Following a jury trial, Ezequiel Casanova was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Casanova appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his trafficking conviction. 1 He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. On appeal from his criminal conviction, Casanova no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See
Williams v. State,
So viewed, the evidence shows that following his arrest for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana, Grady Manus agreed to work with law enforcement to apprehend his supplier. Manus contacted the supplier • — • “Beto” — and asked him to bring a pound of methamphetamine to a hotel room that was monitored by police. Casanova arrived with Beto, who was carrying a plastic bag. When the men gave Manus the methamphetamine, Manus signaled the police, and officers entered the hotel room.
Police officers discovered 442 grams of methamphetamine inside the plastic bag. Several detectives then questioned Casanova about his involvement in the drug transaction. Casanova told police that he had obtained the methamphetamine from his supplier, whom he identified as a “taxi driver,” and planned to pay the supplier $9,000 after the drug deal concluded.
When Beto and Casanova were transported together to jail, officers tape-recorded their conversation in the back of the patrol car. Casanova told Beto that he had given the police information on his supplier, and Beto replied that they were in “deep” trouble. Casanova *555 also stated that although he had “thought about bringing” his gun, he luckily had left it in his truck. The police subsequently found the gun inside Casanova’s vehicle.
“Any person who knowingly sells, delivers, or brings into this state or has possession of 28 grams or more of methamphetamine ... or any mixture containing . . . methamphetamine . . . commits the felony offense of trafficking in methamphetamine. . . .” OCGA § 16-13-31 (e). On appeal, Casanova argues that because he was merely present at the scene, his conduct does not fall within this statute. We disagree.
Casanova admitted to police that he obtained the methamphetamine from his supplier, evidencing his participation in the drug deal. We recognize that under Georgia law, “[a] confession alone, uncorroboratedby any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.” OCGA § 24-3-53. The corroborating evidence, however, need not definitely connect the defendant to the crime. See
Morris v. State,
Sufficient corroboration exists here. For example, Manus testified that Casanova appeared to be involved in the deal. The State also offered testimony that a person would not simply “tag along” to a drug transaction involving over 400 grams of methamphetamine. Furthermore, one of the detectives who interviewed Casanova testified that, through his work in prior narcotics investigations, he knew of the “taxi driver” supplier described by Casanova.
Such evidence corroborated Casanova’s statements to police, demonstrated his involvement in the transaction, and supported the conclusion that he and Beto possessed and delivered the methamphetamine to Manus. See
Morris,
supra,
2. In a related enumeration of error, Casanova argues that the trial court erred in admitting his uncorroborated statements to police. As found in Division 1, however, the State presented sufficient corroborating evidence, which establishes that this claim of error is without merit.
3. Finally, Casanova asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the gun found in his truck. According to Casanova, this evidence was irrelevant and impugned his character. Again, we disagree.
“The admission of evidence objected to as irrelevant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”
Fields v. State,
Under these circumstances, the evidence was relevant, and the trial court properly found it to be more probative than prejudicial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gun-related evidence. See
Hinton v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged Casanova’s conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute into the conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine.
