Case v. People

866 view, juvenile statutory scheme breaks fer of a offender to an adult cor- my

In That, however, year facility. 18 olds who it authorizes rectional would re- down when juvenile offenders adjudicated quire particularized have been determination of county jail. in Jail need, to be incarcerated requirement which is not disposition may applied be is not a Compare the statute now before us. A.F., juveniles. other 19-3-113.2(2)(c), (1986) (allow- 8B C.R.S. § 207, (1976). Ordering 418 a child aggravated ing juvenile offenders who are jail is inconsistent with sentenced years age over 18 to be transferred to strong public policy expressed in other custody Department of the of Correc- parts Code that children Children’s “only upon finding by preponder- tions adults. not be incarcerated with ance of the evidence that the child is no (1986)(con- See, 8B C.R.S. e.g., § longer benefiting programs from of the children). cerning detention and shelter institutions.”). department of noted, juve- confinement of As one court pur- Because there is no rehabilitative “may contribute to jails niles to adult well sentencing year jail, pose for an 18 old to reduce it.” M.L.N. v. crime rather than supporting the rationale different treat- 554, (W.Va.1987) Greiner, 360 559 S.E.2d juveniles present. is not ment of and adults 424, Wilt, (quoting 162 W.Va. R.C.F. v. incarcerating There is no rational basis for 168, (1979)). No one here has S.E.2d year jail olds in an adult an adult when argued jail serves rehabilitative does not face incarceration for the same Indeed, year purpose for the 18 old. my offense. In in Interest of jail “purely time is People concede that A.L., (Colo.Ct.App.1985), punitive.” correctly decided. would hold that an 18 examined Two state courts which have juvenile sen- year old offender be cannot sentencing propriety the issue of the jail directly tenced to either or as a result jails found juvenile offenders to adult have probation year revocation the 18 In statutory impermissible. such schemes possessed less than old is found to have Greiner, (W.Va. M.L.N. v. S.E.2d one ounce of marihuana. 1987), Virginia Supreme Court West pro statutory scheme which considered youth un

vided that offenders who remain continuing jurisdiction juve der the of the turning age nile court after 18 could be county jails pris with adult incarcerated Applying process analysis, a due oners. incarcerating juvenile the court held jail rationally adult is not offenders an CASE, Petitioner, Patricia Mae purpose related to rehabilitative M.L.N., juvenile system. 360 S.E.2d at Grady, 3 Ohio 559. also State v. of the State of PEOPLE (1981)(incarcer App.3d 444 N.E.2d 51 Colorado, Respondent. ating youth jail offender in or other adult No. 88SC6. goal facility contrary to rehabilitative system). Grady con juvenile the court Colorado, Supreme Court of impermissible to sen cluded that it was En Banc. year tence an 18 old who had committed an jail juvenile offense as a to an adult unless May 1989. housing found that was unavail Rehearing Denied June facility appropriate juvenile able public safety required. Grady, so

444 N.E.2d at 54. agree Grady that there justifying the trans-

special circumstances

which affirmed the trial court’s refusal to submit a self-defense instruction to the affirm. We

I. Case, petitioner, Patricia Mae manslaughter1 with reckless fol-

lowing an altercation in stabbed fatally Gregory and wounded Carter. Al- though sequence of events and the surrounding stabbing conflict- trial, ed hotly disputed and were certain conclusions can be drawn from the record before us.

