Thе plaintiff sued for personal injuries caused by the bursting of a pepsi-cola bottle, sold to him by defendant, which he was handling in his business as a storekeeper. He alleged that the explosion was caused by the defendant’s negligence. There was evidence tending to show that while the plaintiff was placing some of the bottles taken from a crate on the shelves of his store, one of the bottles burst, or еxploded, and so injured his eye that he lost the sight of it.
The plaintiff insisted that the mere fact of the explosion is sufficient • to carry the case to the jury, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur,
but we understand that this fact alone was held to be insufficient as evidence of negligence in
Dail v. Taylor,
It was contended by the plaintiff, in
Dail v. Taylor, supra,
that the authorities we have cited above applied to his case, and the meré bursting of the bottle was sufficient to show
prima facie,
at least, that there was negligence on the part of the defendant; but this Court thought that the adoption of that view of the law would not be safe, and that some additional evidence should be required to make out a
prima facie
case for the plaintiff. It was ruled, though, that where it appeared that bottles of the dеfendant, filled with coca-cola, had exploded on other occasions, under • similar circumstances, it was evidence sufficient to be submitted by the court to the jury on the question of negligence, as it was not merely conjectural, but formed a basis for a reasonably safe inference that the defendant had not exercised that degree of care which the law exacted of him, under the сircumstances, and was proof of that kind of probability as to the conduct of the defendant which was mentioned in the decisions of the Court already cited and quoted from. This principle of the law has been clearly recognized and applied in numerous eases. In
Simpson v. Lumber Co.,
133 N. C., at pp. 101 and 102, we said: “Where the plaintiff shows damage resulting from the defendant’s act, which act, with the exercise of proper care, does not 'ordinarily produce damage, he makes out a
prima facie
case of negligence, which cannot be repelled but by proof of care or of some extraordinary accident which renders care useless.
Aycock v. R. R.,
We do not think that the evidence as to the single change of management is sufficient to justify a reversal. The witness stated that “the management was changed only once; Mr. Hooker purchased the business in February and put a new manager there, and in 1915 Mr. Hooker put Mr. Parsons there.” But we do not comprehend how there was any harm done, even if there was a change, as it does not appear, even inferentially, that it was made because of any negligence of Hooker or Parsons. They did not handle the bottles personally, nor was any fault in connection with the explosion imputed to them. The evidence as to the many explosions was clearly admissible.
Dail v. Taylor, supra.
The comments of Mr. Butler on
that
case before the jury were legitimate and proper, as they were intended to show that facts, in law, would constitute negligence, and what was relevant evidence of these facts. He was not reading the facts in that case for the purpose of showing how the jury should find the facts to be in this case. The Court said, in
Horah v. Knox,
There was no sufficient evidence, in law, to show any contributory negligence of the plaintiff. No obvious danger was jnesented to him, in the presence of which he continued to handle the bottles, when a man of ordinary prudence and discretion would have refrained from doing so. He had the right to rely on the assurance that the defendant had performed its duty and so inspected and filled the bottle as to prevent any such catastrophe as has resulted in the loss of his eye, or at least reduced the danger to such a minimum as could be attained by the exercise of proper care and caution. A seller may nоt have knowledge of a danger lurking in his goods, but this lack of knowledge may be produced by his. failure to exercise proper care to acquire it; and knowledge is not an essential or requisite element of liability for the consequence, if the-dangerous character of the goods could be eliminated by the use of that degree of care which the law requires of him under the circumstances. Abstrаct propositions of law, not pointed to the facts of .the particular case, or not pertinent to them, very often are misleading, and should not be given to a jury for guidance to a correct verdict. There are some-other exceptions, but we think that we have fully covered the ground with respect to those having any merit. The material issues and contentions of the respective рarties were carefully set forth by the learned judge, and his charge to the jury is free from any just criticism. He was entirely fair to both parties, and so put the case before the jury that there could be no possible misconception as to the real subject of inquiry- *332 or as to tbe evidence and tbe law bearing tbereon. We are disposed to believe tbat, upon all tbe issues, tbe court was more tbаn fair to the defendant, and tbe latter has no reasonable grounds for complaint. The charge embraced every essential feature of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risks, and damages,-and applied tbe law correctly in every instance.
We have discovered no error in tbe case, or record, and must therefore decline to dismiss tbe action or award a new trial, for which tbe defendant has asked.
No error.