Casey v. Cavaroc

96 U.S. 467 | SCOTUS | 1878

96 U.S. 467 (1877)

CASEY
v.
CAVAROC.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. Thomas Allen Clarke in support of the decree.

Mr. J.D. Rouse and Mr. Charles Case, contra.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The substance of the agreement in this case, so far as necessary to be considered, was, that the Credit Mobilier should accept the drafts of the banking association to the amount of a million of francs at ninety days, the bank agreeing to furnish funds to pay the drafts at maturity, with the privilege of a renewal; and it was stipulated that this obligation of the bank should be guaranteed by Cavaroc & Co., and by a deposit with them, for the use of the Credit Mobilier, of first-class securities, of which deposit the latter was to be advised.

This arrangement was immediately telegraphed to New Orleans, and the drafts were drawn on the 12th of July; but the weight of the evidence is, that none of the collateral securities were delivered until the 19th of August, — which might raise a question whether the accommodation acceptances of the Credit Mobilier could be considered as a contemporary consideration therefor; or, if not, whether the bank was at that time, in the apprehension of Cavaroc (the common agent), in a condition of solvency and good credit, — as to which an affirmative answer could not well be given, since the proof is quite clear that the bank was then struggling with serious financial difficulties, from which it never recovered.

Waiving this question, however, for the present, we will proceed to examine whether, supposing that no objection arises from the time when this transaction took place, it amounted to such a transfer or pledge of the securities in question as to entitle the Credit Mobilier to a preference upon them over the other creditors of the bank at the time of its failure. Was there such a delivery and retention of possession of the collateral securities as to constitute a valid pledge by the law of Louisiana? Clearly they were never out of the possession of the officers of the bank, and were never out of the bank for a single moment, but were always subject to its disposal in any manner whatever, whether by collection, renewal, substitution, or exchange; and collections, when made, were made for the benefit of the bank, and not that of the Credit Mobilier.

The case has some features in common with, though differing in others from, that of Clarke v. Iselin (21 Wall. 360), in which this court held that collateral securities transferred by the borrower to the lender at the time of the loan were not divested out of the latter by the mere fact of his depositing them with the borrower for collection. The court say: "Obviously this deposit in no degree affected the title of the defendants to the notes. It merely facilitated collections." The court then cited White v. Platt, a New York case in 5 Denio, 269, in which it was said: "Where promissory notes are pledged by a debtor to secure a debt, the pledgee acquires a special property in them. That property is not lost by their being redelivered to the pledgor to enable him to collect them, the principal debt being still unpaid. Money which he may collect upon them is the specific property of the creditor. It is deemed collected by the debtor in a fiduciary capacity."

The case of Clarke v. Iselin, being a New York case, and governed by New York law, or the common law as understood in New York, the authority cited was necessarily of great weight, if not controlling. When, as in that case, the title has been transferred to the creditor, and the collections are made for his benefit, the pledgor merely acting as his servant or agent in making them, the character of the security is not affected at the common law by the debtor having actual possession of the collaterals, there being no fraud in the transaction. In such case, they are held by the creditor by way of mortgage as well as pledge; and a mortgage is valid notwithstanding the mortgagor has the possession. The difference ordinarily recognized between a mortgage and a pledge is, that title is transferred by the former, and possession by the latter. Indeed, possession may be considered as of the very essence of a pledge (Pothier, Nantissement, 8); and if possession be once given up, the pledge, as such, is extinguished. The possession need not be actual: it may be constructive; as where the key of a warehouse containing the goods pledged is delivered, or a bill of lading is assigned. In such case, the act done will be considered as a token, standing for actual delivery of the goods. It puts the property under the power and control of the creditor. In some cases, such constructive delivery cannot be effected without doing what amounts to a transfer of the property also. The assignment of a bill of lading is of that kind. Such an assignment is necessary, where a pledge is proposed, in order to give the constructive possession required to constitute a pledge; and yet it formally transfers the title also. In such a case, there is a union of two distinct forms of security, — that of mortgage and that of pledge; mortgage by virtue of the title, and pledge by virtue of the possession.

