Case v. PillsburyCase v. Pillsbury
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Goodman
This is a libel for review of a compensation order and for injunction suspending and setting aside an award under Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424,
Respondent Young lost the sight of his right eye because of the entry of a foreign body therein while employed on board ship. Respondent Pillsbury, Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, awarded compensation for permanent partial disability, resulting from loss of sight of Respondent Young’s right eye, under subdivision (c) (5) of
Upon the issue of facial disfigurement, the Deputy Commissioner found: “That by reason of said injury claimant has sustained, in addition to said loss of sight, serious facial and head disfigurement consisting in a large white spot across the pupil’ of the eye resembling a cataract and some narrowing of the aperture between the upper and lower eyelids of said eye.”
Respondent Young’s employer and its insurance carrier, as libelants, join in the prayer that the Deputy Commissioner’s award of $750, under subdivision (c) (20) of
Subdivision (c) (20) of
It is contended by libelants that the intent of subdivision (c) (20)
The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the award under subdivision (c) (20) of
Both sides agree that the sole question is as to the scope of
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was modeled after the New York law. The deputy Commissioner has cited several New York State lower court decisions wherein compensation for facial disfigurement was allowed concurrently with disability compensation for loss of use of the same member of the head. Some weight may be given to the New York decisions because of the recognized rule of construction that the adoption of a statute of another jurisdiction carries with it the construction placed upon it prior to its adoption. In Marshall, Deputy Commissioner, v. Andrew Mahony Co., 9 Cir., 56 F.2d 74, 77, the Court, after referring to the fact that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was adopted from the Workmen’s Compensation Law of New York, Consol. Laws New York, c. 67, stated “that in so adopting the act the Congress intended to adopt the construction theretofore placed upon it by the courts of the state of its enactment” *884To the same effect, Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Marshall, D.C., 49 F.2d 625; Bethlehem Ship-Building Corporation v. Monahan, 1 Cir., 54 F.2d 349.
More persuasive, however, is the argument that sound and logical interpretation of the statute itself supports the Deputy Commissioner’s decision. Subdivision (c) (20) of
In order to determine the real intent and purpose of the Congress, the whole section must be considered. As was said in Marshall v. Andrew Mahony Co., supra: “To arrive at its proper meaning and application, Section 10 (the section there in question) must be taken in its entirety and its true meaning be ascertained by giving due weight and consideration to all parts of the section in the light of the general aims and objects of the statute taken as a whole.” (Comment in parenthesis supplied.)
The framers of the statute obviously considered facial disfigurement as an element of damage separate and apart from disability resulting from the various classified types of injuries. In my opinion, it was not intended that an employee should be denied an award for disfigurement merely because his disability and disfigurement, by happenstance, are concurrent. Otherwise the inconsistent result might be reached whereby an employee would receive compensation for the loss of an eye and damages for the disfigurement of an ear, but nothing for disfigurement if the two misfortunes occurred in the same member of the head. Clearly, it was intended to allow compensation for the handicaps caused by personal unsightliness, separately and in addition to the disability causing loss of use of a member of the body or head.
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is a remedial statute and hence must be liberally construed. Baltimore & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 52 S.Ct. 187, 76 L.Ed. 366; De Wald v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Cir., 71 F.2d 810; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Branham, 4 Cir., 136 F.2d 873.
The exceptions to the libel are sustained and the libel is dismissed.