabil- the ever-increasing monetary demands weekly ity, average two-thirds of maintaining a decency, standard of dignity wage. (1 self-respect Larson’s 2.20), Law if his wage-earn increased = x $193.844 $290.77 | ing ability between accident and disable average 4. of W’s Since two-thirds ment were recognized. not We do not be than 89% weekly wage greater lieve intended, so its weekly average hypothetical enactments thus are read give most state, may W wage beneficial interpretation to them favorable to the from Au- $187.35 workman. awarded more than

gust through then, Applying, 1978. the rule that the date of However, 1, 1978, July according on a workman’s and benefits A, provisions are to be of the “date he determined and as when the or “when manifests itself” become entitled to 100% of the workman or know he has state, knows average weekly wage in the or we sat- $210.50, injury,” suffered a are since that amount is still less properly isfied that trial court than W’s average weekly actual higher to Mr. Ca- wage. July And if the 1978 aver- Moreover, weekly average sias. since age weekly wage in the state is more wage in the state increased more than greater ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‍(the $2.00 $210.50 1, 1978, $172.46, July then Mr. $2.00 weekly wage Casias became entitled to the entire 100%of 1977), W shall then receive 100% He in the state. greater (so long аmount it only is so limited he is entitled to because $290.77) more than from two-thirds of his own D, 1978forward. § 52-1-42 N.M.S.A. ($182.60) percentage maximum 1978. ($172.46), average weekly wage in the state Thus, a disability compensa- workman’s whichever is less. tion award increase over 600-week Tree, Hanging Gilliland per from maximum $90 week In and Ideal Basic July 1975, through 100% of the dustries, Inc., Evans, *5 weekly wage in the state on and after urged appellants, 1, 1978, but it never excеed two-thirds case, similarity no factual to this since each actual weekly amount of those claimants simultaneous earning workman was at the time his dis- accident, injury and death or disablement. ability commenced. No the Legisla- doubt To have awarded benefits ture, cognizant Report of the Nation- computed respective as the dates of the al Commission of State Workmen’s Com- аccidents in Gilliland and Ideal does pensation published (see Laws in present a conflict with what we have said Study Report “Insurance Committee here. Thirty-second Legislature”), sought to al- leviate impossibility ri- stretching appellee’s final re One matter gidly fixed income to the permanently quest attorneys dis- fees for their services noted, years appeal. abled workman the matter thоse As we have follow- stipu ing disability upon trial when he was submitted to the court would be faced with extra an erosion lation. The record does not indicate benefits, value of his ap ordinary services below counsel for escalating enacted the increase pellee, sub but does an award of in its disclose 1975 amendment § [then Appellee is stantial fees the trial court. 59-10-18.3, N.M.S.A.1953], § attorney’s fees for his With respect to par- the instant appeal. counsel’s services on Gearhart stipulated ties earning was $275.40 Eidson, (1979); 595 P.2d per week both at the time of the Schools, Albuquerque Herndon v. Public 1976and when he became unable to work (1978); Ortega 1977. Two-thirds of $275.40 is $182.60. Highway Dept., 77 N.M. New Mexico State They stipulated also if (1966). were to date, be determined as of the 1976 Judgment is affirmed. $114.61; the rate to be would be if IT аpplied, IS ORDERED. SO figures $142.59. Those accurately represent the maximum entitle- computed JJ.,