This advantage exists when notes and bills are transferred to a creditor by way of collateral security. His possession of them gives them the character of a pledge. Their indorsement if payable to order, or their delivery if payable to bearer, gives him the title also, which is something more than a pledge. This double title existed in White v. Platt and in Clarke v. Iselin. Hence the actual possession of the securities by the creditor was a matter of less importance in those cases.

Whether constructive possession in the creditor can be affirmed, where an article to which his only title is that of pledge is actually re-delivered to the debtor, with general authority to dispose of it and substitute another article of equal value in its place, is the question which we have to meet in this case. Such a redelivery for a mere temporary purpose, as for shoeing a horse which has been pledged and is owned by the farrier, or for repairing a carriage which has been pledged and is owned by the carriage-maker, does not amount to an interruption of the pledgee's possession. The owner is but a mere special bailee for the creditor. So, when the debtor is employed in the creditor's service, his temporary use of the pledged article in the creditor's business does not effect a restoration of the possession to the debtor. This is in accordance both with the common and the civil law. Reeves v. Capper (5 Bing. N.C. 136) was a case of this kind. A sea-captain pledged his chronometer for a debt. He was afterwards employed by the pledgee as master of one of his ships, and the chronometer was placed in his charge, to be used on the voyage. It was held that the possession of the pledgee was not lost. He recovered the chronometer against a person to whom the master pledged it a second time.

In Hays v. Riddle (1 Sandf. (N.Y.) 248), the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, at his request, a convertible bond of the New York and Erie Railroad Company (which had been pledged by the latter to the former), in order to get it exchanged for stock of the same company, which stock was to be returned and substituted for the bond in pledge. The defendant never returned either the bond or the stock. The plaintiff brought an action of trover against him for the bond, and recovered its value, being less than the debt for which it was pledged. It being objected that by delivering back the bond to the pledgor the plaintiff had lost his special property in it as pledgee, the court said: "At common law, as a general rule, the positive delivery back of the possession of the thing, with the consent of the pledgee, terminates his title. 2 Pick. 607; 15 Mass. 389. If the thing, however, is delivered back to the owner for a temporary purpose only, and it is agreed to be redelivered by him, the pledgee may recover it against the owner, if he refuse to restore it to the pledgee, after the purpose is fulfilled. 2 Taunt. 266; Story on Bailm., sect. 299. So, if it be delivered back to the owner in a new character; as, for example, as a special bailee or agent. In such case, the pledgee will still be entitled to the pledge, not only as against the owner, but also as against third persons. 14 Pick. 497."

In Macomber v. Parker (14 Pick. (Mass.) 497), referred to in the last case, the proprietors of a brickyard contracted it out on shares to a brickmaker, agreeing to advance the money requisite to carry on the manufacture of bricks, and, after being repaid their advances, to divide the profits with the latter. It was agreed that the bricks, as fast as made, should be pledged to the owners of the yard as security for their advances; but the brickmaker was to keep them in his charge, and sell them at retail, and as often as he got the amount of a hundred dollars from the sales he was to deposit it in bank to the credit of the owners. The bricks were afterwards attached as to the share of the maker for his debts. But the court held that the owners of the yard had not, by leaving the bricks in the hands of the maker, lost their lien as pledgees of the entire property. They remark: "To say that this limited authority to sell the bricks by retail, in small sums, on account of the plaintiffs, was a waiver of their possession of the residue that remained in the kilns in their yard, would be clearly against the intent and meaning of the parties, unreasonable, and unwarranted by the evidence." Again: "The special authority given by the plaintiffs to Evans [the brickmaker] was to clothe him with the character of agent to a limited extent only, and no remission to him, in his character of pledgor, of the plaintiffs' right to retain the bricks according to the agreement." To the objection that retention of possession by the pledgor would have the effect to deceive those dealing with him, the court said: "If the vendor or the pledgor should have the actual possession of the property after it were pledged or sold, it would only be prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of fraud. The matter might be explained and proved to be for the vendee or pledgee. It is a most familiar principle, that one man may have the actual possession or custody, while another has the legal title and the constructive possession."

In this case, it will be observed, the pledgees were joint owners of the brick, and were owners of the premises on which the bricks were kept; and the decision was undoubtedly correct. But, in the general remarks made by the court, there is manifest, as in many other cases, a tendency to confound the distinction between cases in which the title is in the creditor, and those in which his whole interest depends on possession. All the cases cited, however, show that a bailment to the pledgor for a mere temporary purpose for the use of the pledgee, or for the repair and conservation of the pledge, will not destroy the latter's possession; at the same time, they imply that a redelivery to the pledgor, except for the special and temporary purposes indicated, divests the possession of the pledgee, and destroys the pledge.