Case Carter and were involved an inti- Carter, relationship. mate who lived with mother, his stayed apart- often at Case’s Case, ment. who approximately five weighed pounds, feet tall and and Car- ter, weighed six who was feet tall and pounds, history arguments. had a of violent 16, 1984, On December Case and Carter argue began apartment. Case’s hour, arguing for a half Carter left telephone building’s make a call from laundry gone room. Carter had been for twenty go minutes when decided to Case Moyers, Springs, Robert M. Colorado for check Because several assaults petitioner. recently building, had occurred in the Case put paring knife the waistband of her Gen., Woodard, Atty. Duane Charles B. pants self-protection. spoke briefly for Howe, Gen., Deputy Atty. Chief H. Richard room, laundry and then Forman, Gen., Engle, Clement Sol. P. Asst. they apartment. returned to the Denver, Atty. Gen., respondent. for Case testified that she told Carter that ERICKSON, Justice. go stay he should at his house for mother’s granted We According certiorari to review court testimony, while. to Case’s appeals unpublished opinion in angered v. Carter struck her in became Case, 12, 1987), (Colo.App. face, knocking 85CA1676 Nov. her At this down.2 18-3-104(l)(a), manslaugh- Pursuant section that the indictment was for reckless ter, (1978), 18-3-104(l)(a), man- “[a] commits crime of section 8 C.R.S. (a) slaughter recklessly if: He causes the the testimony alleging 2. Case's Carter had person." death of another 501, Under section 18—1— night stabbing on the struck her recklessly 8 C.R.S. acts "[a] police controverted from the offi- consciously disregards when he a substantial immediately questioned cer who Case after the unjustifiable risk a result will occur or officer, stabbing. According to the Case had no a circumstance exists." her marks on face which would indicate that grand jury Case struck, indictment under which she had been nor were her clothes tom. "[o]n states that about Decem- any type When asked whether she "observe[d] 16, 1984, unlawfully, kind, ber Mae Case any any Patricia did injury of any nature to recklessly feloniously extent, cause the degree,” responded death the officer Carter, Gregory by stabbing “No, Gregory response A. A. Car- not.” I did The officer’s knife; photo- ter question supported by with a Re- violation Colorado a full facial amended, graph vised man- Statutes record. This contained in the (F-4)." charge, night stabbing, photograph, Given it is clear taken the criminally negligent homicide.4 fense of testimony contradicts

