76 N.J.L. 696 | N.J. | 1909
The charter of the city of Trenton (Pamph. L. 1874, p. 385) declares that all contracts for doing work and furnishing materials for any improvement exceeding in amount $200 * * * shall at all' times be given to. the lowest bidder or bidders, who shall give satisfactory proof of his or their ability to furnish the requisite matérial and to perform the work properly and offer sufficient 'security for the faithful performance of the contract, in regard to time, quality of materials and work to be done.
.On August 27th, 1906, the city clerk was instructed to advertise for proposals for the paving of Monmouth street and Chestnut avenue, in the city of Trenton.
In response to such advertisement two bids were received on September 4th, 1906, one from the Barber Asphalt Paving-Company and the other from W. E. McGovern. These bids were referred to the city engineer and street committee, notice was sent to the asphalt company on September 17th that a meeting of the street committee would be held on the evening of September 18th. A Mr. Brackett appeared for the asphalt company before the committee at that time and made a statement respecting the ability of the company to carry out the contract, .for which a bid had been presented. On the same evening the committee reported in favor of accepting the bid of Mr. McGovern, and this report was adopted by the common council, which body awarded the contract to Mr. McGovern, although his bid was somewhat higher than that of the Barber Asphalt Company.
The prosecutor sued out a writ of certiorari to bring up this action of the common council, and in the Supreme Court alleged as reasons for the vacation of such action-—first, that the contract should have been awarded to the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, as the lowest bidder, and second, that it should not have been awarded to W. E. McGovern because of his failure to conform to the conditions imposed upon those who were to submit bids for the work.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the action of the committee and common council in refusing to award the con
We also agree with the Supreme Court that it is too late for that company to complain that no hearing before the common council was afforded to it. Mr. Brackett appeared before the street committee, sitting as a representative of common council, and no objection was raised by him that he was not being heard by the full council.
The remaining question is whether the contract was properly awarded to Mr. McGovern, the only other bidder. The substantial objection against the award to him'is that he did not conform to the conditions imposed upon all the bidders.
The twenty-sixth requirement of these conditions reads: “No bid shall be considered unless samples of the materials to be used, and a sample of the wearing surface, have been deposited with the city engineer, and a receipt given therefor at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for the opening of the bids.” Again, condition No. 37 ends thus: “N. B. —Bidders will carefully study specifications and form before submitting proposal and will not forget to deliver samples required, at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for opening bids.”
The insistence upon the deposit of these samples with the engineer indicates the importance attached to their presence.
One purpose of the deposit of these samples was obviously to enable the engineer to ascertain whether they conformed to the description contained in the proposal; but another purpose was that they should remain as standards by which all materials furnished in executing the work could be compared.
The Supreme Court did not find, as a fact, that Mr. Me-
Mr. McGovern’s declaration in supposed conformity with this requirement is this: “Obispo asphalt, mined in California. Streets laid after five years with obispo, and are in good condition. Also Union street, Kent and Monroe streets in this city.” Now, it is difficult to see how the term “Obispo” describes the properties of the asphalt for the purpose of street paving. But there is no statement at all of the proportions of the several ingredients in the wearing surface of each street pavement that were given as references.
These omissions seem to be more than mere irregularities which the municipal authorities might waive. In consideration of the present situation, we are not to confine our view to this case and consider whether the contract with Mr. McGovern is a reasonable one, or as advantageous to the city as any contract which it will be likely to secure. We must consider the public policy which underlies the requirements of competitive bidding. The purpose of the statute requiring competitive bidding is that each bidder, actual or possible, shall be put upon the same footing. The municipal authori
Nor is the reason for enforcing this rule any the weaker because McGovern remained the only bidder after the exclusion of the Barber Asphalt Paving Company.
The ground for enforcing the rule is because no other persons were invited to bid upon the terms upon which the contract was awarded to McGovern.
The presence of the condition may have deterred others from bidding who would have bid had they known that these conditions would be waived.
Because Mr. McGovern failed to conform to substantial conditions under which all proposals were to be presented, we are of the opinion that the resolution awarding the contract to him- should be vacated, and the judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, so far as it affirms the said resolution.
For affirmance—None.
For reversal—The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Reed, Trenci-iard, Parker, Bergen, Voorhees, Minturn, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Vroom, Gray, Dill, J.J. 13.