ments as SUTIN, concurring accordance with HENDLEY 52-l-41(B), N.M.S.A.1978. in result. Security result). Employment to be fixed HENDLEY, (concurring fixed The Commission Commission. Judge Walters’ I concur in the result of at the effective compensation, amount of particularly, under the facts opinion and per week disability, at $142.59 time of here, aver- holding that the date the 52-1-41, wage. average weekly See § age computed is the “date weekly N.M.S.A.1978, ch. Laws enacted it- compensable injury when the manifests says: B 8. Subsection self.” state wage in the average weekly [T]he appeal agree I fees on employment by the determined shall be $1,000. * * should be *. security commission enacted in is enti- SUTIN, result). Judge (concurring in tled average weekly “Determination I сoncur in the result. wage.” provides formula the Workmen’s Legislature The enacted court shall determine the Compensation century ago. By Act a half wage. The was com- additions, amendments, rewriting of its puted by the remuneration the workman Legislature created a provisions, the receiving was “at time of the accident.” monster that often defies the wisdom me, To long complicated section dexterity of Houdini. I Solomon and impliedly repealed by 52-l-41(B) en- harshly write to alert the years acted later. a Workmen’s Act need of question The for decision is: lan- based common sense and clear begin to employer At what rate does an guage challenge today; that meets the weekly pay the course, does provided, Supreme Court wage, the in effect аt the time of deny publication opinion. disability? accident or the time of “accident,” interplay the words statutory provi- Let us note some of the injury,” “disability,” “injury,” “accidental sions. partial disability,” on a cross- “total and *6 lawyers and puzzle please would the word “Waiting peri- Section 52-1-40 entitled interplay in judiciary. the But to use the od” reads: compensa- the determination of workmen’s compensation No al- benefits shall be conform to the nor- * * * tion benefits does not any lowed for Legislature. We have mal wisdom of the which does not result in the workman’s judicial puzzling problems by these resolved death, or in which for disability lasts Nevertheless, there has interpretation. days; provided, more than seven how- disagreement of what we be- been constant ever, period if the of the workmаn’s dis- in each case. equitable lieved to be fair and ability lasts for more than four weeks from the date of his accidental present Let case. us turn to the compensation benefits shall be allowed was Octo- The date of disability. [Emphasis from the date of 1,1976, the rate ber 1976. Effective added.] the workman compensation paid to be average weekly wage fixed was 78% of the 52-l-41(C) rеads: Section Security Employment the Commission. state, wage in the the amount of com- The Commission fixed B in Subsection provided determined as time of the acci- pensation,' effective at the section, for applicable be shall dent, per week as the at $114.61 compensation period during full weekly wage. occurrence payable, when the date disability was falls within The date of an accidental fol- commencing January 1 the rate of year 1977. Effective calendar determination. lowing the June 30 [Em- the workman in- compensation to be phasis added.] creased to 89% of the applicable disability. law on the date of reads: Section 52-1-48 disability In this total commenced shall The benefits that a workman re- January compen- of 1975 rate ceive periоd the entire of disabili- upon statutory sation should be based ty, death, the benefits shall for be [Emphasis effect at that time. on, to, based and limited the benefits in added.] effect on the date of the accidental resulting disability death. authority De La Torre was not [Em- phasis proposition stated. De La Torre involved added.] disabilities, separate accidents, two two 52-l-41(A) begins: Section separate case, we statutes. In the instant disability For total the workman shall are involved with one one disabili- receive, during of that disabili- one statute that covers the date of * * ty compensation] rate of *. [a disability. the accident and the date of [Emphasis added.] However, agree I principle, do rule partial Section disability, Torre, De La law effective at the language. uses the sаme disability time of controls and should be used, We language note that as relat- applied to the instant case. benefits, ed to compensation speaks in Herndon, In Judge opin- cited in Walters’ “disability,” terms of not “accident.” ion, I said: at in effect both suffered total disabil- [Plaintiff] date of the at accident and the date of 2,1975 ity September as of and is entitled disability. There was one acсident and one benefits as of that date. disability. I choose to the em- hold [Not 1975.] ployer begin pay workman his In Military Lamont v. New Mexico Insti average weekly rate from dis- tute, ability because a workman is not entitled to Court, without then reference happening for the mere an effect, decided that amount fixed accident. January My opinion in De La Torre Kennecott was corrеct. Copper Corporation, discussion, foregoing Based I (Ct.App.1976) misinterpret- must not be opinion. concur with Walters’ How- ed. In De La the first accident ever, opinion, in my plaintiff governed by occurred in 1967 was an fee of for serv- statute of limitations that did not toll the appeal. ices rendered in this period. Thereafter, limitation completely recovered. At time of the

second accident which occurred

amended limitation statute of 1967 which

did toll period,.was the limitation in effect. public policy it,

Because demanded we held year period the one of limitation was tolled complaint was filed in Mexico, STATE of New time. I said: Plaintiff-Appellee, applies The 1967 statute because ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‍is critical and the MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellant. Arthur law effective at the time controls. [89 N.M. at at 842.] No. 3822. Gray In Moorhead v. Ranch Appeals Court of of New Mexico.

220, 224, 561 we 1979. said: * * * Therefore, is au- Torre thority for proposition should be based

Case Details

Case Name: Casias v. Zia Co.
Court Name: New Mexico Court of Appeals
Date Published: May 17, 1979
Citation: 596 P.2d 521
Docket Number: 3842
Court Abbreviation: N.M. Ct. App.
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