The civil law, which is more particularly our guide in the present case, is to the same general effect; though it is more careful in denouncing the danger of losing the right of pledge by parting with any thing like permanent or continued possession to the pledgor; and it preserves very clearly the distinction between pledge and hypothecation, or mortgage. The old civil law of the Digest, it is true, was more indulgent, and permitted the pledge to be delivered to the pledgor without prejudice to the security, in a manner that would not be allowed at the present day. Thus, in book xiii. of the Digest, title vii., law 35, Modestinus says: "A pledge transfers only the possession to the creditor, the property remaining in the debtor; yet the debtor may have the use of it, either as a gratuity, or for hire." And Paulus, in the same title, law 37, says: "If I lend a pledge to the owner thereof, I retain possession by means of the loan; for before the debtor borrowed it, the possession was not in him; and when he borrowed it, it was my intention still to retain the possession, and it was not his to acquire it." Pothier's Pandects, vol. vii. p. 360.

As to this law of the Digest, Mr. Bell, in his Commentaries on the Scotch Law, remarks as follows: "Voet very justly observes, in criticising this law, that to permit such practices were to endanger the safety of other creditors, and to sanction a fraud upon the rule which requires possession to complete a real right to movables; and that no true analogy can hold between the law of Rome, where hypothecs without possession were admitted, and the laws of modern commercial nations, in which the rule is established that possession preserves property. It is true," Bell continues, "that, in the course of many contracts, there is a necessity for separating property and possession; and that the mere circumstance of goods being in the hands of another on a temporary contract will not deprive the real proprietor of his right, in favor of the creditors of the temporary possessor. And there seems to be no doubt that the right of a pledgee will also be sufficiently strong to support this temporary dereliction of possession, in the course of necessary operations on it; the manufacturer, or other holder, being custodier for the pledgee, without injury to the real security. But the doctrine delivered by Voet is sound, where the possession is given up without necessity to the owner of the goods." 2 Bell, Com. (7th ed.), p. 22.

The modern French law, governed by a similar policy, has been put into a very explicit form in the Civil Code, which has been followed in the Civil Code of Louisiana. A quotation of some of the principal articles, bearing on this subject, will show the care taken to require distinct possession in the pledgee.

Art. 3158 (Rev. Civ. Code La.), relating to movables, is as follows: "This privilege" [namely, that of pledge] "shall take place against third persons, only in case the pawn is proved by an act made either in a public form, or under private signature: Provided, that in this last case it should be duly registered in the office of a notary-public at a time not suspicious: Provided also, that, whatever may be the form of the act, it mentions the amount of the debt as well as the species and nature of the thing given in pledge, or has a statement annexed thereto of its number, weight, and measure." This article is copied from art. 2074 of the Code Napoleon.

As to negotiable securities, the Louisiana Code, by art. 3161, provided that a regular transfer by indorsement should be sufficient. But by a subsequent act, passed in 1852, and re-enacted March 15, 1855, it was provided "that where a debtor wishes to pawn promissory notes, bills of exchange, stocks, obligations, or claims upon other persons, he shall deliver to the creditors the notes, bills of exchange, certificates of stock, or other evidences of the claims or rights so pawned; and such pawn so made, without further formalities, shall be valid as well against third persons as against the pledgors thereof, if made in good faith." A question was made on the argument whether this statute was in force in 1873, when the transaction in question took place. Without giving our reasons at present, it is sufficient to say that we are satisfied that the act was in force at that time.

The next article, 3162, which is not affected by the statute, and which is copied from art. 2076 of the Code Napoleon, is important, and is in these words: "In no case does this privilege subsist in the pledge except when the thing pledged, if it be a corporeal movable, or the evidence of the debt, if it be a note or other obligation under private signature, has been actually put and remained in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person agreed on by the parties."