point, . tendered three different self- police night of The defense made to statements requested According Shelly defense instructions stabbing. to Officer jury.5 The night, one of them to the Weber, court submit interviewed Case who because, request in its denied the knocked her that after Carter Case said tendered instructions were down, got up from the floor ... “she trial, and not supported by the evidence At automatically Carter. stabbed” People announced in of under the rule however, gave a different version Case Fink, 516, 574 P.2d 81 knocked happened after she was what the trial court stated that Case Specifically, she stated that when Case down. knife, down, paring which was knocked paring knife was stick- testified that the waistband, began poke to her in her still it uncomfort- ing her in the side and was although that she leg. words, testified able, dece- in other and that the going to take the that she was up told Carter picked her what been dent to relieve the knife out of her waistband hug, she it referred to as a bear took out discomfort, proceed to- to Carter continued sticking her she it was while because Case, According her. to wards being up by held in midair him. Of and, hug” he in a grabbed course, her “bear just wanting to remove she was up, her she reached squeezed and lifted object, she could have an uncomfortable knife. Case for the it, into her waistband and, course, dropped of but removed she removed that “somehow” stated up he wound with two stab instead Then, according to pants. her knife from wounds, through one of which was fatal “moved into the testimony, Carter Case’s heart. got when he stabbed.” knife and that was affirmative defense of So far as the from his wounds.3 Carter died concerned, I do feel that self defense is Fink noted at the case of versus man- charged with reckless 574 P.2d 81 resolves this matter. by jury. The slaughter and was tried charge of Jury indicted her on a Grand court instructed the on is reckless man- manslaughter, that the lesser included of- manslaughter and Instruction 1: It is Patricia Case had been struck shows no evidence that paring that when she removed the the face. defense was, however, pants testimony her she did not act reckless- knife from There substantial danger ly. reasonably Car- believed to be in presented witnesses at trial that She defense occasions, had, physically previous bodily injury and as a ter of imminent serious used, abused Case. the knife in an result of that belief she protect herself. effort to stabbed Carter testified that she 3. Case person has reasonable Instruction 2: When However, performed physician who once. believing, grounds actual- for and does in fact autopsy was a on Carter testified there killed, believe, being danger ly of her or puncture superficial and two chest wound imminent, harm, receiving great bodily wounds, Based on these wounds into the heart. may appearances act on such and defend she physician testified that Carter had been herself, times, taking human even to the extent of not once. stabbed three may necessary, although it turn out life when (1984 pro- Supp.), 4. Section C.R.S. appearances although were false or that the “Any person causes the death of vides that: who as to the extent she have been mistaken amounting person by to crimi- another conduct danger. of the real or actual criminally negligent negligence commits defense to Instruction 3: It is an affirmative is a class 1 misdemeanor." homicide which Manslaughter the crime of 18-1-501(3), provides Section deadly physical force because used negligence person acts with criminal that: “A degree reasonably believed a lesser 1. she when, through gross deviation from the stan- inadequate, and force was a reasonable dard of care that exercise, believe, grounds to 2. had reasonable perceive a substantial and he fails to she or was in did believe that another unjustifiable risk that a result will occur danger being killed or of receiv- imminent exists." a circumstance bodily Gregory ing great injury. Carter was reasonably committing appeared provided, respec- 5. The three instructions tively: about to commit assault. slaughter, mitted were reckless man- the evidence have heard charge homi- certainly support perhaps higher charge. not But cide in the trial court was Jury say Grand had its and that’s what in- submit they at. The entire though arrived to the jury struction even there was no the defendant ... that she at some of self-defense. [was] intent to harm defen- had respondent dant, kill let alone second-degree charged with Peo murder. ple v. 194 Colo. at 574 P.2d at during She has asserted Conflicting testimony presented testimony pulled her this knife in order question at trial raised wheth protect herself and had no intent respondent er the acted self-defense. Id. protect testify herself. did At the close protect that she did it to herself. second-degree instructed mur effect, saying, any- is that der and the lesser included offenses of accident, clearly thing it an and so manslaughter negli and criminally reckless under Fink do not feel that the affirma- gent effect homicide. Under statute in proper, tive defense self defense is decided, criminally at the time Fink was given. not be negligent homicide could be committed ei my ruling think remarks at this amounting neg ther conduct to criminal apply also Defendant’s ligence causing or by intentionally 2 and 3. Tendered Instructions Particu- person good death of in a faith unrea but larly claiming she is that she justification sonable belief that existed. injure even intended These deal 18-3-105(l)(a) (b), (1973). 8 The & C.R.S. § reasonably with where believes that respondent’s trial self- court submitted the deadly physical he is to use about force jury sec defense instructions to on the just and she do so and so. But I ond-degree be murder and “unreasonable applicable it’s don’t think under the testi- justification” criminally negligent lief of mony. charges, refused so on homicide but to do manslaughter “negligent reckless jury The guilty found Case of reckless negligent criminally conduct” homicide manslaughter and she was sentenced charges. respon Id. The found the years Department four of Correc- guilty manslaughter, dent reckless tions. Id. appeal an was filed. appeal, appeals On affirmed It People conviction. relied on v. Fink reversed, holding appeals The court of concluding is that when a defendant that the trial refusal to self- court’s submit a crime has as that an ele- charges defense all four instructions on negli- ment either recklessness or criminal Fink, Colo.App. People was error. 37 v. gence, jury is and the instructed to each 514, 529, 512, (1976). 530 We crime, and every element of the a self-de- granted certiorari to review the court given. fense Be- instruction need not be decision, appeals concluded cause Case was tried for reckless man- properly, and reversed the acted Colo, negligent criminally homi- appeals. Fink, court of cide, and the instructions submitted to the 574 P.2d at 83. We stated that contained element of those “negligent portion conduct” under the charges, no self-defense instruction was statute, homicide required. held to be required for rea a conviction was mens perceive an the’ defendant failed II. unjustified person risk that a reasonable appeals perceived proper- our the court of would have in the same situation. ly construed Colo. Id. at P.2d at We held (1978). crim- charges Since the with the sub- self-defense inconsistent required, to submit Case’s homicide statute because under inally negligent instruction, to the asserting tendered self-defense that his acts reasonably believe had to also had to act justified, but were underlying of Fink re- rationale By finding per- manner. Id. reasonable properly fol- today and was mains valid negligent homicide son by the trial court and the court of lowed conduct,” “negligent rea- we because finding guilty of reck- appeals. By jury specifically found that soned manslaughter, jury has found that less in a reasonable man- did not act consciously disregarded a substantial i.e., unjustified ner, perceive he failed unjustifiable risk that would be