As might be supposed, this article has formed the subject of much discussion by the commentators. Troplong says: "The pledgee has this privilege only on the condition of being possessed of the thing. This condition was expressly imposed upon him by art. 181 of the Custom of Paris. This is reproduced by art. 2102, No. 2, of the Code Civil, and we shall specially discuss it in the commentary on art. 2076. Possession is indispensable to him. It withdraws the thing from the hands of the debtor and from the actions of creditors, and sets it aside in a privileged situation. `Possidentis melior est conditio.' Possession is the most sure foundation, and the most striking index of his privilege. Without it, the creditor would have no ground for escaping the law of contribution. Casaregis says, `Preference is accorded to a pledgee on the thing pledged, because he has it in his own hands.'

"This possession ought to be certain and not equivocal. If it is ambiguous, if the things pledged have been so placed as to deceive the other creditors, and to lead them to believe that the debtor always continued the possessor, the pledge would be endangered."

Troplong shows, however, that this possession may be a civil possession, as where the delivery is made by the transfer of a bill of lading of goods on board a ship, &c. Troplong, Nantissement, arts. 97-99.

The same author, in commenting on art. 2076, after treating of the absolute necessity of possession by the pledgee, in order to constitute the relation of pledge, and after discussing the different forms of possession, actual and constructive, adapted to the nature and situation of the thing pledged, proceeds (Nantissement, No. 309) to treat of the manner in which it may be in the hands of the pledgor without destroying the possession and right of the pledgee. He says: "Though the merchandise be deposited in the creditor's storehouse, it may still need the care of the debtor. Then it is not forbidden to stipulate that he shall continue to attend to it in the interest of the creditor. The important thing is, that this clause does not cover a fraud. Aside from this, the possession of the creditor is not incompatible with a certain co-operation of the debtor, — being for the conservation of the thing, — he still being the owner. The creditor does not any the less continue exclusive possessor of the thing. The debtor is none the less dispossessed of it." He then gives some cases by way of illustration. For example: —

In 1839, Morin & Co., of Beaune, pledged to Weiland & Co., of Baden, sixty thousand bottles of sparkling Burgundy, for a debt. The wine was delivered to an agent of Weiland & Co., and deposited in a vault hired by him for the purpose. It was agreed that Morin & Co. should give the wine all necessary care, in presence of the agent, who was to keep the keys of the vault. But, to facilitate matters, it sometimes happened that the agent gave the keys to Morin & Co.; and once, in 1840, the latter removed some of the bottles of wine to their own premises. Morin & Co. having failed, their assignees (syndics) insisted that the pledge was null and void, because the debtors were not dispossessed of the wine. But Weiland & Co. having renounced their privilege on the wines which had been removed, were sustained by the highest court in their claim to the remainder. It was held that the special character of the wine, and the difficulty of finding persons qualified to take proper care of it, were sufficient reasons for employing Morin & Co. to attend to it; and the agent's allowing them to take the keys occasionally for this purpose was a mere matter of convenience, to facilitate the operations of the workmen. Troplong, Nant., No. 311; Dalloz, Repertoire, vol. xxxii. p. 455, art. Nantissement. See also Duranton, vol. xviii. Nos. 525, 528, 531.

A different result was had in another case, where certain Champagne wines were the object of the pledge, and the debtor had reserved the care of them; and, though the vaults in which they were stored were leased to the creditors, they communicated by open doors with the other vaults of the debtors, where their workmen were employed on the wines, and there was nothing to indicate which were pledged, and which were not, and nothing to prevent a substitution thereof; so that the debtors appeared in possession, and kept up their credit thereby, which they could not otherwise have done. Troplong, No. 312; Ricou et al. v. Syndics of Joly & Co., Dalloz, Repertoire, Nantissement, No. 93, note.

In another case, it was decided that the debtor might be permitted to make sales of the goods pledged, provided that they remained in the pledgee's possession, and could not be delivered to the purchaser without his consent. Dalloz, No. 129.

Troplong deduces, from these and other cases, the general conclusion that, whenever the assistance of the debtor is necessary to the better accomplishment of the object of the pledge, it ought to be permitted, provided always that it does not disturb the possession of the creditor in any respect. Nant., No. 313. Dalloz says: "It is evident that if the pledge of movables could, without a delivery, have effect in regard to third persons, it would be the source of great frauds and deceptions. When the debtor is obliged to surrender possession he cannot deceive third parties dealing with him by keeping possession of the pledged articles as part of his estate, and getting credit thereby." He takes special notice of the decision that a pledge is not valid if the dispossession of the debtor is not sufficiently complete to prevent substitution; or if there is a mere contract for a pledge, and not an actual pledge. Dalloz, Rep. Nant. 119. And he lays down the principle, that though a contract for a pledge may be enforced against the pledgor and his heirs (Nant., No. 121), yet that, by the very words of the Code, he cannot set up the privilege of the pledge, which alone constitutes his right as against third persons, without actual possession, or its equivalent. Nant. 119, 209.

From these authorities it seems to be evident that, in the French law at least, the text of which, in this regard, is the same as that of Louisiana, a delivery by the owner of securities by way of pledge, followed by a return thereof to him, for the purpose of enabling him to collect them and apply the money to his own use, on substituting others in their stead, and with general liberty of substitution, and to appear as the owner and possessor thereof in his dealings with others (the title of the securities not being transferred to the creditor), is not such a delivery of possession as is necessary to establish the privilege due to a pledge as to third persons. It would be contrary to the very letter of the law to allow such a transaction to have that effect. It would not be mere evidence of fraud, which might be rebutted by counter evidence; but it would be contrary to the rule of law adopted to prevent fraud. In other words, as to third persons, it would not be a pledge at all within the meaning and requirements of the law.

We think that the decisions in Louisiana lead to the same conclusion. In the case of Geddes v. Bennett (6 La. Ann. 516), the object of the pledge was certain barrels of whiskey in the warehouse of a third person. The creditor allowed the debtor to remove them to his own premises, upon giving the following receipt: "Received from J. & R. Geddes four hundred and fifty-six barrels of whiskey, on storage." Having the goods thus in his own possession, the debtor parted with them to a third person. The Supreme Court, in an action brought by the pledgees to recover the whiskey, said: "The plaintiffs have shown no compliance with the articles of the Code, concerning the form of the contract of pledge, which it would be necessary to observe in order to enable them to recover against the defendants, who are third persons; and our impression is, that, under the circumstances of the case, the delivery of the object pledged to Bennett, even under the receipt he gave, would of itself defeat the pledge;" referring to article 3162 of the Code, which we have been considering. And in the late case of D'Meza's Succession (26 id. 35), Myers & Levy had made certain accommodation indorsements for the deceased, upon the faith and promise of receiving from him a policy of insurance upon his life, for which he had made application. Having procured the policy, he told them to call at his office and get it from his book-keeper, informing them that he had told the book-keeper it was for them. But he died before it was actually delivered. The court held that the policy was never placed beyond the control of D'Meza, and that Myers & Levy never had the requisite possession thereof. "The book-keeper," say the court, "never held the policy as agent or trustee for Myers & Levy. Although informed of his employer's intention in regard to one of the policies" (he had obtained two of the same amount), "he was never instructed to deliver it to Myers & Levy, or any one else. There was, therefore, no delivery of the policy to Myers & Levy, although the deceased intended to do so. Consequently, they never held it as a pledge or collateral security for their accommodation indorsements." These cases appear to us to govern the present. The securities claimed to have been pledged to the Credit Mobilier remained in the possession and control of the bank until the time of its failure. Up to that period they were not in such a condition as the law requires for a pledge. The placing them in such a condition afterwards, by Cavaroc's removing them from the bank at the time of its failure, was, in fact, an attempt to create a pledge then, by assuming the possession requisite thereto; and a pledge taking its origin at that time was a preference forbidden by the banking act.

It must not be overlooked that the Credit Mobilier has no other claim to the securities in question but that of pledge. A pledge, and possession, which is its essential ingredient, must be made out, or their privilege fails. An agreement for a pledge raises no privilege. There is no mortgage; for the title of the securities was never transferred to them. The evidence of the cashier is, that they were all stamped payable to the order of the bank, when discounted. They were not indorsed by the cashier until the day they were removed by Cavaroc, which was after the bank had failed.