risk, rejected self-de- impliedly and thus 18-3-104(l)(a), 8 C.R.S. killed. See § theory. fense (1984); (1984). 18-1-501(8), C.R.S. § rejected therefore the contention that applied the same rationale We acting in self-defense. See charge. cited We Had the 9:7 the Use of CJI-Crim. § the Notes on she was act- believed Case’s “The de- stated: affirmative self-defense, ing in not have found upon the rea- clause is deleted based fense recklessly. her to have acted exemption soning justification defendant would not be present, the were per- undisputed It is that the trial court therefore, acting recklessly, mitted Case to evidence of self-de- the defendant acted reck- able to find that properly in- fense and that the already precluded any find- lessly, [it had] criminal- structed on the not- ing of affirmative defense.” Id. We Ironically, ly negligent charges. homicide ed, however, that a that this did mean testimony, it was Officer Weber’s presenting barred from evi- defendant was Case’s, theory of self- supported the at trial. We stated dence of self-defense defense. Case testified that she somehow of self-defense must be al- that evidence impaled the knife and Carter then removed lowed, and that the should consider by asked the himself on the knife. When determining the the evidence when whether prosecution whether she stabbed Carter acting in a reckless or a defendant was herself, replied: attempt protect Case out_ criminally negligent manner. Id. just took the knife He “No. he moved into the knife and that when sum, In held that when an element of we testimony, poten- got This while stabbed.” charged crimi- the crime is recklessness or accident, tially supporting the defense of negligence, properly support offers no for self-defense. Officer instructs the as to each element Weber, however, testified Case told her charged, no error results from the crime Carter, by being knocked down after give in- court’s failure to a self-defense “automatically stabbed” him. This tes- struction. Because the trial court allowed supporting timony could construed as present of self-defense Fink Regardless claim of self-defense. properly in- during trial and the testimony, the trial of the merits of the structed, appeals. we reversed the court of properly present Case to allowed jury. to the self-defense evidence The facts of the case now before us are jury on The trial court instructed the strikingly found in similar to those Fink. charges. element of The man- charged In with slaughter instruction tendered Conflicting manslaughter. testi- read: mony presented at trial which raised the crime of man- The elements of The trial court issue of self-defense. slaughter are: manslaugh- instructed the on reckless defendant, 1. That ter and the included offense of crimi- lesser Colorado, nally negligent 2. at or homicide. Based on these State facts, place charged, the trial court was the date and we conclude that about recklessly, 3. self-defense instruction to the per- 4. the death of caused another (1978). Accordingly, we affirm

son. appeals. evidence, considering all After you prosecution proven decide has beyond each of the elements reason- LOHR, J., dissents, QUINN, doubt, you able should find defen- J., MULLARKEY, join C.J. guilty manslaughter. dant dissent. evidence, all considering After LOHR, Justice, dissenting:

you prosecution decide the has failed to prove beyond each of the elements I respectfully dissent from the majority doubt, you reasonable should find the opinion. my view, the trial fail- court’s manslaughter. defendant jury regarding ure instruct the the de- theory of fendant’s re- criminally negligent homicide instruc- Although agree versible error. tion stated: by majority result reached The elements of the crime of follows from Colo. negligent homicide are: I would take oppor- defendant, 1. That the tunity to overrule Fink and hold Colorado, 2. in the State of at or charged with reckless man- place charged, about date and homicide per- 3. caused the death of another is entitled to a instruction self-de- son, long fense as as some evidence was ad- neg- conduct amount to criminal support duced at jury’s ligence. finding that the defendant acted in self-de- fense. considering all In People v. Fink we held that you prosecution prov- decide that the defendant is a crime that has en each the elements of crime as an .either element recklessness or crimi offense, or of a lesser included negligence, jury and the is as instructed you guilty should find the defendant crime, every and element the proven, you the offense and should so given. self-defense instruction need not be your state in verdict. Thus, 194 Colo. at at P.2d considering all the if under the trial need in court you prosecution decide that the has jury struct the as to the elements of the prove or failed to one more elements of any specific crime omit the crime or lesser included theory reference to the of self-defense. offense, you find should the defendant reasoning underlying The Fink was that not of the offense which jury believes that a defendant accused proved, you been state in so manslaughter neg of reckless or your verdict. ligent self-defense, then homicide acted submitting By these instructions to the it will be unable find that the defendant jury, jury the trial court instructed the as requisite acted with the mens rea of reck manslaughter to each element of reckless or negligence. lessness criminal The homicide. See holding of case based on as was (1983). CJI-Crim. 9:06 & 9:09 sumption jury any use evi will dence of self-defense to determine if the III. acting in reckless or was crimi Because the trial court allowed Case to nally negligent manner. present trial self-defense at properly jury sup- instructed the on each ele- result reached in Fink was charged, ported by ment of the crimes the “Notes on Use” CJI-Crim. was to submit Case’s tendered 9:7 Fink States, 1981) (quoting Shepard v. United that the affirmative defense stated decided 96, 104, 22, 25, purposefully from the 78 L.Ed. deleted 290 U.S. S.Ct. clause was manslaughter. (1933)). Moreover, jury reckless in this case the instruction on ex- justification guided by note reasoned instructed that it was whole, the defendant would emption were taken as a judge’s instructions recklessly, jury finding acting so a not be lawyers’ comments on the rules preclude any af- conduct would of reckless court, case. The applicable of law Fink was decid- defense. Since firmative however, jury instructed the as to never however, Jury ed, the Colorado Instrue- person may the circumstances which a to include have been revised tions-Criminal Consequently, it would act self-defense. crime of reckless element of the as an light difficult in of these instruc have been relevant manslaughter the absence persuade tions for defense counsel to 9:06 CJI-Crim. See defense. affirmative justifiable that the defendant’s use of longer no The “Notes Use” the element force to defend herself refuted exemption pre- is justification state of recklessness. There- by finding of recklessness. cluded reasons, these conclude that For fore, appears it that the current wrongly decided and would hold Fink was manslaughter contemplates an instruction that a self-defense instruction should be As so con- on self-defense. instruction given in a reckless case strued, regard the current version of this supported by is such an instruction evi- instruction to reflect a standardized dence in the record. the circum- Under understanding more reasonable properly instructed stances of this appropriate thought-processes give and to police jury could have chosen to believe the right recognition to a defendant’s to have testimony officer’s that at the crime scene as to all matters of law instructed stated that “automatical- the defendant his case. applicable to ly” the defendant. The could stabbed for an instruction from It is no substitute treated this statement as evidence of have legal regarding requirements the defen- self-defense and concluded that that counsel theory of self-defense stabbing dant’s justified argue that the defendant was can faulty accidental was based on recol- using deadly force to defend himself. circumstances, lection. Under these Hardin, 229, 234, charge jury on self-defense failure to (Colo.1980)(“It is the regarded not harmless and must be duty of the trial court to instruct Accordingly, I re- error. reversible law.”). A properly on all matters of defen judgment appeals of the court of verse the to an instruction on his dant is entitled remand the case to that court with theory of the case whenever instructions to return district supported by some evidence the record. trial. for a new People Marquez, 692 P.2d (Colo.1984); Dillon, People v. C.J., MULLARKEY, J., QUINN, (Colo.1982). This is true no matter join in this dissent. improbable his how unreasonable Marquez, might 692 P.2d at be. expect

1098. To to understand with guidance from the trial court that it out should consider evidence determining whether the defendant acting recklessly negligently is to ignore practical limitations of the expect from it an

and to awareness legal is a feat point “so subtle [that it]

beyond compass ordinary minds.” Madson, (Colo.

Case Details

Case Name: Case v. People

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: May 30, 1989

Citation: 774 P.2d 866

Docket Number: 88SC6

Court Abbreviation: Colo.