Two cases, decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, have been cited and relied on (as well as some other cases in England and the United States), to show that an assignee only takes the property assigned exactly in the plight in which the debtor held it, and subject to all the equities to which it was subject in his hands. The first case is that of Campbell v. Slidell (5 La. Ann. 274), in which a syndic claimed certain real estate which the debtor had conveyed to a bona fide purchaser, but the deed had not been duly registered. The court held that this made no difference. The debtor had parted with the title, and, therefore, he could not assign to the syndic what he did not himself own, although the deed might be void, for want of registry, as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith, or a subsequent judgment creditor who should acquire a mortgage by recording his judgment. It is evident that this case is unlike the one now under consideration. Here the debtor never transferred the title; and the only question is, whether there was such an attempt to pledge as to raise a privilege, — which, as we have seen, there was not.

The second case is that of Partee, Syndic, v. Corning, 9 La. Ann. 539. In this case, the debtor had actually pledged and delivered bills receivable to the defendants for simultaneous advances, but had not indorsed the bills, as required by art. 3156. The court said: "It is clear that the pledgors could not have set up this objection; and we are of opinion that the syndic cannot, upon a mere naked informality of this sort, disturb the pledge. Let it be observed that there is no pretence that the pledges were taken in bad faith, or that an injury was done to creditors in taking them." Here, the indispensable requisite of possession existed. The other formalities (which were required at that time) were enjoined by the article referred to, it is true; but there was no declaration that the pledge should be void, or that the privilege should not exist without them. We do not think that these cases conflict with the conclusion which we have reached in this case.

We have examined the other authorities referred to, among which are Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. Jr. 86; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; and also the cases of Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall 244, and Cook v. Tullis, 18 id. 332; but these were all cases in which the creditor claiming adverse to the assignee had a clear legal or equitable title to the property claimed. None of them stood as the present case does, upon the claim of a privilege expressly denied by the law. We do not deem it necessary, therefore, to go into a review of those cases. They cannot affect this.

Whilst it is generally true that an assignee for the benefit of creditors holds the property assigned subject to the same equities as the debtor or assignor held it, it is not universally true. Many transactions would be binding on the latter which would not be binding on the assignee. All sales and securities made for the actual purpose of defrauding creditors are of this class. By the law of Louisiana, a pledge, in order to be effective against third persons, must be accompanied by a privilege. It may be valid as a contract between the parties without this quality, as held both in the French law (as already shown) and in Louisiana, in the case of Matthews v. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225. But art. 3162 expressly declares that the privilege arising from a pledge does not subsist except when the thing pledged has been actually put and remained in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person agreed on by the parties. Without the privilege, or right of preference, the Credit Mobilier has no claim to hold the securities in question as against the other creditors. How, then, can it set up such a claim against the receiver? The receiver does not represent the bank alone: he represents all the parties. He represents the law, which takes charge of the property for the benefit of all creditors, according to their respective and mutual rights. Suppose no receiver had been appointed, and, when the bank failed, it had called the creditors together, and laid all its assets on a table, could the Credit Mobilier, in presence of the other creditors, have laid its hands on the securities in question, and claimed them by right of any privilege or preference? It certainly could not have done so if it had no privilege as against them. And yet this is precisely the relation in which the parties stood. The existence of a receiver, as trustee for all, did not change it. That one essential thing which the law requires for the subsistence of the privilege, namely, possession, was wanting. Other formalities might have been dispensed with. But, possession is essential, — made so by the express terms of the law. Nearly all the cases in France, where this question has arisen, have been contests between creditors claiming by way of pledge, and the syndics of the failing debtor, who stand in the place occupied by the receiver here. If there is any distinction between them, it is in favor of a firmer right on the part of the receiver to protect the interests of the general cred itors. He is not made receiver by a voluntary assignment of the bank, but is appointed by the magistrate in invitum the bank, for the very purpose of securing equal justice to all its creditors, and under a law which sternly forbids preferences. Surely such an officer, whatever may be the rule in the case of voluntary assignments, may assert those rights of the general creditors, which the law itself creates, without being subject to all the disabilities under which the bank would labor in combating its private engagements with favored creditors. If the law says, "there shall be no privilege, as to third persons, by a pledge without possession," there will be no need of a judgment and execution in order to oppose such a pledge, if only a creditor, or one who represents creditors, has a proper standing in court. Insolvency of the debtor, if a bank, and the appointment of a receiver thereof, will force the pledgee into concurrence with the general creditors; and the receiver's power will be fully adequate to the protection of their interests as established by law. The case of Bank of Alexandria v. Herbert (8 Cranch, 36) presents a state of things almost precisely analogous to this. There, the trustee of an insolvent debtor recovered the proceeds of property which the latter had mortgaged to the bank. The recovery was had on the ground that the mortgage had not been recorded in proper time under the law of Virginia, which declared that all deeds and mortgages, though good between the parties, should be void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, unless recorded within eight months from date. "To set up this deed against the creditors," said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, "would be to defeat the very object for which the law was made."

Indeed, it may be laid down as a general rule, as well at the common law as the civil law, that a trustee, assignee, or syndic, having the powers and occupying the relations which are sustained by a receiver under the National Banking Act, or an assignee in bankruptcy, may well oppose any privilege or preference which the law itself, unaided by a bona fide purchase or judgment, would regard as void against the general creditors in a direct contest between them and the parties claiming such privilege or preference; even though the debtor himself, on account of some personal disability arising from his own acts or engagements, could not resist the claim. That an assignee in bankruptcy has this power cannot well be doubted; and since a national bank cannot be put into bankruptcy, but can only be wound up under the peculiar provisions of the banking act, the receiver appointed by virtue thereof must have the same power, or the absurd consequence would follow, that the property of a bank disposed of by voluntary conveyances, or pledges not good as to third persons, would be beyond the reach of creditors.

Where the legal or equitable property in a security passes, and there is no express law invalidating the transfer, the creditor will be entitled to hold it as well against the assignee or receiver as against the debtor; because the assignee only takes such title as the debtor has at the time of the assignment or insolvency. In that case, however, the question of fraud would be admissible as a question of fact, to invalidate the transaction. But, in the present case, that question does not arise; or, if it might be raised, it is immaterial. The Credit Mobilier claims a privilege by virtue of a pledge; and such a privilege, as we have seen, cannot be maintained as to third persons, without possession. Bad faith, it is true, would defeat the pledge though the creditor had possession. But want of possession is equally fatal, though the parties may have acted in good faith. Both are necessary to constitute a good pledge so as to raise a privilege against third persons. The requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, adopted to prevent fraud and deception; for, if the debtor remains in possession, the law presumes that those who deal with him do so on the faith of his being the unqualified owner of the goods.

This consideration meets the objection which is urged against the rule, that it would result in giving to the general creditors the benefit of the advances made to the debtor on the faith of the stipulated pledge, inasmuch as the estate is increased to the extent of these advances. It is true that the estate is so increased; but the debts and liabilities are also increased to the same amount by the demand of the party who makes the advances, — the only effect of the rule being, that the latter comes into concurrence with the other creditors on an equality, and not by way of preference; and if the latter derive any benefit from this result, it must be remembered that, in the view of the law, they might not have given credit to the common debtor had he not remained in possession of the goods, and appeared to continue as the absolute owner thereof. If the pledge should be sustained, they would have good cause to complain that they had been deceived by the acts of the parties setting up the pledge. So that, on the question of relative merit and demerit, the parties are in all respects equal. It is on this principle that the law is founded.

These considerations also supply an answer to another suggestion, that equity will consider as done what the parties intended should be done, which it is assumed was, in this case, a transfer of the title of the securities. Equity will not exercise this power when it would injure third persons who have incurred detriment, and acquired consequent rights by the acts that are done. Such detriment has, in the view of the law, been incurred in this case, and such rights have, by the express letter of the law, accrued.

This suggestion may also be answered by the fact that it cannot be truly said to have been the intent of the parties to transfer the title. The agreement was only that "securities of the first class shall be deposited with the firm of Messrs. Cavaroc & Son." A transfer of the title would have been inconsistent with that unrestricted control over the securities which the bank desired to, and did, retain, and which must be considered as having been assented to by the Credit Mobilier, through the common agent, Cavaroc.

On this ground, therefore, of want of possession in the pledgee, or of a third person agreed upon by the parties, and of actual possession and control in the pledgor, we feel compelled to hold that the Credit Mobilier had no privilege as to third persons, and that the receiver was entitled to the securities in question.

The decree will, accordingly, be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to enter a decree in favor of the complainant below in conformity to this opinion; and it is

So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, MR. JUSTICE FIELD, and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.